

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STUDY OF HISTORY*

R. M. SAUNDERS

WE have all read accounts of those unfortunate persons who through some terrible concussion have found themselves face to face with a complete loss of memory. Plaintively they ask, "Who am I?" "Where am I?" "Where do I come from?" and countless other pathetic questions, trying always to establish their identity, to get back into their place in society, to feel secure, somehow to belong. If they succeed, well and good; if not, they must begin anew, building another identity, making connections with people, growing roots in society until after a long and painful process they once more can think of themselves as persons with a known identity, as beings among fellow beings, with relationships and connections that have been slowly created over the years, and which can be remembered. They have, in other words, acquired a personal history which enables them to place themselves in the world.

In reading of such tragic cases we might well ask what it would be like to be living in a land where all the people, ourselves included, were suffering from amnesia, the result, perhaps, of some incalculable atomic explosion, or of a hitherto unknown disease? Who then could answer the queries, "Who are we?" "Where do we come from?" "What are we doing here?" What an enticement to some aggressive nation, avid for power, this situation would be. How easy to impose upon the anxious, frustrated people the welcome bonds of slavery, with its security and certainty. Incredible, ridiculous, it may be said. Possibly. Yet we may not have been too far from something of this sort these latter years. However, let us leave the imaginary, and come to reality. What, in fact, have we been considering if not a people that has lost its sense of identity, of being. Why? Because of their loss of memory. Now a people, no more than an individual, can *be*, can exist, without memory. If they live they can at best be but animals, stripped of all social and human aspect. But a people's memory, like an individual's, is history. We are, then, thinking of a people without history.

It is significant that in order to think of a people without history it has been necessary to dream up an imaginary cataclysm. In the ordinary course of events peoples without history do not exist. As we

*Lecture given in a series on "The Philosophy of History" in the University of Toronto, November, 1955.

look around the world, or back into the record of man, we find no people without a sense of history, from the most primitive to the most civilized. To the primitive tribe history may be oral tradition, legend and myth, but it informs the tribe that holds it with a sense of being, as surely as the most cultivated history does the most civilized societies of men. The very universality of the sense of history wherever we encounter human society makes it reasonable to conclude that man in society and some sort of historical-mindedness are inseparable. Indeed, it looks as though man could not exist in society without history, for history provides at least partial answers to those essential questions, "Who are we?" "Where do we come from?" "What are we doing here?" Without answers to these questions there can be no cohesion, no organization, no purpose in society. If this be so then the first use of history is to provide any society with a sense of unity and being, lacking which it would die.

Historically this is the oldest and most persistent of the uses of history. Lest anyone should object that the function I am allotting to history is in truth the role of religion—an objection to which I could take no exception—let me hasten to say that throughout most of recorded time history and religion have been so fused together as to be one entity. If anyone doubts this he should examine the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the *Aeneid* and the *Old Testament*. To the inhabitants of the Greek city-state, of the Roman Republic, of ancient Israel, there was no doubt as to the inseparability of history and religion. If faced with the question of how to think of the two independently of each other they would have been baffled to know what to reply. With few exceptions—Thucydides was one—it is only secular-minded moderns who have tried to see the past in terms of history and religion apart. Even contemporary secularists have, however, had the tables turned on them by man's emotional needs, for deprived of their traditional divine origins—in large part, it should be pointed out, through the researches of historians—peoples have turned to substitutes. The gods of old have been displaced but in their places sit the founding fathers and the national heroes. Woe betide an unwary historian who toys with the reputation of a man or woman who has been crowned as a national saint. He will be told that it is the historian's business to build up the nation, not to weaken it in the minds of the people; that history should teach its students how the nation came to be, why it has a right to exist, who are its heroes, and what are its institutions; in a word that history's first function is to produce good citizens of the national state. With all this we are familiar, and in contemplating it we are not at all

sure that religion and history have actually been torn apart. Have we really moved so far away from Athens and Sparta and Rome? Are there not modern states where many a lesser Socrates has had to drink the hemlock for corrupting the youth with wrong ideas? Would the department of education of any existing national state—or the great majority of the people either—have any trouble in recognizing that the first use of history is to provide the nation with a sense of unity and being and purpose? No—history in this respect stands where it has always stood since men were self-conscious enough to know that they had ancestors.

That this use of history—to provide society with a sense of unity and being—will continue to be regarded as basic by most people may, I think, be taken for granted. Is it not imbedded in human nature, in the requirements of society? It has in the past been applied to many social and political groups: family and clan, city-state and empire, feudal kingdom, and now, national state. There are efforts being made in our day to have history serve international organization in a similar way; and the time may well come when it is asked to aid in the building of a world-state. History, in other words, has been, and can be utilized as a cohesive force in any type of society or state; indeed, it must be, for if history does not play its part it is doubtful if any of these organizations can come into being or last. The role of history in the creation of modern nations during the past two hundred years is emphatic evidence on this point. If there is ever to be any welding together of the peoples of the world within some framework that surpasses the nations, if there is to be one humanity in one world, it will only come effectively when through a study of the history of all peoples men come to realize that over and beyond all the differences between peoples there are, and always have been, the likenesses, the common human characteristics and experiences that make all people men, that set off humanity from the rest of creation.

At this point, however, we are sharply reminded that, whereas history, as the guardian of social memory and tradition, may play a necessary part in building nations and holding peoples together, it can as easily be a source of division between different nations, between social classes or rival political parties inside one nation. We have but to turn the pages of French or German, Czech or Polish, Turk or Greek, and how many other national histories, to find them dotted with historic memories designed to heat the blood of one against the other. The man on the street, I suppose, would, if asked, say that the Iron Curtain is something entirely new. But

anyone mindful of the human record knows that curtains and screens and films of bias, prejudice, and fear have always existed. The present example is only an immediately urgent instance of an age-old human phenomenon. The very effective curtain that hung between Islam and the Christian West for more than a millenium, and which in large part still divides them, is a classic sample of the type. Indeed, it was only two years ago, when a greater fear than that of each other had rent that curtain sufficiently, that religious leaders of the Christian West and of the Moslem world could come to sit down together and try to discover what they might have in common. With the erection and preservation of such barriers between men historians have had their full share. It is obviously true that they have made history an instrument for the building of states and nations. But at other times, it is equally true that the historians' cultivation of harsh memories has helped to tear their own peoples apart, to plunge a nation into the horrors of revolution and civil war, and into conflict with other powers. At all times it has been only too easy for history to be used in this way, for if history as a cohesive force feeds the essential human needs of a sense of identity and unity, so history as a divisive force feeds the ugly but deeply entrenched human frailties of pride, fear, envy, hatred, and greed. To the lover of peace and reason this may seem a sad state of affairs, an abuse rather than a right use of history. Still, it is well to remember that history has been so used, is still so used, and, in view of the nature of the human emotions to which it appeals, is likely to be so used indefinitely!

Yet, if history may be made to pander to the baser feelings of man, it may also serve as a means to his betterment in other ways than through the development of social cohesion. No use of history has been more persistently upheld, none more popular, than the conviction that history ought to be a moulder of character. It is ingrained in the thinking of the Greeks and Romans. Herodotus and Thucydides, Plutarch and Polybius, Tacitus and Augustine, however else they differ, agree upon this purpose for the study and writing of history; and in so doing reflect a cherished opinion of their days. Down through the years—the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment—to our own day, with historians, teachers, and the general public this point of view has remained vigorously alive. Stoic and Epicurean, Christian and Humanist, rationalist and nationalist, have all been at one on this matter. Differences of religious or ethical views have not altered the feeling that history should be so used. Voltaire, the so-called

Father of Modern History, saw history as a means for raising up rationally and morally sound men, and the giving of moral warning by descriptions of bad actions, of benign example by portrayal of good deeds as a sure way to this end. In this, like his classical predecessors, he mirrored the temper of his time, and the prevailing view of contemporary historians. Were he alive today he would be gratified to discover that in present-day school systems the teaching of history customarily begins with exactly this emphasis, and that through each year of school to the gates of the university the student of history is made to feel the impact of history, the maker of good men and women. That this use is in modern states combined with or coloured by the desire to produce good citizens, makes no real difference: it means only that this is a contemporary variant of the ancient theme.

We must, however, remember that since the eighteenth century the idea of the betterment of man, whether through the study of history or by other means, has been radically altered by the emergence of the concept of secular progress. Once, in a world that would ever be much the same, the training of men to endure this life with Stoic dignity, or to pass through it with reasonable Epicurean enjoyment, was regarded as sufficient. Then succeeded the Christian idea of men making a pilgrimage through this world to salvation in another. When this gave way to man progressing in this world to some form of worldly Utopia, then history, in common with all other subjects of education, was called upon to contribute to man's perfection. History's rank amongst the progressive subjects was enormously enhanced in the nineteenth century when natural science, in the evolutionary hypothesis, confirmed the concept of the progressive development of man. In so doing science itself became historical in outlook; and the implantation of the genetic or historical point of view in men's thinking since the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* is one of the most profound alterations in modern thought. For history the change was basic. If evolution was accepted as true to the facts, as, of course, it has been, then man's development could be understood only in terms of history. No wonder that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became an age of history writing and teaching, that chairs of history were established in all universities, that history books poured from the presses.

But it has not been enough for the historian merely to unearth and to tell the story of human development. That this, as a first step, is essential is the conviction which stands behind the modern emphasis

upon the value of the study of history for the understanding of the present, of contemporary institutions and problems. This is a use of history with which few of our contemporaries would fail to concur. That it does not seem enough in itself, to many if not to most people, may be seen when we consider that the worth of understanding the present is almost always coupled in people's minds with the prospect of using this understanding to build a better future. The historian, then, is asked not only to trace the course of human progress in the past, and so to make it possible to comprehend the world and the society in which we live; he is also expected to ponder upon the ways in which progress takes place, and out of his contemplations to offer suggestions to men for their guidance in the future course of events. Here, then, are two of the most treasured uses of history in our generation—understanding of the present, guidance for the future.

If in recent years there has been some questioning of the value of the study of history, it has arisen chiefly because to some people history did not appear to be fulfilling satisfactorily the second of these functions: providing guidance for the future. When we ask what is meant by this accusation of failure we are told that historians do not derive from their researches and meditations any clear-cut conclusions upon which planned future action may be securely based. Historians may talk about possibilities and probabilities, forces and trends, but never about "laws" in the scientific sense. A feeling of indefiniteness and uncertainty pervades the strongest held conclusions of most historians since they insist upon keeping in the picture the possible occurrence of the unpredictable, the unexpected, be it the vagaries of the weather, or, far more likely, the unforeseeable actions of men. They contend that in any particular set of circumstances it will be impossible, however similar those circumstances may be to other known situations, to state with complete assurance just what decisions the men involved in this situation will make. Also, they will affirm that if you examine carefully each set of circumstances in detail, you will find that, whatever similarities there may be, no human situation exactly duplicates another. History, in other words, does not really repeat itself. The uniformities that mark the inanimate world and the animal kingdom do not retain their rigidity in the human sphere. At most they set up a framework within which man must operate. They therefore pose certain problems to man. In this sense they are deterministic. But all the efforts of geographic, economic, sociological, psychological, and biological determinists—among whom may be numbered certain

historians—have not satisfied the bulk of historians that their own reading of historical evidence is fundamentally at fault. Useful and suggestive the findings of the determinists certainly are, but most historians remain convinced that the introduction of man into the world scene brought at the same time an element of free decision and consequent uncertainty that makes it impossible for students of human history to speak and write in more final terms than likelihood and probability. If, then, the charge laid at the historian's door is that he fails to provide a precise blueprint for the future, the historian must and will accept it as valid. It can not be otherwise, according to the record as he sees it. To attempt to place humanity in any deterministic straitjacket, and so to place oneself in a position to discern and predict the future exactly, thereby to offer an infallible guide to future action, is intellectually possible, as most historians see it, only through closing one's eyes to large sections of the evidence. It is a distortion of history as it really was.

Yet, to study and to record history as it really was, that is, the story of the human past as it really was, bears the mark of the nineteenth century as surely as do the beliefs in progress and evolution. No doubt historians from the Greeks to the present have aspired to this ideal, but in the last century the rise of science and the application of scientific methods to social fields made this ideal seem far more possible of achievement than ever before. The names of Ranke, Buckle, and Taine amongst the historians, of Comte and Marx outside their ranks, have but to be mentioned to illustrate the point. Historians, becoming scientific, seeking to know the truth and nothing but the truth, would, it was believed, not only reveal definitively what man had done in the past, but would, with the stores of true historical knowledge they were accumulating, help to carry forth the progressive revolution in society to which all their fellow scientists in other fields were likewise expected to contribute. This second part of their work was, so far as the historians were concerned, sometimes openly, sometimes tacitly avowed, sometimes unconfessed. If there were doubters amongst them, and of course there were, they were exceptions, who could be overlooked, their doubts disregarded, as historians in general joined other thinkers in heralding the onward and upward march of man, which the knowledge of history would assist and guide.

Unfortunately, as man's past was explored in greater and greater detail, as archives burgeoned and library shelves groaned beneath the weight of historical tomes, the findings of the historians tended to becloud the simple picture of progress, however valiantly mem-

bers of the historical fraternity clung to its support. The record of history, viewed as impartially as was possible, indicated that human affairs were more complex, more varied, more fluid and uncertain than the progressivist idealists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries supposed. Men were full of emotions and passions, biases and prejudices, as well as reason and idealism. Progress and retrogression, reason and unreason, cruelty and altruism, creativity and destruction, have, it was discovered, lived together at all times. Historians, attempting scientifically to paint a full picture of the past, were making, in fact, a rediscovery of an ancient world that had been nearly forgotten, of a humankind much more like that known to ancient Stoic and mediaeval Christian than to the liberal progressives of the Victorian age. Then came the more recent investigations of psychology to support the darker findings of the historians; and the twentieth century, exploding with world war, revolution, and civil strife, sick with depression, anxiety, and fear, confirmed almost the worst anticipations of the forgotten doubters of progress of a century before. The revolution in society was not going the way the prophets of progress and enlightenment had foreseen. All the writings of the historians, all the works of the social scientists, had done nothing to prevent these catastrophes. Some persons began to repeat the cynical dictum that the only thing people learn from history is that people learn nothing from history. Instead of talking about the uses of history, they said, we should abandon the study of history as of no use at all.

Some, then, plunged into blackest pessimism and saw no value in the study of history. Others, however, and they were a far greater number, turned in their anxiety and bewilderment to history, to find, if possible, in the story of the human past some explanation for existing conditions. In so doing they were giving recognition anew to one of the most important uses of history, the understanding of the present by a study of the past. Many such students and readers discovered that our fathers and grandfathers in their enthusiasm for certain Utopian dreams overlooked much of the historical account, history as it really was; and so had helped to raise false hopes, and to pave the way for the kind of baffling disillusionment in which so many people now find themselves. They thus found one very cogent reason for the present state of affairs. As they read back through the story, and noted that other ages of anxiety, and other times of trial and suffering have existed, often for very similar reasons to our own, many found a sober comfort in the realization that man has been

through great crises before, and has survived. They were being given a new and truer perspective on themselves and their times. In this broadening and deepening of perspective they were being made aware of one of the greatest of all uses of history, the enabling of men to see themselves in the light of the historical record of humanity, thereby helping them to comprehend more fully their own possibilities and limitations. A sobering process this may be, especially to the contemporary student of history on this continent, conditioned as he is by the traditional progressive views amidst which he has been raised; yet, if he finds little reason in the pages of history to pin his faith on worldly Utopias, he does learn that men can be more than destroyers, more than blind creatures of passion, for the record shows them also to be seekers and finders of truth, creators of beauty, builders of civilization. This is a note of hope in these anxious days, the more so when we find that in the past much if not most of man's finest creation has emerged out of anxiety and suffering. History, then, in extending our experience of life may teach us a note of caution, but combined with it is equally a gleam of hope.

We come to realize, as we think about history, that in the pages of history we can, if we will, see human life in all its richness, its variety, and its colour. In the study of this subject we can broaden our experience, enrich our lives, deepen our understanding, sharpen our judgment, even find sympathy and tolerance for our fellow men, for if we look carefully we shall find in them, ourselves. We discover that the greatest, the over-arching use of history, is to give to men a vision of man.

What the student of history will do, if and when he catches sight of this vision of man that may be found in the pages of history, what use he will make of his knowledge, is a decision that has to be made by each individual. He may, if he will, sell his knowledge, or use it to exploit his fellowmen. He may find in it a perennial source of pleasure, a satisfaction of curiosity and an aesthetic delight that will last him all his life long. He may be inspired to extend our knowledge and understanding still further, to become a worker himself in the field of history. He may be led to use his knowledge to work for a better understanding amongst the peoples of the world, or to bring about reform and betterment in the society of which he is a member. He may even find himself impelled through the study of history to a deeper worship of God.

Whatever decision is made it will in the last analysis be founded on the student's personal philosophy and religion. Now the study

of history does not impose belief in any particular philosophy or religion, for history is no more deterministic than human life itself. None the less, there is a point where, if a student of history press his enquiries that far, he must enter upon a consideration of questions of a philosophic and religious import. He asks himself, for instance—and this is the point at which history and philosophy merge—what is the meaning of these facts of history that I am studying? Most, perhaps all, the answers given will find their source in the philosophy or religion which the student brings to the study of history, but they must, even so, be given in the light of the new knowledge of man that comes through that same study. Because of this, although the study of history does not automatically force a person to hold any one set of beliefs, few students can go very far in this study without either finding in history an illustration of their own beliefs, or being led to a revaluation and clarification of their philosophy of life. The study of history, in other words, has its own part in the formulation of that philosophy on the basis of which the student will finally decide what use he will make of his knowledge of history.

To know history, then, is not only to know man better, it is to know oneself better, one's relations to mankind as a whole, one's own outlook on life. The knowledge of history is one doorway to wisdom.

IMPERIAL PROTECTION FOR THE TRADING INTERESTS OF THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, 1857-1861*

ALVIN C. GLUEK, JR.

IT has often been said that the Hudson's Bay Company preserved the British character of Rupert's Land and thus assured Canada's later expansion into the Northwest; but it might also be said that Great Britain preserved—although unwittingly—Rupert's Land for the commercial interests of the Company. Certainly the truth of the latter statement was shown in 1857 when the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment was dispatched to Fort Garry.

No cogent reason has ever been given to account for the stationing of the Rifles in Rupert's Land from 1857 to 1861. The usual explanation offered is that Her Majesty's Government intended them "to serve as a counterpoise to the growing influence of the United States."¹ But this was the language of the Hudson's Bay Company itself, the persuasive phrasing that it used to convince the Crown of the need for imperial protection.²

In reality, the company was threatened by the apparently irre-

*The author would like to thank the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company for permission to use the H.B.C. Archives on microfilm in the Public Archives of Canada.

¹The visible evidence of American influence was the appearance of cavalry on the border in the fall of 1856.

"American troops marched to the vicinity of the border and issued a warning to British subjects against hunting on the American side; the Hudson's Bay Company took alarm, and demanded imperial protection; and again British troops were despatched to Fort Garry." C. P. Stacey, "The Hudson's Bay Company and Anglo-American Military Rivalries during the Oregon Dispute," *Canadian Historical Review*, XVIII, 297. And yet cf. p. 297, n. 73: "By this period, Canadian as well as American agitation at Red River was alarming the company, nor did it conceal its desire for military aid to the civil power."

"The matter [the American manoeuvres] was at once reported by the Hudson's Bay Company to the Imperial Government, with the request for a small military force to be stationed at the Red River Settlement, 'to serve as a counterpoise to the growing influence of the United States in the North-West Territory'. . . . It was understood that the troops were stationed there for imperial purposes, and that they were not at the disposal of the Company to hold down the half-breeds." A. S. Morton, *A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71* (Toronto, n.d.), 828-9.

Cf. L. B. Irwin, "Pacific Railways and Nationalism in the Canadian-American Northwest" (doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1939), 41; A. H. Mochlman, ed., "Journal of J. H. Bond," *North Dakota Historical Quarterly*, VI, 232, n. 4.

²Extract of Sir George Simpson, Governor of Rupert's Land, to the Secretary of the Company, Lachine, Oct. 20, 1856, enclosed in John Shepherd, Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, to Lord Clarendon, London, Nov. 4, 1856, Military Series C, vol. 364, Public Archives of Canada.

sistible expansion of free trade in the Red River District and the accompanying deterioration of its authority throughout Rupert's Land. With but few exceptions, the free traders were British subjects, many of whom were underwritten by Americans below the line; and most of the free traders sold their illicit wares in the United States. But if the Americans were acquiring a "growing influence" over Rupert's Land, it was commercial in nature—not military or expansionist. In the middle fifties, the United States was not strengthening its frontier posts either to subvert or to check British influence; and by that decade, the spirit of Manifest Destiny in the North—if not the South—was dormant. Always a keen observer of the American scene, the Company knew full well that it had to fear only the commercial influence of the United States. It hoped that the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment would arrest the growing strength of the free traders and sustain its government in Rupert's Land.

I

With the establishment of an American fur trading post at Pembina in 1844, the Red River Settlement became the centre of the free trade movement in Rupert's Land. Before that fateful event, the Hudson's Bay Company had not been overly concerned with the problem of free trade. It knew, of course, that there was "some illicit trade between the neighbouring Indians and the settlers" and that—in all probability—furs were "occasionally conveyed" to the United States.³ But when Norman W. Kittson erected his post at Pembina, as if by sleight of hand, he brought the American market to within a day's ride of the Red River Settlement.⁴ Despite the Company's efforts to suppress it, the free trade movement quickly matured; and along with it, there arose a spirit of independence among the people of Rupert's Land. It was soon apparent to Sir George Simpson that only the establishment of a military force at Fort Garry could "permanently reconcile the enforcing of our rights with the preserving of the public tranquility."⁵

Fortune favoured the pleas of the Company for troops. In 1846, its officers were able to persuade Whitehall, already distressed by

³Sir George Simpson to the Governor and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, Red River Settlement, June 21, 1843, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives.

⁴Within a year, Kittson had "the promises and good wishes of most of the hunters" and had made arrangements with "the only persons in the Settlement who make any collection of furs." Kittson to Henry H. Sibley, Pembina, Sept. 10, 1845, Sibley Papers, Minnesota Historical Society.

⁵Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Red River Settlement, June 20, 1845, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives.

the Oregon crisis, that a chance movement of American dragoons below the border⁶ and the activities of American and native free traders within Rupert's Land were evidences of Manifest Destiny.⁷ A part of the 6th Royal Foot was sent to Fort Garry for a two-year tour of duty and "had the effect of tranquilizing the [Red River] Settlement and checking that disposition which had begun to manifest itself for illicit trade in furs."⁸

But when the regulars had departed and were replaced by a small corps of bibulous, undisciplined pensioners, the Company's sustaining strength—and its trading monopoly—vanished.⁹ For the pensioners could not preserve order. In 1849, a court of law in the settlement was forced by the threat of mob violence to liberate a self-confessed free trader. Thereafter, the Company ruled "rather by sufferance than by authority";¹⁰ and its traders had to "trust alone to . . . [their] superior means in the way of trade to secure even a portion of the furs hunted in the disturbed parts of the country."¹¹

In the succeeding decade, the volume of free trade expanded as the American market became more accessible. A transportation revolution had taken place below the 49th parallel; and by the middle fifties, it was easier—and would presently be cheaper—to ship goods by rail and steam from the eastern seaboard to St. Paul, Minnesota, than to carry them by the all-water route from England to York Factory. Moreover, the overland trails from St. Paul soon demonstrated their superiority to the troublesome and costly river-and-portage path from York Factory. The improved transportation system greatly benefited the independent merchant of Rupert's Land.¹² By

⁶Captain E. V. Sumner, Report of maneuvers near Pembina, 1845, *Senate Document No. 1*, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 470.

⁷Governor John H. Pelly to William E. Gladstone, London, April 24, 1846; Pelly's letter and memorandum to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, April 22, 1846: Series A. 8, H.B.C. Archives.

⁸Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Norway House, July 1, 1847, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

⁹Although the pensioners were few in number and not employed during the disturbance accompanying the Sayer trial in June, 1849, it is extremely doubtful whether a greater number of these mercenaries, mustered out, could have sustained order. The H.B.C. Archives are filled with adverse comments regarding the pensioners, who may be likened to the DeMeurons of Selkirk's day. Simpson referred to them as disorderly and intemperate, drunken and worthless. Simpson to the Governor and Committee, en route, Winnipeg River, July 5, 1850, and Fort Garry, July 2, 1853, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives. Eden Colville wrote the secretary on February 7, 1851, stating that nothing had occurred in the Red River Settlement to disturb the tranquillity save the usual number of black eyes among the pensioners during the Christmas holidays. *Ibid.*

¹⁰Governor William B. Caldwell to the Governor and Committee, Upper Fort Garry, Jan. 26, 1850, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

¹¹Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Norway House, June 30, 1849, *ibid.*

¹²The transportation costs of the first H.B.C. shipments to the Red River Settle-

1856, there were over fifty shops in the Red River Settlement¹³ and "American goods of some kinds . . . [were] becoming as common in the Settlement as those imported from England."¹⁴

Competition from the free traders was severe and the Company tried to meet it by matching their rivals' inventories and by continuing to offer high prices for furs that were brought into the Red River District. Neither course of action succeeded. Instead, the Company's position in the trade was placed in greater jeopardy. Furs were drained from all the neighbouring districts, the indent for Red River rocketed from £8,000 (in 1855) to £22,000 (in 1857),¹⁵ and the York Factory route was presently unable to supply enough trading goods for the crucial district.¹⁶

The free trade movement swept throughout Rupert's Land and left in its train, exasperated and impotent, the "Lords and Owners of the soil." The cash that American traders offered for furs was both irresistible and demoralizing. More and more settlers were drawn "from their ordinary pursuits to the less laborious but more profitable occupation of hunting and trading."¹⁷ Indeed, the glitter of American gold began to undermine the loyalty of some of the Company's own servants; while others, made increasingly aware of their master's declining powers, grew disrespectful and insubordinate.¹⁸

Prohibitory duties levied upon imported American goods would

ment, via the United States, averaged £6.2.6 per ton; while shipments via York Factory averaged £7.7 per ton. The Secretary to William Mactavish, London, Aug. 19, 1859, Series A. 6, *ibid.*

Cf. James W. Taylor to S. P. Chase, St. Paul, Nov. 15 and 16, 1860, Letters and reports from James W. Taylor, Special Agent of the Treasury, to the Secretary of the Treasury, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

¹³Henry Y. Hind, *Report of the Exploration of the Country between Lake Superior and the Red River Settlement* (Toronto, 1858), 342.

¹⁴F. G. Johnson to the Secretary, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, June [1], 1856, Series A. 11, H.B.C. Archives. Johnson was the Governor of Assiniboia. He estimated that the goods imported from the United States would "soon exceed in value the whole of the Company's to Red River by way of York Factory."

Even champagne was brought up from St. Paul, much to the annoyance of the Company's servant in charge of the Red River District. John Swanston to the Secretary, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, Oct. 6, 1856, *ibid.*

¹⁵The Governor and Committee to Simpson, London, April 9, 1855, Series A. 6, *ibid.* The Secretary to F. G. Johnson, London, Nov. 13, 1857, *ibid.*

¹⁶Simpson to the Secretary, Lachine, March 8, 1858, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

¹⁷Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Norway House, June 2, 1853, *ibid.*

¹⁸John Ballenden to Simpson, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, Jan. 12, 1855, Series A. 11, *ibid.*

Even the wives of Company servants had to be kept under surveillance. Too many of them were disclosing too many trade secrets to their free-trading fathers-in-law. Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, July 2, 1853, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

have severed the supply lines of the free traders; the arbitrary seizure of their furs in the interior would have halted their progress into other trading districts—but the Company dared take neither step, for it lacked the military strength necessary to support its civil powers. Indeed, although the existing import duties were slight and their collection entrusted to a half-breed popular with his countrymen, the free traders would still not pay them.¹⁹ Furthermore, the half-breeds, united by a “common feeling of nationality” and conscious of their strength of numbers, would never tolerate any seizures.

On August 2, 1856, Sir George Simpson described to Governor John Shepherd the deplorable state of affairs in the Red River Settlement:

... we are in a very critical position, the authorities being overawed by the numerical strength of the Halfbreed race; so that, at any moment, an unpopular measure or accidental collision might lead to a general rising against the Company and the destruction of their establishments. In the meantime, by tact and forbearance, we contrive to maintain peace and are making large returns,—a state of things which may continue one, two or more years, although at all times liable to be suddenly interrupted. I know of but one remedy for this evil,—the introduction of a military force in support of the Company's authority, but I fear it is hopeless to look to the Government for assistance in that form, and even if such a force were sent to the country to preserve order, I am doubtful that the British Parliament and people would sanction its employment in the maintenance of the exclusive privileges of a trading monopoly.²⁰

Both he and Shepherd considered selling the Company's charter to the Crown and trying to best their competitors “in the legitimate way of trade.” However, a sale would be the last resort. For the moment, another course of action seemed more appropriate: “First, to petition H.M. Government for a renewal of the Company's trading privileges and for the aid of a military force to support them; & secondly, if that application be not favorably entertained, to open a negociation for the surrender of the Charter, the maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the Indian tribes in the Territory being impossible without the protection prayed for.”²¹

But fate upset their plans and the application for the renewal of the trading licence was not combined with that for troops. Instead,

¹⁹Johnson to the Secretary, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, June [1], 1856, Series A. 11, *ibid.*

²⁰“Confidential,” Lachine, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

²¹Simpson to Shepherd, “Confidential,” Lachine, Sept. 27, 1856, Series A. 12, *ibid.* The licence to trade in the Northwest Territories, the region lying without Rupert's Land and west of the Rockies, would expire in 1859.

the Company made a separate request for a garrison. For, once again, the United States provided a colourable pretext for military aid when a body of American cavalry conducted late-summer manoeuvres on the Northern Plains.

II

In early October, 1856, John Swanston, the Hudson's Bay officer in charge of the Red River District, notified the London office that American troops had visited the borderlands but a month before.²² The American commandant had made his presence known by forwarding a notice to Swanston that forbade the half-breeds from running the buffalo on the Dakota plains. But the exact reason for the manoeuvres was not revealed to the trader, although he suspected that "it was for the purpose of examining the localities for the erection at no distant period, of a permanent garrison either at Graham's Point, the headwaters of this river, or at Pembina."²³

In either case, Swanston was not alarmed and the Red River Settlement remained "in peace and quietness." The notice was published throughout the colony with Simpson's approval. Indeed, "as

²²Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, Oct. 6, 1856, Series A. 11, *ibid.*

²³The American force consisted of two companies under the command of Colonel C. F. Smith. He was instructed to observe the topography of the lower Red River Valley so that he could inform the War Department of the proper site for a military post in the area. Moreover, he was to impress the Sioux with the strength of his arms, counselling them to remain at peace and to demand that an end be made to the depredations recently inflicted upon Americans in the vicinity. And finally, he was to visit the British half-breeds at Devils Lake and warn them off the American plains. His mission was only partly successful. He carefully surveyed the sites for a post, but he failed to meet either the Sioux or the half-breeds. Therefore, he circulated notices that the United States had ordered the latter off the plains. *Senate Executive Document No. 1, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 975.*

Colonel Smith's manoeuvres were occasioned by a chronic border problem. For decades, the half-breeds had chased the buffalo of the Northern Great Plains. Twice each year, they assembled on American soil and fashioned from their numbers an efficient hunting machine that slew nearly twenty thousand buffalo during the 1856 season alone.

Moreover, their disciplined organization served as a defensive measure against the American Sioux, who also ran the buffalo on the Dakota plains. The economic competition between them fostered an enmity that frequently ended in bloodshed. Since the 1820's, American Indian agents had deplored the half-breed invasions and their unsettling effects upon the frontier. American traders, too, resented these invaders who annually carried back an increasing number of buffalo robes over the 49th parallel. Thus, protests reached Washington, D.C., telling of the incursions and seeking military expeditions and posts to end them.

The official response to these pleas resulted in border manoeuvres by troops whose commanders sought, time and again, to warn the métis off the American plains. But their efforts were forever fruitless, for the half-breeds believed that they possessed a "dual citizenship" and continued to cross the international line as long as the buffalo remained.

regards the Company's commercial interests," the latter was "in hopes [that] the establishment of a garrison at Pembina . . . [might] prove beneficial rather than otherwise, from the apparent determination of the U/S Government to enforce the revenue laws along the frontier; the first act of Colonel Smith . . . having been to issue a notice prohibiting the inhabitants of the British possessions from hunting & trapping within the United States territory."²⁴ Moreover, Simpson already knew that the primary reason for establishment of an American garrison at Pembina would be to protect American citizens from the Sioux.²⁵ But all this knowledge was carefully hidden from Her Majesty's Government.

The fortuitous appearance of the American cavalry provided the Hudson's Bay Company with the example of Manifest Destiny that it needed. With extracts from Simpson's report of the manoeuvres²⁶—trimmed to omit any mention of the possible advantages that an American garrison at Pembina would bestow upon the Company—Governor Shepherd wrote Lord Clarendon of the Foreign Office:²⁷

. . . that the Govt. of the United States have formed a military garrison of considerable force at Pembina . . . and from other sources of information we are induced to believe that it is their intention to establish a line of fortified posts along their frontier.²⁸

²⁴Simpson to the Secretary of the Company, Lachine, Oct. 20, 1856, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives.

²⁵Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, June 29, 1855, *ibid.*

In the cursory debate in Congress upon the bill to appropriate funds to establish a fort at Pembina, Henry Rice, the sponsor and territorial delegate from Minnesota Territory, stated: "All that we ask now is a small force there; a sort of depot for arms and ammunition, which would enable the citizens to protect themselves." He added that the force would also aid the customs collector in his struggle against British subjects from Rupert's Land who violated American revenue laws. *Congressional Globe*, Jan. 29, 1855, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 454.

In his annual report for 1856, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis remarked that Colonel's Smith expedition had been sent "for the purpose of acquiring information respecting that region . . . and the Indians residing there, upon whom it was supposed the appearance of a body of troops would exercise, a beneficial influence." Moreover, the knowledge gained from the manoeuvres would determine an eligible site for a military post "should it hereafter be deemed advisable to establish one." *House Exec. Doc. No. 1*, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., Serial 894.

²⁶Extract of Simpson's letter to the Secretary, Lachine, Oct. 20, 1856, enclosed in Shepherd to Lord Clarendon, London, Nov. 4, 1856, Military Series C, volume 364, P.A.C. Cf. Simpson's original letter, *supra*.

²⁷London, Nov. 4, 1856, Military Series C, vol. 364, P.A.C.

²⁸No fort was erected at Pembina in 1856, nor for several years thereafter. For some reason—perhaps to please real estate speculators—the fort that should have gone up at Pembina was built at Graham's Point, about 250 miles up river. Moreover, an examination of the annual reports of the Secretary of War for the years 1854–7 revealed no plan or intention by the United States to establish "a line of

Whatever may be the real object of this movement . . . we are of [the] opinion that the effect of it will be to intimidate the natives and inhabitants within the British territory, and to weaken their confidence in our means of protecting them.²⁹

Therefore, he urged that the "wing" of a regiment be dispatched to Fort Garry—and closed this amazing letter with a rare blending of candour and deception: "We do not desire to conceal from your Lordship that . . . the presence of such force . . . will also be advantageous to the interests of the Hudson's Bay Company by affording support to the Civil Power, and inspiring their servants and people with feelings of confidence and security." Clarendon forwarded the letter to the Colonial Secretary, Henry Labouchere, and sought his opinion of the matter.

Shepherd also wrote Labouchere and found in him a more receptive audience.³⁰ The Secretary immediately urged Lord Panmure of the War Office to honour the request for troops.³¹ But the latter was not anxious to send a force to "so isolated a position" without further information about the intentions of the United States from both Simpson and Sir William Eyre, the Lieutenant General Commanding in Canada.³²

Both responses from Canada supported the Company's request for troops. In accordance with Shepherd's suggestion, Simpson designed a letter to the Hudson's Bay Company, "embodying such arguments as appear[ed] to me [Simpson] best calculated to operate most favorably on the mind of Lord Panmure."³³ The result was a masterpiece of deceptive prose which may be summarized as follows: According to "reliable" information, the United States would establish a permanent garrison at Pembina in the following summer in order to protect the frontier settlement and to gain influence over the British, "both Whites and Indians." The British subjects—three-

fortified posts along their frontier." In 1857, the Secretary of War called for an increase in the army in order to man additional posts and cavalry establishments along the frontier of settlement, but not along the 49th parallel. *House Exec. Doc. No. 2, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 943.*

²⁹In the Annual Indian Report (1854), W. A. Gorman of the Minnesota Superintendency pleaded for a post at Pembina for the protection of the inhabitants from the Sioux. Furthermore, he averred that a garrison there would attract "most of the British métis, who would 'renounce their allegiance to the British crown, if they were assured of their safety from the Sioux.'" *Senate Exec. Doc. No. 1, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 746.*

³⁰London, Nov. 27, 1856, Military Series C, vol. 364, P.A.C.

³¹Elliot to Peel, London, Nov. 27, 1856, *ibid.*

³²Mundy to Elliot, War Department, Dec. 12, 1856, and Grey to Eyre, War Department, Dec. 12, 1856, *ibid.*

³³Simpson to Shepherd, "Private," Lachine, Jan. 9, 1857, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives.

quarters of the population of Rupert's Land were half-breeds—were uncivilized people and extremely difficult for the Company's civil authorities to manage without military aid. Since the removal of the 6th Royal Foot, their loyalty to the Crown had diminished and their attachment to the United States had grown more profound. To maintain the peace, counterbalance the American influence, and forestall "any covert designs entertained by the United States," the Company needed a garrison of about 400 troops at Fort Garry.³⁴

General Eyre's report to the War Office endorsed Simpson's arguments.³⁵ On the very afternoon that Simpson had composed the above letter, he spent several hours discussing it, paragraph by paragraph, with the General.³⁶ Observing that Eyre disliked sending troops to such an isolated command, Sir George had cleverly allayed his fears with the assurance that war with the United States was unlikely. And even if it should come about, Simpson doubted that Americans could transport heavy guns across the plains from Fort Snelling. But if the Americans should invade Rupert's Land, the troops could fall back upon Norway House, where, with adequate supplies and reinforced by the Company's servants and their Indian allies, "they would be all-powerful against any invading force." Simpson easily won his case; General Eyre recommended that a detachment of the Royal Canadian Rifles be sent to Fort Garry.³⁷

In the latter part of January, 1857, Simpson provided Governor Shepherd with a secondary argument for imperial protection. Just before sailing for England,³⁸ he learned that a Canadian party had left Toronto for Rupert's Land "on a tour [of] agitation against the Company."³⁹ Armed with this new information, Shepherd informed the Colonial Office that a Canadian party had gone to the Northwest "for the purpose of creating disturbance and discontent, and stirring up the people of that Settlement in opposition to the Civil Authorities."⁴⁰ Moreover, they intended—undoubtedly in concert with

³⁴Jan. 6, 1857, *ibid.*

³⁵Eyre to the Secretary of State for War, Montreal, Jan. 12, 1857, Military Series C, vol. 1283, P.A.C.

³⁶Simpson to Shepherd, "Private," Lachine, Jan. 9, 1857, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives.

³⁷Eyre, however, made one very disturbing suggestion: that he go in person to Fort Garry. Simpson shuddered at the idea, knowing that "several objections would in the course of the Journey occur to his mind unfavorable to our views and wishes." Simpson to Shepherd, "Private," Lachine, Jan. 10, 1857, *ibid.*

³⁸He was to appear as a witness for the Company before the Select Committee of the House of Commons investigating the Hudson's Bay Company. But undoubtedly another reason for the journey was to confer with Shepherd about the question of troops for Fort Garry.

³⁹Simpson to the Secretary, Lachine, Jan. 26, 1857, Series A. 12, H.B.C. Archives.

⁴⁰Shepherd to Labouchere, London, March 16, 1857, Series A. 8, *ibid.*

Americans⁴¹—to renew a trading rivalry whose only results would be the excitement of the métis and the Indians; “and thus the whole country . . . [would] become involved in conflagration and bloodshed.”

With masterful strokes, Shepherd had painted an extravagant picture of Yankee expansionists and Canadian agitators. But incredible though it was, the canvas looked genuine to Whitehall, and the troops were ordered to Fort Garry. It was an extraordinary success for the Company and was achieved despite many obstacles. Nearly one-half of the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment was detached from service in Canada, although the loss militarily weakened Canada.⁴² At the very moment that Canada was trying to annex Rupert's Land, the Company had secured Canadian troops to protect the region from Canadian traders. Moreover, it was cheap protection. The Company agreed to pay for transporting the troops to—but not from—Fort Garry and to supply them with free rations while on garrison duty.

After arrangements had been settled in London, Simpson returned to Montreal and began, in collaboration with the military authorities, the task of assembling the men and the supplies for the journey to Fort Garry. Volunteers were called for; and an officer, Major George Seton, was selected to command the detachment. His orders read: “The principal object of the establishment of a Military Force in the Red River Settlement is the protection of the lives and property of the Company's servants, and of the settlers resident within the territory.”⁴³ If the Company applied to him for military aid, he was ordered to comply with the request only if it were “consistent with Military usage.” The detachment was “a strictly military force . . . [and was] not to act as a police force. . . . the object of their being stationed at Red River was to aid the civil power, when necessary, in maintaining the public peace.”⁴⁴

When all was in order at Montreal, Sir George Simpson got under way for his annual journey to Rupert's Land. Before leaving Canada,

⁴¹Simpson to Shepherd, London, March 14, 1857, enclosed in *supra*. There is no evidence linking the Canadians with Americans in or out of the Red River Settlement.

⁴²Furthermore, Her Majesty's Government refused to augment the depleted ranks of the Rifles who remained in the East. Labouchere to Sir Edmund Head, March 17, 1857, Military Series C, vol. 778, P.A.C.; Head to Eyre, Toronto, April 20, 1857, *ibid.*, vol. 364.

⁴³General Eyre's orders to Seton, Montreal, April 30, 1857, enclosed in J. H. Ramsden to H. H. Berens, Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, War Office, June 3, 1857, Series A. 8, H.B.C. Archives.

⁴⁴Simpson to the Secretary, Lachine, May 4, 1857, enclosed in Berens to the Secretary of State for War, London, May 19, 1857, *ibid.*

he capped his diplomatic success at London with a similar conquest at Toronto. After a conversation with Governor-General Sir Edmund Head—and the gratifying news that the Governor and his Council took “a very reasonable & moderate view of Canadian interests as connected with Hudsons [*sic*] Bay Affairs”—Simpson moved among the members of the Government and of the Assembly. None seemed very interested in the prospects of a Canadian fur trade in Rupert's Land. But there was one disturbing matter. At the motion of George Brown,⁴⁵ inveterate foe of the Company, the Legislative Assembly had appointed a select committee to investigate the Company's claims to the British Northwest. Forewarned by Head, Simpson left Toronto before he could be summoned before the committee, but not before he had been assured that the committee's deliberations would probably be favourable to his cause. An important committeeman, the Honourable Mr. Drummond, was given a £100 retainer “to secure his good offices.”⁴⁶

But George Brown did not remain silent. Only his paper, the *Toronto Globe*, had followed the military issue with any consistent attention; and, for the most part, it had been more interested in the route taken by the Rifles than in the reason for their departure. It was only after the troops had sailed (June 20) that the *Globe* questioned the purpose of the voyage itself; but then it came quickly to the heart of the matter:

Without again commenting upon the absurdity and the cruelty of sending these men, their wives and families, around by Hudson's Straits, we would direct attention to the motives which have prompted the Colonial secretary to dispatch troops to Red River. What necessity was there for doing so? Have the inhabitants sought protection in view of any anticipated difficulties? We know of none, we have heard of none. On the contrary, the inhabitants of the Red River have commenced a peaceful trade with their neighbors of Minnesota, the only country which has offered to trade for their production. And the people of Canada are now preparing to carry on a trade with the Red River; and they can afford more favorable terms of trade as soon as the old route via Lake Superior shall be opened.

Is it true that the Colonial Secretary is one of that Company? And are the troops he now sends, ordered to take their instructions from the servants of Mr. Labouchere and his partners in trade? Well-informed persons say it is so,

⁴⁵His paper, the *Toronto Globe*, had long sought to discredit the Company. Its coverage extended even to the Orcadian press and threatened to deter the Orkney men from enlisting in the Company's service. The Secretary to Simpson, London, Sept. 11, 1857, Series A. 6, *ibid*.

⁴⁶Simpson to the Secretary, Biddle House, Detroit, May 14, 1857, Series A. 12, *ibid*. This evidence of Simpson's interest in Canadian politics is not unique. Other men received the support of the Company's purse; and even the *Toronto Globe* was answered by Simpson from other organs friendly to his cause.

and that they hope, with the aid of British troops, to enforce those illegal decrees which are no longer respected by the people of the Red River, and which are about to be fully tested by Canadian traders.⁴⁷

The sea voyage and the long overland journey from York Factory to Fort Garry consumed the entire summer. The Rifles did not reach their destination until the middle of October—and in the interim, the “people of Canada” had set off a bombshell in the Red River Settlement.

III

The bombshell was fused by a visitor from Canada who had arrived in the Red River Settlement during the winter. He was “Captain” William Kennedy, a disgruntled ex-clerk of the Company and an English-speaking métis with many relatives in the settlement.⁴⁸ Kennedy’s visit was not a family reunion. He represented an obscure Toronto concern, the Northwest Trading and Colonization Company; and his mission in Rupert’s Land was twofold: he intended to reopen the Lake Superior–border lakes route to the general trade of Toronto; and he hoped to convince the people of Red River of the virtues of political as well as economic annexation to Canada.

Attacking his work with the zeal of a man who was both a commercial runner and a political messiah, Kennedy quickly assumed the leadership of a movement designed to discredit the Company and to work for annexation to Canada. Within a fortnight after his arrival, he was moving from house to house throughout the settlement, getting signatures for a petition to the Legislative Assembly which prayed for the extension of the “protection of the Canadian Government, laws, and institutions” over Rupert’s Land.⁴⁹

When the canvass began to lag, Kennedy suddenly called a public meeting to discuss the petition and to expedite the taking of signatures. The manoeuvre caught Governor Francis G. Johnson completely off guard.⁵⁰ At the meeting, Kennedy delivered a long diatribe against the Hudson’s Bay Company that generated far more heat than light.⁵¹ He enunciated the “many evils and instances of bad government” complained of in the petition and complimented

⁴⁷June 24, 1857.

⁴⁸Kennedy was also a nephew of A. K. Isbister, the famous foe of the Company. But note that the decision to send troops was made before the news of Kennedy’s activities could reach London.

⁴⁹*Toronto Globe*, June 12, 1857.

⁵⁰Johnson to the Secretary of the Company, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, March 9, 1857, Series A. 11, H.B.C. Archives.

⁵¹*Toronto Globe*, May 18, 1857.

his audience for enduring what "no government would attempt to impose on any people." For their salvation, he prescribed a political union with Canada, for annexation would not only provide them with the rights of all British subjects but would also bestow wealth and greatness upon their country. When he had finished, Governor Johnson "rose up more like a spectre than a man" and—in Kennedy's opinion—addressed an unsympathetic and inattentive audience.

In truth, public opinion in the Red River Settlement was divided over the question of annexation. The Roman Catholic, French-speaking settlers—half-breeds for the most part, and the majority of the population—sided with their priests; and the priests "having set their faces against M^r Kennedy's movement very few of that church signed" the petition.⁵² But many members of the Anglican and Presbyterian faiths championed Kennedy's cause; and "consequently nearly all the inhabitants" of the lower settlement signed.⁵³

The métis and their clergy stood by the Company because of a political accommodation that had been achieved between them and Governor Johnson. The latter approached his gubernatorial duties with an enthusiasm and an intelligence unseen in his predecessor. Shortly after assuming office in the spring of 1856, he had sought to resolve a problem that had long bedevilled the Company: the failure of the free traders to pay any import duties. After the customs collector had personally visited all the importers—most of whom were métis—and had failed to get any money, Johnson himself met with them. Much to his surprise, they presented him with three resolutions to explain their conduct: the collection itself had been neglected in the past; the duties collected were not equitably expended by the government; and the French-speaking people were not "properly represented" on the Council of Assiniboia. In order to secure the collection of the duties and to assure the support of the métis to the government, "the two sections of Colonists ought to be equally represented in the Council." Accordingly, the free traders prayed for the appointment of five additional councillors by the Company and suggested ten names from which to choose.⁵⁴

Believing that the métis had a justifiable grievance, Governor Johnson approved the resolutions. From the list of names presented him, he selected five men whose addition to the council would "render nearly equal the representation of both races."⁵⁵ The Com-

⁵²Swanston to the Secretary of the Company, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, April 7, 1857, Series A. 11, H.B.C. Archives.

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴Johnson to the Secretary, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, June [1], 1856, *ibid.*

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

pany accepted his advice and dispatched the necessary commissions. The wisdom of Johnson's policy was demonstrated in the following year when Kennedy arrived in the settlement. The councillors-elect, the Roman Catholic clergy, and the half-breeds generally, all supported the Company and the government of Assiniboia.⁵⁶

Only a handful of the Red River settlers backed the annexationist movement, but it was a vociferous, well-led group, and it kept the settlement in somewhat of a turmoil until Kennedy departed for Toronto. The captain and his crew circulated false reports and rumours about the Company and the future of Rupert's Land. The settlers were asked to believe that the Select Committee of the House of Commons investigating the Hudson's Bay Company would terminate the Company's reign in the northwest and that much of the region would be handed over to Canada.⁵⁷ It was reported that when Captain Palliser arrived in the settlement, he would immediately assume all powers of government.⁵⁸ Wide were the fears in Company circles that Kennedy's machinations might lead to a civil disturbance,⁵⁹ but by spring of 1857 the fears had subsided. The Royal Canadian Rifles were coming to Red River and their presence would "do much good in tranquilising the minds of the settlers."⁶⁰

What then was the balance-sheet of Kennedy's activities? His commercial schemes bore no fruit, for the merchants of Red River refused to ally themselves with a new North-West Company. And when he returned to Toronto (June 15, 1857) along the border lakes to Lake Superior, the Company's servants dogged his every step, throwing a net around him that effectually isolated him from the Indians.

Kennedy's political bequest was more enduring and far more mischievous. He had brought about "the revival of ancient and barbarous animosities, the diffusion of much false information, and the spread of considerable discontent among the ignorant and designing."⁶¹ Governor Johnson thought enough of the grievances in the petition to Canada and the furore surrounding it to suggest additional changes in the government of Assiniboia. He strongly

⁵⁶Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Norway House, June 30, 1857, Series A. 12, *ibid.* Cf. Johnson to the Secretary, Fort Garry, June 29, 1857, Series A. 11, *ibid.*

⁵⁷Swanston to the Secretary, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, May 1, 1857, Series A. 11, *ibid.*

⁵⁸Swanston to the Secretary, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, June 1, 1857, *ibid.*

⁵⁹Swanston to Finlayson, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, May 9, 1857, *ibid.*

⁶⁰Simpson to the Secretary, Lachine, May 9, 1857, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

⁶¹Johnson to the Secretary, Fort Garry, June 29, 1857, Series A. 11, *ibid.*

urged the Company to adopt a new system of landholding to replace the old and uncertain method that so greatly irritated the settlers.⁶² Furthermore, he maintained that in order to satisfy the people, the Company had to do something about the government of the Red River Settlement—regardless of what the Select Committee did—and he suggested that a governor and clerk be appointed and paid independently of the Company.⁶³ But now that troops had been ordered to Fort Garry, the Company was no longer interested in altering the government or the administration of Assiniboia.⁶⁴

IV

With the arrival of the Royal Canadian Rifles in mid-October, 1857, the Company's fears vanished. The competitive issues between the Company and the free traders were never wholly resolved; but with the presence of the troops, the Company no longer feared an outbreak against its authority. The contagion carried by Kennedy lingered on—and would become more virulent in the winter of 1859, when the *Nor'Wester* began its turbulent career—but the Canadian party dared only to criticize the Company, not to take the law into its own hands.

A serious disturbance never arose to test the new police powers of the Company. To the untrained eye, it would seem that the troops were not needed; but to Sir George Simpson, their value was self-evident:

The peace of the Settlement has remained unbroken since the arrival of the troops, so that, happily there has been no occasion to call upon them to support the Civil Authorities. Their presence has, I believe, nevertheless been beneficial, by giving confidence to the more quiet and well disposed part of the Community, and keeping in check the disaffected who might have attempted to agitate questions likely to disturb the public tranquility.⁶⁵

Indeed, the garrison aided the Company in many ways. The Northern Department of Rupert's Land remained orderly and quiet. The Company cut down its personnel, particularly in the vicinity of Red River, and greater reliance was placed on its servants every-

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Johnson to Simpson, "Private," Fort Garry, Aug. 22, 1857, enclosed in Simpson to the Secretary, Lachine, Oct. 5, 1857, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

⁶⁴The Secretary to Simpson, London, Oct. 16, 1857, Series A. 6, *ibid.*

⁶⁵Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Norway House, June 24, 1858, Series A. 12, *ibid.* Cf. the Secretary to Simpson and the Councils of the Northern and Southern Departments of Rupert's Land, London, April 18, 1860, Series A. 6, *ibid.*: "... we consider the moral effect of the presence of a controlling power, sufficient to put down any attempt on the part of the evil disposed, as of itself a great element in the tranquility which is so happily established."

where. The annual cost of maintaining the troops was comparatively high—nearly £2,000—but much of that was returned through military purchases in the Company stores.⁶⁶ Both Simpson and the Company agreed that the force should be permanently stationed at Fort Garry.⁶⁷

Moreover, the competitive position of the Company was soon greatly improved. The Red River free traders and their American colleagues received a considerable blow in the fall of 1857, when a panic swept the United States and severed the credit lines to the East upon which the large St. Paul houses depended. Furthermore, the transportation advantage of the Company's competitors was nullified when the Company itself began to carry goods from England and the United States via St. Paul. The Company now used the same routes as the free traders, but with greater efficiency; and the Red River District burst into prominence both as a fur-gathering district and as a mercantile outlet.

The Royal Canadian Rifles looked upon their new surroundings with mixed feelings. The rank and file seemed quite satisfied with their lot; but their commander, Major Seton, was an unhappy man. He had apparently never been pleased with his assignment to Fort Garry, for it meant that he would be separated from his young wife, a woman of delicate health, and their two small children. Aware of Seton's frame of mind, Sir George Simpson had sought to alleviate his unhappiness by allowing him "command money" in addition to his pay and by appointing him a councillor of Assiniboia.

All Simpson's efforts were in vain. Seton began to complain shortly after he arrived in the Red River Settlement. Having got command money for himself, he sought a daily allowance for his fellow officers "as long as they remain[ed] in the service of the Company," because of the "expense and inconvenience to which [they had] . . . been subjected in coming to Red River on behalf of the Hudson's Bay Company."⁶⁸ But the Company declined to grant the added pay and indignantly replied:

The Governor and Committee distinctly disclaims the notion that this detachment is in the "Company's service." It appeared to them desirable that some of Her Majesty's troops should be stationed at Fort Garry, in consequence of

⁶⁶Simpson to the Governor and Committee, Norway House, June 21, 1859, Series A. 12, *ibid.*

⁶⁷The Secretary to Simpson and the Councils of the Northern and Southern Departments of Rupert's Land, London, April 18, 1860, Series A. 6, *ibid.*

⁶⁸Seton to the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, Fort Garry, Red River Settlement, Nov. 9, 1857, Military Series C, vol. 364, P.A.C.

the establishment of a United States garrison at Pembina, and their application to Her Majesty's Government on this ground was favorably entertained.⁶⁹

Seton's bitterness was not confined to money matters. On that very day that he had sought command money for his colleagues, he wrote an extraordinary letter to General Eyre, suggesting that a police force would be more suitable for garrison duty at Fort Garry than a detachment of regulars.⁷⁰ Although he was aware that the major had never been pleased with his present billet, nevertheless Eyre believed that he was "an intelligent and good officer" and forwarded the dispatch to his superiors in London.⁷¹

Seton's report evoked a sympathetic response from the War Office. Indeed, both the War Office and the Duke of Cambridge, the General Commanding in Chief, agreed that a police force was "better adapted for the discharge of duties such as those required of this or any other Detachment of Her Majesty's Troops in the Company's Settlement on the Red River."⁷² In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Lord Panmure stated his objections to a military garrison at Fort Garry:

It would seem that the principal ground of disturbances in the Territory arose out of infringements of the monopoly of the Hudson's Bay Company, sometimes by Americans . . . [and] sometimes by Half Breeds. . . .

Were Regular Troops to interfere in cases of this kind, and blood to be shed, His Lordship conceives that complications might arise which would be difficult to set at rest. His Lordship would therefore suggest, for the consideration of Mr. Secretary Labouchere, whether Armed Police under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company, would not be a more appropriate Force for such a Settlement.⁷³

Furthermore, Panmure thought that eighty men would be adequate and suggested that volunteers be secured from the Irish Constabulary.

A reply was delayed by a change in the government; but when the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Stanley, answered the War Office, he saved the Company.⁷⁴ He directed General Peel's attention to the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the War Depart-

⁶⁹The Secretary to Simpson, London, Feb. 17, 1858, Series A. 6, H.B.C. Archives.

⁷⁰Eyre to the Secretary of State for War, Montreal, Jan. 16, 1858, Military Series C, vol. 1283, P.A.C. Eyre enclosed the Seton dispatch; but the writer was unable to find it.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²H. K. Storks to the Military Secretary, War Office, Feb. 25, 1858, Military Series C, vol. 364, P.A.C.

⁷³Storks to Herman Merivale, War Office, Feb. 25, 1858, *ibid.*

⁷⁴Lord Palmerston's ministry was overthrown in the latter part of February, 1858, and replaced by the Derby-Disraeli ministry.

ment, and particularly to the letter (dated March 16, 1857) from Shepherd to Labouchere:

Major General Peel will perceive that the Governor [Shepherd] distinctly states in that letter that the Company's application for Military assistance was in a great measure founded on the alleged danger of "disturbance and discontent," and "stirring up of the People of the Red River Settlement in opposition to the Civil Authorities."

The assent of Lord Panmure to the measure was, therefore, given with full knowledge of the particular Service which was likely to be required of the Detachment.

While fully admitting, therefore, the force of the objections urged in your letter, Lord Stanley is of opinion that it would be scarcely just towards the company which has been at the expense of Transport and Lodging for this Force, if they should be either removed at present or prohibited from meeting the duties which it was from the first understood might be imposed on them, and he is more anxious that no immediate change be made, from the circumstance that the future Government of the Red River Settlement is at this time a subject of correspondence between H. M.'s Government and that of Canada.

He will however . . . caution the Government [*sic*] and Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company, as to the necessity of using great discretion in calling on the Military for their assistance, and confining such application to cases of actual disturbance of the peace.⁷⁵

Peel agreed not to disturb the Royal Canadian Rifles; but at the same time, he maintained that when the political future of Rupert's Land had been settled, it would be "necessary to re-open the subject with a view to providing some more suitable Force for the protection of the Colony."⁷⁶

Major Seton was not content to rest at his labours. In the spring, he wrote a second report, an official dispatch to his commanding officer; and in it, he explicitly denied the imperial need for troops at Fort Garry.⁷⁷ He carefully separated the political (Company) from the military (imperial) considerations and concluded that "Her Majesty's Troops ought not to be quartered in this locality." He presented several arguments in support of this position: Fort Garry was remote, virtually isolated; and "nothing short of the most overwhelming necessity could justify sending troops here at all." What possible military service could his men perform? The Company had nothing to fear from the inhabitants of Rupert's Land. No attempt had ever been made by any inhabitants "to prevent the execution of a judgement."⁷⁸ In regard to the charter, the Company had long since given

⁷⁵Merivale to Storks, London, March 6, 1858, Military Series C, vol. 364, P.A.C.

⁷⁶Storks to Merivale, War Office, March 13, 1858, *ibid.*

⁷⁷Seton to the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Rifles, Fort Garry, March 14, 1858, *ibid.*

⁷⁸Seton had been "assured" of this point. Was he ignorant of, or did he chose to ignore, the Sayer trial?

up its pretensions to a monopoly of trade; and there was competition everywhere in Rupert's Land. Moreover, if there should be a collision between the Company and the free traders, the chances were that the conflict would occur too far from the fort for the troops to intervene—"even if it were considered (which I hardly venture to think would be the case) that armed interference between rival traders in the skins of animals were a proper service for any portion of the British Army." But what about the American menace, the Pembina garrison and the string of border posts? Seton correctly asserted that there was nothing to fear from the United States. The nearest military establishment was at Fort Ripley, nearly four hundred miles away, and its military complement did not exceed one hundred and thirty men.

Seton's report presented a more truthful picture of the military needs of Rupert's Land than did the reports of either General Eyre or Sir George Simpson; and yet the document received little notice. It passed up the chain of command without comment until it reached the War Office and the Duke of Cambridge.⁷⁹ Seton's reward was a stern rebuke from the Duke, informing him that the question of a detachment was a matter for London to decide and that the decision had been made.⁸⁰ Seton was silenced. In the fall of the year, he tendered his resignation; and within the year, he had left the service.

The Royal Canadian Rifles met all the expectations of the Company, for their presence brought about tranquility in the Red River District. But did they ever serve the interests of the Queen? The one occasion on which the Company applied for military aid offers only a bit of comic relief. On March 1, 1860, the Red River Settlement was alarmed by a small band of Sioux who had come to make one of their countless treaties—made and broken ever so frequently—with the métis and the Saulteaux. Fearing that the Sioux might be attacked on their way back to the Dakota plains, the Company called upon Captain Sharpe "to preserve the peace, and to protect . . . the Sioux."⁸¹ Sharpe responded with an alacrity that betrayed his ennui. He unlimbered two field guns and, with his entire force, escorted the nearly two-score Sioux for two miles on the road to Pembina. In his report of the affair, the zealous captain apparently thought it best to explain why he had brought along the guns—"it

⁷⁹Eyre to the Secretary of State for War, Montreal, May 20, 1858, Military Series C, vol. 1283, P.A.C.

⁸⁰Sir Charles Yorke, Military Secretary, to Eyre, Horse Guards, June 16, 1858, *ibid.*, vol. 364.

⁸¹Sharpe to the Military Secretary, Red River Settlement, Fort Garry, March 3, 1860, *ibid.*

was with the desire of deeply impressing upon both the Saulteaux and Sioux Indians, as well as the Half Breeds, the powerful means available for any thing like violent and riotous opposition to the laws."⁸²

V

The Royal Canadian Rifles could not remain at Fort Garry forever. In the early summer of 1860, the Duke of Newcastle, Colonial Secretary in Palmerston's second ministry, informed the Hudson's Bay Company that the Rifles would be removed from Fort Garry and that no other troops would be sent to replace them.⁸³ However, at the same time, he asked if the Company had any reasons to oppose the withdrawal. In his reply, Governor H. H. Berens recalled the original circumstances under which the Government had stationed the troops at Fort Garry and pointed out that their presence had brought about the most beneficial results.⁸⁴ The settlers were now "peaceable" and "inspired with confidence;" and the Canadian and American "agitators" had been "discouraged." The troops had necessitated "a very serious" financial burden to the Company; "but in the interest of peace and humanity we felt it our duty not to shrink from it."

The picture that Berens painted was not as convincing as Shepherd's original canvas. There was no response from Newcastle, despite Berens' continued correspondence; and the Company presently grew resigned to the coming withdrawal.⁸⁵ Although the Rifles remained in the Red River Settlement for another year—Newcastle's decision had come too late in the year for transportation to be arranged—nevertheless, they left in the fall of 1861.

No sooner had the troops departed than the Company began to seek their return. After the Trent affair and the resulting aggravation of Anglo-American differences during the Civil War, Governor Berens called the Crown's attention to the "defenceless state of the [Red River] settlement."⁸⁶ Newcastle expressed his awareness of the gravity of the situation. However, nothing could be done at the time because Hudson Bay was ice-locked; and when summer came, the clouds of war had rolled away.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³Chichester Fortescue to Berens, London, June 21, 1860, Series A. 8, H.B.C. Archives.

⁸⁴Berens to Newcastle, London, July 12, 1860, *ibid.*

⁸⁵The Secretary to Simpson, London, July 18, and Aug. 18, 1860, Series A. 6, *ibid.*

⁸⁶The Governor and Committee to Alexander Dallas and the Councils of the Northern and Southern Departments of Rupert's Land, London, April 16, 1862, *ibid.*

In the fall of 1862, the Hudson's Bay Company was again threatened by an invasion from the United States. But the invaders were Sioux and not fur traders; and they represented a graver danger to the Red River Settlement itself—if not the Company—than either the Canadian "agitators" or the American "expansionists" of the middle fifties.⁸⁷ The Sioux had risen against the pioneer farmers of Minnesota and rolled back the American frontier. It was a short-lived triumph. The tide of battle soon turned; and with American troops in hot pursuit, the Sioux fled over the 49th parallel and into the sanctuary of Rupert's Land. During the next few years, they gathered in the vicinity of the Red River Settlement and, with their presence, posed a dilemma for the Company's authorities there. Without troops, they dared not quarrel with the Sioux; and yet, with limited provisions, they could not indefinitely maintain the starving savages.

Pleas for troops showered the Colonial Office. But all the letters from Company failed to awaken Newcastle's sympathy.⁸⁸ He was disdainful of Governor Berens' statement that, despite the need for troops, the Company had no funds to meet such public expenditure—"His Grace . . . [could not] for a moment admit that the Company . . . [was] not responsible for providing funds for a Territory of which they claim to be the sole and absolute proprietors."⁸⁹ It was clear to Newcastle that the duty of self-defence lay with the inhabitants of Red River and that they should have a militia system. He therefore refused to recommend troops unless the Company agreed to underwrite all their expenses—pay, subsistence, and transportation. The letter from His Grace ended on a sarcastic note: "The Duke earnestly trusts that the alarms entertained by the Inhabitants of Red River may prove unfounded as appears to be the confident expectation of Governor Dallas, and that their own forbearance and courage, together with the influence for good which the Hudson's Bay Company has to its honor acquired over the Indian tribes, may suffice to preserve them from danger, if it should exist."⁹⁰

How much were the troops worth to the Hudson's Bay Company?

⁸⁷Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., "The Sioux Uprising: A Problem in International Relations," *Minnesota History*, winter, 1955.

⁸⁸The Council of Assiniboia—at Governor Dallas' prodding—memorialized Her Majesty for troops in the fall of 1862. Minutes of the Council of Assiniboia, Oct. 30, 1862. E. H. Oliver, ed., *The Canadian North-West* (Ottawa, 1914), I, 511-13. The Secretary to Dallas, London, Feb. 19, 1863, Series A. 6, H.B.C. Archives.

⁸⁹Fortescue to Berens, London, March 12, 1863, Series A. 8, *ibid*.

⁹⁰*Ibid*.

Evidently, Newcastle's price was too high, for the Company could not—or would not—pay it. Although the inhabitants twice petitioned for the establishment of a local constabulary to protect themselves, their prayers were rejected by the Company.⁹¹ When the Governor of Rupert's Land proposed that the settlement raise a volunteer force "in case of need," his suggestion was also denied.⁹² The Company saw too many difficulties in the scheme: the settlers would expect the Company to meet all the expenses and, furthermore, the discipline and control of such a force could not be easily maintained.⁹³

When the Hudson's Bay Company needed troops to maintain its monopoly (1846) or to preserve its position in the fur trade (1857), it was able to get them. But when the Red River Settlement was infested with Sioux—nearly three thousand of them crowded in during the summer of 1864⁹⁴—and when the settlers themselves cried out for imperial protection, they were not allowed to establish their own militia and Her Majesty's troops were not sent to Fort Garry.⁹⁵

⁹¹Minutes of the Council of Assiniboia, March 11, 1863. Oliver, *Canadian North-West*, I, 515–19. Joseph J. Hargrave, *Red River* (Montreal, 1871), 341.

⁹²The Secretary to William Mactavish, Governor of Rupert's Land, and the Councils of the Northern and Southern Departments, London, April 16, 1867, Series D. 10, H.B.C. Archives.

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴Hargrave, *Red River*, 339–40.

⁹⁵In the spring of 1864, Governor Dallas was obliged to comply with the request of Major E. A. C. Hatch, whose Independent Battalion was then quartered at Pembina, "to pursue and capture these savages, with an armed force, wherever they may be found." Hatch to Dallas, Pembina, March 4, 1864, and Dallas' reply (no place, no date) in Oliver, *Canadian North-West*, I. 536–7. But Hatch's orders prevented his crossing the international line.

ARTHUR GORDON AND CONFEDERATION¹

J. K. CHAPMAN

ARTHUR HAMILTON GORDON, Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick 1861-6, has been looked upon with ill-favour by Canadian historians. For the most part, they have regarded him as having been an opponent of the union of the provinces who used his official position to undermine the cause of Confederation in the New Brunswick election of 1865. Among the reasons for the general disparagement of Gordon, the chief has been the one-sided nature of the available evidence. This is no longer so. Three years ago Gordon's private papers were made accessible to the present writer.¹ Gordon, though a shy man, fortunately had a well-developed ego, and his papers are thus reasonably comprehensive, and throw much light upon his character, and upon his activities as a colonial governor. This article by drawing considerably upon his private papers will, it is hoped, go some way toward correcting current misconceptions concerning him.

Gordon was a young man, a few weeks short of his thirty-second birthday, when he arrived in New Brunswick in the autumn of 1861. Although without direct experience of administration he was far from being a political novice. As the youngest son of the fourth Earl of Aberdeen he had been born to politics. Educated at home because of precarious health, Arthur Gordon never developed that ease of manner which comes from daily association with those of one's own age, but he made friends with many of the leading statesmen of the day. From them he early acquired a knowledge of political events and a mastery of the principles of English law. He was sent up to Cambridge in 1847, distinguished himself by becoming president of the Union in 1849, and obtained a Master of Arts degree in 1851. He then became private secretary to his father during the latter's prime ministry, won a by-election in 1854, but, with many another Peelite, lost his seat in 1857. The following year he accompanied Gladstone as private secretary on the mission to the Ionian Islands and, as a result, resolved to make his career in the

¹Gordon later became the first Lord Stanmore and his private papers have been named the "Stanmore Papers." Except for his correspondence with Sir Roundell Palmer (Lord Selborne), Gordon's New Brunswick papers are lodged in the Beaverbrook Collection in the Bonar Law-Bennett Library, University of New Brunswick. All of the others including the Palmer letters are in the British Museum.

colonial service. Lord Aberdeen's last illness prevented an immediate appointment, but in 1861 Gordon was given his choice between the governorship of New Brunswick or of Antigua. He chose the former.

Arthur Gordon was well qualified to govern colonies although he was perhaps more suited to Crown colonies than to those having responsible government. In Selborne's view, he had

excellent natural abilities, very well cultivated, and a strong desire to use them for good; a mind superior to conventions and prejudices; and great warmth of heart, restrained from being generally demonstrative by a sensitive temperament and fastidious taste. . . . He had a force and reality of character, a power of intellectual discernment, a habit of sound and independent judgement, and an invariable preference for what was just and pure and true over everything artificial, hollow, or low in tone and aim. . . .²

These qualities together with his aristocratic heritage and his distaste for demagoguery were to make conflict between Gordon and the leading politicians in New Brunswick virtually inevitable. There statesmanship had scarcely ever existed and was, within the narrow confines of that frontier community, almost unachievable. Bribery and corruption had reigned supreme since the founding of the province, personal and political morality were unrelated attributes, and a most flagrant brand of Jacksonian democracy prevailed. It was unlikely that the local "bosses" who managed this system would willingly concede much power to a governor whose efforts on behalf of respectable government would, if successful, threaten the sources of their power and interfere with their exploitation of the provincial treasury and of the natural resources of the colony. Only a governor who would allow himself to be carried along the rocky path of administration in New Brunswick on the shoulders of his council could avoid an occasional barked shin or stubbed toe. Gordon hadn't come for the ride. Because of this, many historians to whom self-government or colonial independence has been of such consequence as to lead them to ignore the importance of good government have taken sides with the colonials against Gordon.

For reasons of space, and because of the overriding importance during Arthur Gordon's administration of the question of union, this article must concern itself almost exclusively with that subject. The new Governor had no prejudices against union of the colonies when he arrived in North America, and, even before he assumed office, he had formed impressions favourable to the legislative union of the British North American colonies. He landed at Halifax and while

²Roundell Palmer, Earl of Selborne, *Memorials* (London, 1896-8), Part I, *Family and Personal 1768-1865*, II, 261.

there read two of Mulgrave's despatches on the subject of union. With one (December 30, 1858) pointing out "the folly of federation" he fully concurred. With the other (March 1, 1860) which recommended a union of the lower provinces he did not concur. "The difficulty," he wrote, "would be nearly as great as of effecting a real [i.e. legislative] union of the whole of Canada—the result far less brilliant and I think far less useful."³ However, as he grew to learn of the petty, corrupt, and personal nature of politics in New Brunswick, Gordon came to believe that the only way in which this condition might give place to public morality and statesmanship would be through some form of union. Thereafter, although he never departed from the view that a legislative union of all the colonies was the best and ultimate goal, he adopted a more positive attitude to Maritime legislative union than he had at first displayed. Doubtless his own observations were confirmed by the despatches of his predecessors who had been its advocates.

But while Gordon soon began to think seriously about Maritime union he was not exclusively a Maritime unionist and the larger union was never very far from his thoughts. At the end of 1861 he advised Newcastle that "it might be advantageous that all the Provinces of British North America should be placed under one Government during a war to ensure a unity of purpose and action. . . . Should it be thought advisable to bring Nova Scotia and New Brunswick under direct control of the Governor-General . . . I shall applaud your decision."⁴ In January of the new year, in a letter to Monck concerning the inadvisability of allowing public control of the militia in New Brunswick, Gordon said that if he were the Duke he should be inclined to refuse any further concession to the local governments until the three lower provinces were united into one.⁵ A week later he considered that "every effort should be made to bring about a union either of the three Lower Provinces, or of all with Canada."⁶ In March, with his first session of the legislature behind him, he had concluded that "the only chance for these provinces would be their union, either with Canada or with each other,"⁷ and in May he promised Newcastle that he would support the projected Intercolonial Railway "because it is an essential step towards that union of the Provinces which I look upon as the only

³Stanmore Papers, diary, Oct. 17, 1861.

⁴*Ibid.*, Gordon to Newcastle, Dec. 23, 1861.

⁵*Ibid.*, Gordon to Monck, Jan. 25, 1862.

⁶*Ibid.*, Gordon to DeGrey, Feb. 3, 1862.

⁷*Ibid.*, Gordon to Wilberforce, March 16, 1862.

chance of securing anything like respectability in the conduct of their public affairs."⁸

Throughout 1862 Gordon worked hard for the Intercolonial since he saw clearly that it was a necessary preliminary to the larger union, and that it would if constructed provide a powerful stimulus to political consolidation. He had, with Tilley's support, bullied the Executive Council into accepting on behalf of the province a fair share of the financial responsibility for the railway, and, as a result, had made his first enemy, A. J. Smith, the Attorney-General, who resigned. He had also attended the conference in Quebec and had laboured to bring about the Intercolonial agreement which was there arranged. This was followed by the conference in London after which both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia passed the necessary legislation to give effect to the arrangements which had been made respecting the railway. When the Canadians failed to do the same, and in effect repudiated the agreement, the general public in New Brunswick was deeply angered and the suspicions engendered then respecting the good faith of Canadians were to constitute a barrier of considerable magnitude to subsequent negotiations for a union. Gordon was extremely annoyed with the Canadians for having brought the Intercolonial to a standstill, thus postponing, indefinitely as it seemed, legislative union of British North America. Gordon's ire is evidence of the frustration of his hopes for the greater legislative union; it can scarcely be cited⁹ as a mark of a desire on his part for Maritime union. Had he favoured the smaller union over the larger he would have been pleased with the action of the Canadians and the failure of the railway negotiations. There is absolutely no evidence of this. However, now that the possibility of a larger legislative union appeared to have been ruled out by the Canadians, Gordon turned to Maritime legislative union as the only alternative.

Although he seems not to have stated it, Gordon probably considered Maritime union as a useful first step in the direction of an over-all legislative union, but he did not regard it, as did the Duke of Newcastle,¹⁰ as a "necessary preliminary" of such a union. He did believe that a fusion of the Maritime Provinces was in every way preferable to a loose federal union of British North America which would leave in existence the petty provincial governments. He also

⁸*Ibid.*, Gordon to Newcastle, May 12, 1862.

⁹See W. M. Whitelaw, *The Maritimes and Canada before Confederation* (Toronto, 1934), 189.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 178.

believed that if the union of British North America had to be of a federal nature then it was essential that a legislative union of the Maritimes, at least of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, should precede it; otherwise the local legislatures would continue to function. He fervently desired their abolition because he had come to believe that the lower provinces were too small for the satisfactory operation of responsible government.¹¹

Governor Gordon had no quarrel with responsible government as such. Indeed he believed it was the only system under which the North American colonies could be retained within the Empire. It also relieved the mother country of much responsibility. But he could not fail to see that its operation in New Brunswick had not contributed much to material prosperity or social happiness and that it had degraded, rather than improved, the standard of government. For its successful working, it required a good opposition as well as government party. Sufficient talent for both was not forthcoming because the colony's size, population, and the importance of its affairs were not great enough to attract men of property and talent to its political arena. Consequently, the Assembly was, for the most part, filled with ignorant and uncouth men to whom the pay (some £80 currency per annum) was of great importance, and whose parochialism was proverbial. Compelled as they were to keep the confidence of the Assembly, the members of the Liberal executive, even had they been favourably disposed, could do little to raise the tone of public morality or to provide strong leadership. There was no practicable alternative to the Liberals, for the Conservative party had never recovered from its defeat in 1854 and by the 1860's was composed chiefly of men who differed only from those who made up the Government party in that they had not control of patronage and desired it, while their Liberal opponents had control of patronage and desired to keep it. Under these circumstances, Gordon feared that a federal union would simply draw to Ottawa such capable leaders as did exist and New Brunswick would, for the foreseeable future, be left to wallow deeper and deeper in the morass of mediocrity and maladministration. It was, therefore, in an attempt to forestall the worst of the evils of federalism (supposing it should come), and in an effort to create the conditions for an improvement in the government of the smaller provinces, that Gordon laboured through the summer and autumn of 1863 and the first half of 1864 in behalf of Maritime union. His only means was persuasion of his advisers; his chief ally was the

¹¹Stanmore Papers, Gordon to Palmer, April 27, 1863.

antipathy of the Maritime public men to Canada as a result of the railway fiasco. The Charlottetown meeting was in great measure the result of his activities.

Gordon was not unhappy when the Canadian delegates appeared at Charlottetown. It was, he wrote to Cardwell, "with great pleasure" that he had heard the views of Galt and his colleagues in favour of a union consisting of a strong central government with subordinate local legislatures similar to municipal institutions.¹² He warned, however, that the only union which Maritimers would willingly enter with Canada would be one in which the lower provinces would retain their virtual independence and that the character and methods of the public men of British North America would ensure that their views on union would fall into line with popular concepts, partly from fear of unpopularity and partly to render some form of union more palatable.¹³ He was sorry to see this process begin so quickly. Federation doubtless could solve Canada's difficulties; it was, he believed, for that purpose that the scheme was put forward. But why could the Canadians not be patient for a little while, until the lower provinces (at least New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) had eased their own political problems, before proceeding with federal union? Gordon believed he knew the answer to this question, and confirmation came from George Brown. Brown admitted that Maritime union would have been a desirable preliminary to the larger union, and when asked by Gordon why the Canadians had not allowed it to take place replied: "'Because we can't wait. We are not going to be tied to Lower Canada, for twelve months more.'"¹⁴

As Governor of New Brunswick, Gordon had to look at the question of union from the point of view of what he conceived to be the welfare of that colony. If Maritime union was not to precede federation then the larger union must be a legislative union or at least a very strongly centralized federation. At first Cardwell fully concurred and was sure such a union would be created. Lord Monck had assured him, and in October, 1864, he assured Gordon that "there is no idea of that feeble Legislature which you so justly object to; . . . they [the Canadians] wish a strong central Legislature with subordinate municipal institutions. . . . We all agree in favouring a complete fusion not a federation."¹⁵ A month later he repeated his

¹²P.A.C., CO 189/9, Gordon to Cardwell, Sept. 12, 1864.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴PRO 30/48-6/39, postscript to Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 30, 1865.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Cardwell to Gordon, Oct. 14, 1864.

assurances. "It signifies little," he wrote, "what name is employed. What we wish is a central and strong Government, as distinguished from a number of small states united by a feeble bond."¹⁶ Within the next few days, Cardwell received a copy of the Quebec Resolutions and after reading them passed them on to the Cabinet. He wrote Gordon that he believed the Cabinet would approve the resolutions and that he would soon have to instruct him to "promote the scheme of the Delegates to the utmost of your power."¹⁷ The Quebec Resolutions, however, obviously did not provide for the "complete fusion" of the colonies or the reduction of their legislatures to the status of "municipal institutions." Cardwell had therefore made an about-face in his attitude to the principle upon which a union was to be based.

It is not difficult to discover the reason. As Whitelaw has pointed out,¹⁸ there is little evidence that Cardwell had thought deeply about political constitutions or indeed that he was even much interested. Still, there is no ground for believing that he could not see the difference between a "complete fusion" and the kind of union offered by the Quebec Resolutions. The fact was that the Secretary of State, whose rise to political eminence had taken place under the shadow of Gladstone's economies, was primarily concerned with saving money for the Imperial treasury. He believed that the Quebec Resolutions would provide the North American colonies with the means to undertake their own defence and thus relieve the mother country of an onerous financial burden. Edward Cardwell was also a politician, one who "sometimes watched too closely the currents of public opinion, and was too critical of those who (as he used to say) 'never looked out of a window.'"¹⁹ It was at this time (December 23, 1864) that Frederic Rogers wrote: "Cardwell is happily absent. . . . The constant presence in his mind of the House of Commons and the leader of the Opposition is a terrible nuisance."²⁰ On this view of Cardwell's political outlook, it may be suggested that when the Quebec Resolutions appeared to be popular in British North America, but more importantly in British Cabinet and political circles generally, Cardwell was prepared to adopt them and to drop his strongly expressed preference for a "complete fusion."

Before he received instructions to promote the Quebec Resolu-

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1864.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1864.

¹⁸Whitelaw, *Maritimes and Canada*, 276.

¹⁹Selborne, *Memorials*, part II, *Personal and Political 1865-1895*, II, 244.

²⁰G. E. Marindin, ed., *Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford . . . , 1860-1871* (London, 1896), 252 f.

tions, Gordon had been urging on Cardwell the necessity and feasibility of making changes in the proposed union in the direction of greater central control. Even though these changes might not be accepted, and while he believed the proposed union would have mischievous results, he was prepared to acquiesce in a policy he did not approve and to promote it when advised to do so by his government.²¹ He could not, however, say things he did not believe, or recommend as beneficial that which he considered injurious. Cardwell might therefore remove him if he saw fit. If the Secretary of State chose to allow him to remain, Gordon could do what, in the opinion of his advisers, was necessary to accomplish the union: "sanction the necessary amount of corruption; and approve the wholesale removal of officeholders of respectability."²² Still the Lieutenant-Governor felt his position to be an embarrassing one and on January 2, 1865, a few days after receiving Cardwell's instructions to promote federation, wrote and despatched his resignation.²³

There were several reasons for Gordon's tender of resignation. The powerlessness of his position as Lieutenant-Governor he felt to be a "humiliation."²⁴ He disagreed with the principle upon which union was to be based. But these were insufficient causes in themselves, as he did not wish to resign. However, he believed that Cardwell might wish to have as governor a man more favourable to his own views. He would rather resign than have the Secretary of State think him negligent in his duty. Although improbable, it was not impossible that federation would be defeated in New Brunswick and should that be the case he was sure Cardwell would lay the responsibility at his door.²⁵ Although he asked that his resignation be deferred until after the next mail because he had received information that a Fenian raid was planned and a resignation in such circumstances would seem like running away,²⁶ his offer was a genuine one. Cardwell saw no reason to accept it.

Meanwhile, discussions had taken place between Gordon and the Tilley Council regarding the course of politics for the coming year. The life of the Assembly was due to expire in June and elections must be held by that month at the latest. The Council at first (mid-December, 1864) intended to hold another session before dissolving but it did not wish to bring the Quebec Resolutions be-

²¹PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, Dec. 19, 1864.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1865.

²⁴*Ibid.*; Stanmore Papers, Gordon to Wilberforce, [January, 1865].

²⁵PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, Feb. 3, 1865; Stanmore Papers, Gordon to Palmer, Jan. 2, 1865, and Gordon to Head, Feb. 8, 1865.

²⁶PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 2, 1865.

fore the legislature at that session. Gordon was so advised.²⁷ However, Gordon's instructions from Cardwell, which arrived late in December, compelled him to urge his Council to take action on the resolutions. But union was intimately connected with the Intercolonial Railway, and it was inevitable that discussion of union would lead to controversy over railways, since the proponents of a rival of the Intercolonial, the European and North American Railway, were active and vociferous especially in Saint John, the seat of Tilley's power. Some of the members of the Council wished to hold another session before dissolution in order to receive pay for two sessions in 1865 instead of one,²⁸ but they were overridden by Gordon and Tilley. Tilley wished to postpone the elections as long as possible in order to prepare the electorate for federal union, but he was anxious to avoid a pre-election session of the legislature. In fact, he did not dare call a session before the election. "Had we met the House," he wrote to Galt in reply to Canadian criticism that the union question should have been dealt with by the existing legislature, "we would have been compelled to have taken a course [concerning railway matters] that at the Elections in June would have defeated the Government Members [Tilley and Walters] and their supporters, five in all for the city and county of Saint John."²⁹

On the other hand, to postpone the elections until June without meeting the Assembly would be difficult, not to say dangerous. It was customary for the legislature to meet early in the year, and it would not be difficult for the Opposition to discover the real reason for the omission and to make capital out of it. Moreover, many of Tilley's own supporters in the Assembly would be incensed at the delay in collecting their stipends and some would feel that they ran the risk of losing their seats and thus their £80 per annum. To delay the elections also meant going counter to the Canadians, Cardwell, and Gordon, all of whom for one reason or another desired an early decision. And although Tilley himself wished the delay in order to educate the public for Confederation, his party had been in power almost continuously since 1854 and had to expect to lose seats no matter when the election came. If, therefore, he could not be sure of passing the union resolutions in the old Assembly, how could he be sure of doing so in the new?

Tilley's dilemma was plain and painful. He could hold a session

²⁷*Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1864.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1865.

²⁹P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Confederation Correspondence, vol. 6, Tilley to Galt, March 6, 1865, quoted by A. G. Bailey, "Railways and the Confederation Issue in New Brunswick, 1863-1865," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXI, 381.

of the legislature which would ensure his own defeat at the elections,³⁰ or he could choose between two uncertainties: early elections or late elections. Whichever course he followed, he and his Liberal party ran the risk of defeat. Though his own preference was for postponing the contest, he allowed Gordon to persuade him to choose an early election, a course which led to temporary defeat. But it does not follow that the choice of the other road would have led to victory or that Gordon was wrong in persuading Tilley to call immediate elections or Tilley for allowing himself to be deflected from his own preference. Delay might have led to victory, but it might equally have led to a defeat less temporary than the one which actually occurred.

The result of the elections was a surprise and a shock to the Lieutenant-Governor. He had never imagined the defeat of the leading members of the Government.³¹ While he had noted in December that there was little positive support for the union, he considered that those who desired it were more in earnest than those who opposed it and the former had the "means of influence at their command which here seldom fail of effect."³² In his final forecast before the elections he estimated that in the new Assembly there would be 15 for Confederation, 18 against, and 8 purchasable seats. The Government could thus expect to find a majority.³³ However, Gordon had overestimated the strength of local issues in a contest which introduced a new concept antagonistic to the isolationism and to the fear of innovation which were characteristic of the cultural backwater that was New Brunswick.

Cardwell and the Canadians were disappointed and Tilley and Fisher were deeply chagrined at the result of the elections. The Canadians asked for and obtained from Cardwell a decided expression of imperial policy favouring union which it was felt would have a marked effect in persuading the loyal people of New Brunswick to reverse their decision. Fisher and Tilley, and Tupper of Nova Scotia, were parties to this plan and to an attempt to saddle Gordon and MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, with the blame for the defeat. They bluntly declared that their actions had "insured the defeat of the measure."³⁴ Fisher wrote to Macdonald: "I know everyone that he [Gordon] might be supposed to have the least influence with in any way, violently opposed Con-

³⁰Cf. Tilley's admission to Galt quoted above.

³¹PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, March 13, 1865.

³²*Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1864.

³³*Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1865.

³⁴A. G. Bailey, "The Basis and Persistence of Opposition to Confederation in New Brunswick," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXIII, 387.

federation, a state of things I cannot think could exist without his procurement in some way."³⁵ Gordon, then, was to be made the scapegoat, and what he had feared—that Cardwell would suspect him should New Brunswick reject Confederation—had come to pass. What is the truth? Did Gordon ensure, or seek to ensure, the defeat of the proposed union?

The answer to both parts of this question must be an unqualified "no." There were sound and adequate causes for Tilley's defeat without considering any interference on the part of the Queen's representative. These have been detailed by A. G. Bailey in the works previously cited, and by D. G. Creighton in *John A. Macdonald: the Young Politician*, and it is unnecessary to recount them here. Moreover, the governor of a colony possessing responsible government simply did not have the power or means to effect any marked change in public opinion. The election was not a close one, and even if Gordon had used such power as he possessed against Tilley the result would have been nearly the same. Judging from the result of the election and from the fact that it took more than a year, in not unfavourable circumstances, to reverse the decision, one may conclude that a difference of three months in the timing of the elections of 1865 would not greatly have affected the result.

There are also several reasons for arguing that Gordon did not seek to ensure the defeat of the proposed union. Even if we take seriously the testimony of the corrupt Fisher (the Duke of Newcastle once called him one of the worst public men in British North America) that everyone connected with Gordon opposed Confederation, this signifies very little when it is known that Gordon did not desire the defeat of the Tilley party and actually looked forward to its victory. He viewed with much pleasure the prospect of the abolition of his office with the coming of Confederation and he was anxious for an appointment which would give more scope for his talents.³⁶ He fervently desired to leave New Brunswick because the amenities it offered were insufficient to atone for the disgust he felt at the powerlessness of his official position.³⁷ He had, it is true, by dint of much persuasion and management, been able to build up and to maintain a degree of ascendancy over his Council which lasted until 1864 when he took his first leave of absence.

³⁵Fisher to Macdonald, April 5, 1865 quoted in *ibid.*, 387 f.

³⁶Stanmore Papers, Gordon to Wilberforce, Sept. 12, 1864, Nov. 16, 1864; Gordon to Head, Feb. 8, 1865; Br. Mus. Add. MSS 39114, Layard Papers, CLXXXIV, Gordon to Layard, March 25, 1865.

³⁷PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, Oct. 24, 1864; Br. Mus. Add. MSS 44320, Gladstone Papers, CCXXXV, Gordon to Gladstone, Feb. 26, 1865.

When he returned, he found that the Council had reasserted itself, his influence had evaporated, and every hint of opposition from him was met by its members with threats to resign, they knowing that it was impossible for him to form a new government.³⁸ He was driven to declare that he was viewed by the Council simply as its clerk.³⁹ This, for a man of Gordon's character, was intolerable. He hoped fervently that the whole question of union would be settled by spring and that he would be enabled to return to England by the end of the summer of 1865 at the latest.⁴⁰ The defeat of the Tilley ministry in March blasted this hope. It is hardly likely that he worked or lent such influence as he possessed to bring this about.

There were other reasons why the Lieutenant-Governor could not have sought to defeat Confederation. Such a defeat would ensure the victory of the American-sponsored European and North American Railway at the expense of the Intercolonial. Gordon had worked hard for the Intercolonial and he was decidedly anti-American. Furthermore a Liberal defeat would bring to power as head of a new ministry Albert Smith, the one man with whom he had never agreed and who had openly boasted of being his enemy.⁴¹ Gordon could scarcely wish this, nor could he foresee that the new ministry would be so divided within itself that he would have more power than he had ever experienced under its predecessor. Finally, no Lieutenant-Governor could have sought to place himself in the invidious position in which Gordon now found himself. Until the March elections his duties as an officer of the Crown and as Governor responsible to his Council had coincided. He had had simply to carry out imperial orders which, though he disagreed with them, were approved by his advisers. Now he had still to promote the same imperial policy with advisers who opposed that policy but whose own policies concerning union he deplored. Was he to act as the governor of a colony possessing responsible government should act and accept the advice of his constitutional advisers, or was he to carry out the orders of the Crown and thus be forced to deal with the official Opposition and so act unconstitutionally? A choice had to be made in matters pertaining to the union question.

To both Gordon and Cardwell the choice was obvious. Unless the new Government could be persuaded to adopt the federation policy

³⁸Stanmore Papers, Gordon to Wilberforce [Jan. 1865], Nov. 16, 1865, Gordon to Head, Feb. 18, 1865.

³⁹*Ibid.*, Gordon to Head, Feb. 18, 1865.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Gordon to Wilberforce [Jan., 1865].

⁴¹There are many evidences in the Stanmore Papers of the mutual antipathy of Gordon and Smith, e.g., see diary entry, Nov. 18, 1861, and Gordon to Waterfield, Jan. 27, 1863.

of its predecessor, Gordon must regard himself as being primarily an officer of the Crown and must carry out the policy of the Crown even if it meant that he had to consult and act with the leader of the Opposition. Cardwell was, however, doubtful of Gordon. He feared that the latter's opinions regarding the necessity of a strong union were so firmly held that he would not be able or willing to obey orders not wholly in conformity with those opinions. Gordon deeply resented Cardwell's suspicion of him since he had not only warned Cardwell against it but he had carried out his orders to the best of his ability and his ability was not in question. He had even gone beyond his orders in attempting to weaken the Opposition by trying to induce J. C. Allen, who became Smith's Attorney-General, to join Tilley before his Government fell. He had also, he wrote to Cardwell, kept his criticisms of the Quebec Resolutions to himself. He had, of course, informed the Canadian Government and the leading members of the Tilley Council of his views before the Quebec Conference while the preliminary agreement reached at Charlottetown still admitted of modification, but after that he had kept quiet. He believed that not more than half a dozen people outside the Tilley Government had known his opinion and even within the Council some members supposed him to be a warm advocate of the Quebec scheme.⁴²

The Secretary of State's doubts of him, the rumour current in New Brunswick and in England that he was being recalled because of dissatisfaction with his administration, and the fact that he had made a proposal of marriage and that he preferred, if accepted, to bring his bride to New Brunswick because of its healthier climate, combined to change Gordon's mind about taking the governorship of Hong Kong. He had been offered and had accepted this promotion early in March before the election results were known. He now preferred to remain in New Brunswick and work for a reversal of the decision on Confederation provided that Cardwell was disposed to give him his confidence.⁴³ He expected this would take some time and he and Tilley were agreed that it was too soon (May, 1865) to make the attempt. Opinion had not changed much, he informed Cardwell, and of this he was a better judge than the Canadians "who speak of this province without the same responsibility [and whose opinions] are accepted by you in preference."⁴⁴ He demonstrated to Cardwell his willingness to carry out orders when in the

⁴²PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, May 22, 1865.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, June 5, 1865.

late spring and early summer of 1865 a revival of the cause of Maritime union originated in Nova Scotia. While personally pleased and still believing that Maritime union would be a useful preliminary to Confederation he dutifully obeyed Cardwell's wish to prevent the movement gaining ground.⁴⁵

In August Gordon sailed for England. There is no foundation for the assertion that he was being recalled, despite the rumours which were circulating both in the North American colonies and in England and which led him to write to Cardwell that he would be much disappointed "if the reasons which were not considered sufficient to justify my resignation are considered sufficient to require my recall."⁴⁶ The fact was that he was returning to England to marry the eldest daughter of Sir John Shaw Lefevre. He applied for leave in the regular manner but since Cardwell had heard of his plans and had sent congratulations he did not await formal approval. The wedding festivities and honeymoon allowed little time for business. Gordon had but one interview with the Secretary of State.

This talk was, according to Gordon, a most unpleasant one. Cardwell "never forgets that he is ones [*sic*] master which is right and never lets one forget it oneself which is more questionable. On the other hand he never remembers that the relative positions of master and man have not always been what they now are."⁴⁷ Cardwell continued to show a marked distrust of Gordon's willingness to promote Confederation and to add insult to injury he demanded of him written assurance that he would do so.⁴⁸ Gordon's pride was deeply wounded. He was an English gentleman whose word was his bond. He had given his promise. Why then should he be compelled to put it in writing? He was reassured by Bishop Wilberforce who wrote: "It is 'nasty' and like him; but I think that is all. He [Cardwell] wishes I presume to be able to defend himself against attack."⁴⁹ Gordon then gave Cardwell the required assurance but in a stiff and formal manner. So long as he had the honour, he wrote, to hold any employment under the Crown he would always endeavour to the best of his ability to carry out the orders he received through the Secretary of State or any other authorized channel. Should he from any cause feel himself unable to do so, it would be his desire and duty at once to retire.⁵⁰ He left England for New Brunswick

⁴⁵*Ibid.*; Whitelaw, *Maritimes and Canada*, 279 f.

⁴⁶PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, June 30, 1865.

⁴⁷Stanmore Papers, Gordon to Wilberforce, Oct. 14, 1865.

⁴⁸PRO 30/48-6/39, Cardwell to Gordon, Sept. 29, 1865.

⁴⁹Stanmore Papers, Wilberforce to Gordon, Oct. 1, 1865.

⁵⁰PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, Oct. 5, 1865.

highly incensed with Cardwell, but by the time he and his wife reached Halifax he had calmed down sufficiently to repeat his assurances and ask the Secretary of State to be patient because if federation were to be accomplished it would be necessary to act slowly and cautiously.⁵¹

Before his journey to England, Gordon's approach to the problem had been to take advantage of the strong differences of opinion within the Smith Government in order to create a coalition between one of its factions and Tilley and a group of his more respectable supporters. However, the divisions in the Government had not come to the fore as early as he had expected and his plan was frustrated. Shortly after his return to New Brunswick he received a visit from George Brown and they "confidentially settled the whole course of operations to be pursued"⁵² in effecting New Brunswick's entry into Confederation. Satisfactory resolutions were to be adopted at the next session by making or buying a union majority in the legislature.⁵³ There would not be a resort to dissolution. Because the Government was rapidly weakening and the power of the Lieutenant-Governor was correspondingly enhanced, the chances were good that this plan might succeed and had it not been for the jealousy of Fisher and the Liberals it probably would have done so.

The Smith Government suffered a blow when Charles Fisher was returned for York in November. It suffered the loss of Timothy Anglin when it refused to undertake the western extension railway as a public enterprise. The conversion of the second man in the Government, R. D. Wilmot, to the cause of Confederation was another. Its policy became bankrupt when Smith failed both to change Cardwell's mind on the question of the union and to secure a renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty. Meanwhile Tilley's campaign on behalf of Confederation was gaining ground. On Smith's return from the abortive Washington trip Gordon persuaded him to agree to put a resolution favouring Confederation through the legislature. The Lieutenant-Governor was unable, however, to prevent Wilmot leaving the Government or to persuade Peter Mitchell to join it. Nevertheless the speech from the throne served notice on the anti-confederates that a change in policy was imminent.⁵⁴

The Legislative Council returned a strongly worded reply favouring union. In the Assembly, Colonel Boyd, speaking for the Government in answer to a question from Fisher, said that the speech from the throne meant that the Government had no objection to union

⁵¹*Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1865.

⁵²*Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1865.

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴*Journal of the House of Assembly of New Brunswick*, 1866, 10-12.

provided the terms were right. Fisher then moved an amendment not on the Confederation issue but questioning the competence of the Government in protecting the colony against the Fenians. The debate on this point dragged on for about three weeks and effectively prevented action on Confederation. If Smith had been looking for an excuse for delay this was it. As Macdonald suspected, "Fisher was playing Mr. Smith's game."⁵⁵ He was putting party before province, saying to Smith in effect: "You prevented us carrying confederation; we shall prevent you."

In view of such tactics a coalition was plainly impossible. Cardwell and the Canadians were impatient, and Gordon, feeling that he could countenance no further delay, decided to force the issue. On receiving the address of the Legislative Council, he replied to it against Smith's advice, with the result that the ministry resigned in a storm over the unconstitutional action.

It was impossible that the caretaker government headed by Mitchell and Wilmot could pass the address in reply to the speech from the throne in an assembly dominated by Smith's followers, who were clamouring for the Governor's head and who succeeded in passing, by a considerable majority, a motion of censure upon him. New elections were inevitable. But upon what issue would the campaign be fought, Confederation, or Gordon's unconstitutional behaviour? Smith, now bereft of policy, could but raise the cry of interference with the sacred principle of responsible government. Tilley was worried by this issue but he had forgotten too soon the lesson of 1856. Then the "unconstitutional" procedure of Manners Sutton had failed Tilley as an issue.⁵⁶ Now, as events were to show, it would fail Smith.

The intrusion of the constitutional issue was perhaps more fortunate than otherwise for Tilley's success. As Macdonald later told Tilley, he was never in a position to fight an election on the basis of the Quebec Resolutions,⁵⁷ and it was easier to defend the Lieutenant-Governor than it was the proposed union. By making public his correspondence with Smith, Gordon forced Smith to admit that he had agreed to support a union "provided one could be obtained upon fair and equitable terms."⁵⁸ He had not fulfilled his promise. This demonstrated to the public that the Premier had been guilty

⁵⁵D. G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician* (Toronto, 1952), 43.

⁵⁶J. K. Chapman, "The Mid-Nineteenth-Century Temperance Movement in New Brunswick and Maine," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXV.

⁵⁷Macdonald to Tilley, Oct. 6, 1866, quoted by Creighton, *The Young Politician*, 439.

⁵⁸*Journal of the House of Assembly of New Brunswick*, 1866, 217.

at least of procrastination if not of outright betrayal of his promise to Gordon. If not the latter, then he had been prepared to betray his supporters. In addition, Smith was prevented from making much of the Governor's failure to consult the Council as a body before replying to the address of the Legislative Council: according to Gordon,⁵⁰ it was generally known that Smith had hidden for several hours in order to delay receiving the Governor's message asking him to come immediately to government house on the day the Legislative Council presented its address.

Gordon admitted his error to Cardwell but the latter refrained from adverse comment. Doubtless he would not have been so kind had the Lieutenant-Governor's new advisers failed of election. The Secretary of State did however suggest that, in order to avoid angry correspondence with his former ministers, Gordon would be well advised to accept the governorship of Trinidad which had recently been offered him. The latter rejected this suggestion. His sudden departure from New Brunswick would leave the impression that his conduct had been disapproved at home and authority would thus be given to the views of the anti-confederates. Besides, he did not see why he should bear all the abuse being showered upon him by the discomfited ex-ministers and should receive no praise. He had, he felt, pulled the chestnuts out of the fire. Should he not have the satisfaction of reporting complete success and of receiving the credit for accomplishing a difficult task? Cardwell acquiesced.

Gordon remained in New Brunswick to witness the reversal of the decision of 1865 and to see the end of the Fenian menace. He left for Trinidad at the beginning of October. He had governed New Brunswick at a difficult time and had helped to direct her upon the path which the Imperial government, the Canadians, and the provincial Liberals desired her to take. He had not, however, been able to lead the province into a legislative union which might have abolished, or at least set at a distance, the political immorality from which it suffered. He had only been able to mitigate its profligacy. It was with wry humour mingled with sorrow that he heard, a few months after his departure, that there had been a wholesale dismissal of civil servants once his presence had been removed. Corruption was, then, to continue.

⁵⁰PRO 30/48-6/39, Gordon to Cardwell, April 23, 1866; June 3, 1866.

MR. BURKE'S IMPERIAL MENTALITY AND THE
PROPOSED IRISH ABSENTEE TAX OF 1773

THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY

IN 1773 a proposal was made in the House of Commons of Ireland that a tax of two shillings per pound be placed upon the net rents of Irish estates, the owners of which did not reside for six months of the year in Ireland. Those who stood to suffer the most, should this proposal become law, were, of course, the great English absentee holders of Irish estates, prominent among whom was Edmund Burke's patron, the Marquis of Rockingham. Rockingham became the leader of an opposition in England to the proposed tax, and his London town house in Grosvenor Square was the headquarters of this opposition.¹

Many years earlier, when Burke was an undergraduate at Trinity College, Dublin, he had proposed a similar tax in one of the sessions of the Debating Club which he had helped to found and which was the parent body from which the Trinity College Historical Society was descended. Burke proposed to his fellow members of the Debating Club on May 28, 1747, that the absentees be taxed 10 per cent of their estates. In support of his position, he argued that such a tax was the only means of preserving "some part of the little money in the Kingdome" and advanced "many other arguments" to strengthen his proposal. His opponent in the debate, William Dennis, thought that Burke's proposition was a most arbitrary one and argued that the money that went from Ireland to England could not rightly be said to go away from the country since "the blood wch runs from the extreame parts of the body to the heart can not be said to be lost to them, because it refunds it much improved" and further that such a tax would be a hindrance to "improvement by travel."²

Now as a seasoned member of the British Parliament, Burke's position on the proposed Irish Absentee Tax was just the reverse. In his opposition to the proposition, we are given a splendid insight into his imperial mentality, since, in playing the part he did in this instance, Burke was clearly placing himself in opposition to the

¹J. E. Tyler, "A Letter from the Marquis of Rockingham to Sir William Mayne on the Proposed Absentee Tax of 1773," *Irish Historical Studies*, VIII, no. 32 (September, 1953), 362.

²Arthur P. I. Samuels, *Early Life, Correspondence and Writings of Edmund Burke* (Cambridge, 1923), 251.

sentiment prevalent among the majority in the land of his birth. His convictions were so strong that this fact did not deter him in the least. He was well aware of the popularity of the measure in Ireland³ and likewise knew that it stood a good chance of passing in England.

One of the things which disturbed him in connection with the bill was his feeling that its proponents did not foresee that it would drive many absentees to permanent residence in Ireland. The very core of the proposal, as he saw it, was that it would separate Ireland from England to a considerable extent. Furthermore, if the proposal were to be adopted, it would be a case of a most important but nevertheless a subordinate part of the Empire being allowed to legislate for the whole.⁴

Rockingham and four other absentee peers, Devonshire, Bessborough, Milton, and Upper Ossory, all English-born but holders of vast amounts of landed property in Ireland, signed a remonstrance against the suggested tax. Dated October 16, 1773, and addressed to Lord North, the Prime Minister, it was very probably written by Burke and has been called one of the best state papers of the entire period.⁵ The remonstrance had the desired effect of creating a public agitation against the proposal. In it the signatories claimed the right of free citizens of the Empire to choose their place of residence wherever it might suit them in His Majesty's dominions. They expressed surprise that it should be proposed to stigmatize them for living in the country which was the principal member of the Empire and the residence of its ruler. It was their professed belief that the projected tax would be harmful to both England and Ireland. In the latter country, it would result in a depreciation of the value of landed property. In the former, it would mean that restrictions would result which had no counterpart within the Empire or, for that matter, as they claimed, in the whole civilized world.⁶ The protest was widely circulated and proved most effective.

Nevertheless, there was powerful support for the measure in England. Lord Chatham, for example, felt that there was considerable merit in the idea that the absentees should make a real contribution to Ireland in return for the benefits which they derived there

³Burke to Rockingham, Sept. 29, 1773. *The Correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke: Between the Year 1744, and the Period of His Decease, in 1797*, eds. Charles William, Earl Fitzwilliam, and Lt. Gen. Richard Bourke (London, 1844), I, 440.

⁴*Ibid.*, 441.

⁵William E. H. Lecky, *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1887), IV, 437.

⁶*Original Letters, Principally from Lord Charlemont, Edmund Burke, [and] William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, to the Right Hon. Henry Flood* (London, 1820), 59 f.

and was also of the opinion that colonial parliaments possessed the sole right of deciding their own taxation. So convincing were his arguments that he won Shelburne over to them, no mean feat in view of the fact that Shelburne was himself an Irish absentee.

Burke laboured vigorously behind the scenes and was assisted by his friend, Joseph Hickey, the attorney. They made Rockingham's town house their headquarters for the campaign against the projected tax. On October 16, the same day the Rockingham remonstrance, which was signed by the other four peers, made its appearance, Burke wrote a letter to Sir Charles Bingham, Bart., a member of the Irish House of Commons, calling the latter's attention to the writer's conviction that the measure would pass unless those interested in defeating it exerted themselves strenuously. Burke said that the tax would be used to "support Pension lists, useless establishments & every sort of Ministerial Profusion & extravagance" and asked Bingham to intercede with Lord Charlemont "who can influence Mr. Flood, if he means to support this measure." He went on to say that he himself would oppose the proposal in England and felt that he had "many weighty arguments against it" but could use more and asked Bingham for any which he could suggest.⁷

On October 30, 1773, Burke wrote another letter to Bingham in which he stated his unequivocal opposition to the tax, which, he said, struck a blow at both the power of England and the very unity of the British Empire itself. Bearing in mind his position in the dispute then going on with the American colonies, Burke was careful to make it clear that he did not entertain any odious notions concerning the directing power of the mother country in the Empire and pointed out that, if the Empire were to be preserved as a unit, there had to be an authority capable of maintaining that unity. Such an authority had to reside some place, a place within the Empire which could only be England. No other member of the Empire would approve of any other place of residence unless it were within its own borders. But this was manifestly impossible, hence the seat of that power in the very nature of things was England. This being so, England must have the distinctive privilege of imperial legislation—the law which regulates the policy and economy of the other members as they relate to one another and the whole. Under such

⁷Burke to Bingham, Oct. 16, 1773, Burke Papers, Sheffield. For permission to study these papers, which are deposited in the Sheffield City Library, and to quote from them, I gratefully acknowledge the courtesy of the Earl Fitzwilliam and his trustees of the Wentworth Woodhouse Estates Co.

an arrangement, the parts could not arrogate to themselves the power of making laws which could upset the order of the Empire.⁸

The proposed tax was equivalent to a declaration that England was a foreign country in the eyes of Ireland, he asserted. Such an implication constituted a real threat to the solidarity of the Empire and was commensurate with the rejection of the principle of "common naturalization" which embraced the whole Empire. He then asked Sir Charles whether he, or any other Irish gentleman, considered it a mean privilege that the moment he set foot on the soil of England he became to all intents and purposes an Englishman.⁹

Mutual intermarriage and inheritance were likewise discouraged by the tax. This was a bad feature, Burke observed, because it would mean the loss of factors which bound countries together closer than any laws or constitutions. Another obnoxious feature was the discouragement of travel.¹⁰ As a matter of fact, said Burke, the number of inconveniences which the tax would produce was considerable. He was constrained to admit that, in the nature of things, a large share of the money of each of the members of the Empire would flow to the seat of power, England, but this was unavoidable.¹¹ Other disadvantages were bound to result for the constituent parts of the Empire, because they were parts, each a member of a larger entity and not a whole themselves. Yet despite these inconveniences, did not the advantages which resulted from the united power of the Empire, considered as an undivided organization, more than make up for them? Burke replied to his own question in the affirmative.

Bingham replied privately to Burke on November 7 and thanked him for the arguments which he had supplied. He suggested to Burke that it would be a good idea for all absentees "who have good estates, to order their agents here to make some Freeholders in the several Counties where their states lye, & this before the next general Election—such a step would alarm the Members for those Counties more than you can imagine, & in order to get these Freeholders, they would always vote against any tax that would affect the Absentees—"¹²

⁸*Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke* (Beaconsfield ed., Boston, 1901), VI, 132.

⁹*Ibid.*, VI, 125.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, VI, 126 f. In 1795, over twenty years later, Burke maintained that it was of inestimable advantage that an Irishman possessed all the privileges of a natural-born Englishman simply because the former was a member of the Empire.

¹¹Here Burke employed one of the very arguments advanced against him during the debate in the Trinity Debating Club over his proposal of an absentee tax.

¹²Bingham to Burke, Nov. 7, 1773, Burke Papers, Sheffield.

In two letters to Rockingham, November 7 and 11, Burke made mention of his activities in behalf of the defeat of the absentee tax scheme. In the first one, he informed Rockingham:

I have seen Glynn who has done all that depended on him. My Lord Mayor departed has likewise done all that was to be expected from his character & connections. He cooled by a communication w. Berkeley Square as fast as he heated from the vivacity of his natural temper. The wind that blew from the great house in our quarter quite dulled the Mansion House. No common council has been called; the letters have indeed been communicated to the Irish Society. They acted properly, & come to a resolution of concurring in an opposition to the proposed tax. Whether it was merely accidental, or the politicks of the court or the [?] of Shelburne house, I know not, but a report was universally propagated & credited that the ministry had quite dropped the scheme. This contributed much to the postponing all ideas of calling a common council.¹³

The second letter revealed Burke to be quite sanguine over the prospects of the defeat of the measure.¹⁴

A long letter from Rockingham to Burke, November 12, showed the former's dependence upon Burke in this business. In it the Marquis revealed a proposed follow-up to the circular letter of remonstrance of October 16 and asked Burke to make any changes he desired. He assured him that he would be guided completely by Burke's judgment. In reply to this letter, Burke informed his friend and leader that he had heard that Lord North had said that "Nothing could be more popular than an absentee tax in Ireland, if Ministry had not supported it." He went on to advise Rockingham to send out the new circular letter in which he made a few minor changes. In flattering terms, he emphasized that the changes which he made were unimportant ones since Rockingham's letter was such that "Nothing can be more properly conceived or expressed."¹⁵ One alteration which he did make was to change the phrase "this Country" to "this Empire" for "reasons very obvious."¹⁶

As an illustration of how steamed up those who would be affected by such a tax had become, there is an interesting letter from the Earl of Clanricade to Burke, November 17, wherein His Lordship called the tax "an oppression which even a Turkish Government would blush [to] Carry into Execution."¹⁷ Burke himself was growing

¹³Burke to Rockingham, Nov. 7, 1773, *ibid.*

¹⁴Burke to Rockingham, Nov. 11, 1773, *ibid.*

¹⁵Burke was sincere in this belief as the letter to Charles O'Hara quoted below indicates. But as usual, he was blind to the faults of a friend. Rockingham's style was very involved and very hard to follow as a rule.

¹⁶Burke to Rockingham, Nov. 16, 1773, Burke Papers, Sheffield.

¹⁷Clanricade to Burke, Nov. 17, 1773, *ibid.*

more and more exercised as he revealed to his intimate friend, the Irishman Charles O'Hara:

All the rest of the Kingdom is quite stupified; except a small part which you have awakened by the scheme of an absentee Tax. You know the steps that have been taken in this Business, by the circular Letter & correspondence; which by being sent to all the absentees, have undoubtedly found their way to Ireland through more channels than one. Could any one believe it possible, even among all the drowsy visions of this raving (but not inspired) age we live in, that such a Project should be entertained among the ways & means of English Government? proposed by an English Secretary—to an English Lord Lieutenant,—adopted,—& what is more—avowed by an English first Lord of the Treasury—*stante Jove et urbe Roma!* I hear the pleasant end of it may be, that it will be smothered in the filthy slime & mud of that very popularity, to which it owed its equivocal Generation. Sr. Charles Bingham has written me two long & friendly Letters on the Subject. It is amazing with what spirit & activity Ld. Rockingham exerted himself on the occasion. Malagrida¹⁸ disapproved the measure as you may easily Judge—but he acted too in the manner you may easily judge.¹⁹

The opposition which Burke had done so much to raise proved strong enough to defeat the proposed tax. He received word of their victory from Bingham in a letter dated November 29. Although the initial measure was defeated, a Mr. O'Neil, urged on by Henry Flood, "who was enraged at his disappointment," proposed the same tax in a different form. This time it was "one shilling in the Pound on all remittances arising out of the Lands of Absentees." It, too, was defeated by being withdrawn, as the sense of the Irish House of Commons was against it following "a debate very dry & bad, the subject having been exhausted."²⁰

In another letter Bingham exulted over their victory and revealed that he "got great applause, thanks to your friendly assistance, for the support I gave against the Tax, and I had the Pleasure to hear from Many Gentlemen, that my arguments had the greatest weight with them, as they came undecided into the House." Bingham remarked that he did not let it be known that he had heard from Burke or that the latter's "Powers" contributed so much "to the throwing out of this infamous attempt of Administration."²¹

¹⁸I.e., Shelburne.

¹⁹Burke to O'Hara, Nov. 19, 1773, O'Hara MSS. The Burke-O'Hara correspondence has been edited by Professor Ross J. S. Hoffman and is shortly to be published. While in Sheffield, Professor Thomas W. Copeland, editor of the forthcoming edition of Burke's correspondence, kindly made available to me photostatic copies of the transcripts of this correspondence made by the late Canon Robert Murray. I had previously consulted these transcripts at the Bodleian Library in 1948. The quotation above is from the photostats in Professor Copeland's possession.

²⁰Bingham to Burke, Nov. 29, 1773, Burke Papers, Sheffield.

²¹Bingham to Burke, Nov. (n.d.), 1773, *ibid.*

Rockingham was also elated but felt that it was no time to rest on their laurels. Rather they should take every precaution and remain vigilantly prepared against a revival of the project. He felt that a parliamentary commendation to the "*Wise & Just Men in Ireland*—would be mustard to L North's nose even in his House of Commons Slumbers." This long letter concluded: "*I am glad they begin to abuse me in the News Paper—You come in for Your Share . . . It was a letter in Monday's News Paper signed—Marius.*"²²

Finally, Burke himself was pleased but also fearful that the idea might be revived:

The Parlt. of Ireland have I think done themselves much Credit. I believe no man rejoiced more who saved the ten per Cent on his Estate than the Ministry did here when the Parliament refused to send them that Coal of fire which they could neither know how to cast away or to hold. Most of the Cabinet here was utterly unacquainted with the design. They railed at it open mouthd. If it had come hither there would certainly have been some work; but you saved us the trouble & the Sport. However if I may judge by some conversations, & by the stir the Court hirelings have made in the Newspaper when it was so evident the wish & Interest of most of the ministers to let the matter drop, the attempt will be revived another time. I suspect it came from the Sanctum sanctorum. It must indeed by either very deep design or very consummate folly that first gave rise to it—Possibly a Little of both.²³

Poor Burke was criticized so often throughout his life for one reason or another, and still has his detractors today, that we cannot avoid noting the usual criticisms directed against him for the position which he took in the matter of the projected tax. Party feeling, personal friendship, and inconsistency are the customary charges against him in this business. The last may be dismissed rather easily since the fact that he had reversed the position which he had taken as a student ought not to be taken seriously for obvious reasons. The other strictures are more valid and have considerably more merit. One must admit that there can be no doubt that both of these factors influenced him in this affair. Nor is it surprising that he should have been so motivated—most people are in similar circumstances. But, as is so often the case with Burke, there was something else which was even more important than either of these considerations, weighty as both of them were with Burke. After all, it must be remembered that Burke had voted against his party before and would do so again and that friendship took second place to his principles on more than one occasion, as his famous breaks with Sheridan and Fox vividly demonstrate. That something which

²²Rockingham to Burke, Dec. (n.d.), 1773, *ibid.*

²³Burke to O'Hara, Dec. 22, 1773, O'Hara MSS.

had for Burke the first order of magnitude in this affair was his reverence for the British Empire and his personal feeling of obligation to it.

The fact that he, an obscure middle-class Irishman, could sit in the British Parliament never failed to impress him or to fill him with a truly reverential awe and appreciation for the imperial system which made such a thing possible. In his view of things, the benefits of imperial citizenship as he had learned from personal experience far outweighed any disadvantages accruing to it.

The feeling which he had displayed in the absentee tax business remained unaltered for the rest of his days. In 1797, only five weeks before his death, he wrote to his protégé, Dr. French Laurence, that he sincerely hoped that the Opposition in Ireland, which was composed of Burke's friends, would desist from the idea of an absentee tax which they were then considering. Such a proposal, he told Laurence, even went beyond that of the United Irishmen in the direction of the separation of England and Ireland, an idea which he would never tolerate.²⁴

A couple of months before the above-mentioned letter to Laurence, Burke alluded to the revived idea of an absentee tax in the strongest terms to Lord Fitzwilliam:

The Opposition, your Lordships friends & let me add, my friends, have gone the full length of Jacobinism, & are doing all they can to pull up the land-marks of private property & public safety, & to disunite the two Kingdoms; and that upon the falsest ground both of fact and principle, which, I might easily prove, if I had heart or strength for such a task. I confess whilst I blame the conduct of the Minority in that Kingdom I know how to excuse it. They, who provoke the passions of men beyond the limits of human prudence, are primarily & much the most heavily responsible for all the excesses into which Men are led by these passions. But the effect on the publick is the same, who ever may be culpable. I am extremely glad that your Lordship has resolved on the defense of those persons who residing in the seats of their Ancestors, and living in the Country in which they are born, possess Property in Ireland. I cannot enter into the case of every individual; but of this, I am sure, that several of you have been basely calumniated by the Opposition in Ireland, —You are branded by the odious Name of Absentees, as if you were bound to be present in Ireland at every roll call, as if you were Soldiers & the very people, a great part of the power & consideration of whose families has arisen from English Matches, as their Estates have arisen from English grants, have endeavoured to make English inter-marriages impracticable, & the inheritance of Irish property by Englishmen odious & precarious. I am glad that your Lordship intends to exert himself upon this occasion.²⁵

²⁴*The Epistolary Correspondence of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke and Dr. French Laurence* (London, 1827), p. 233.

²⁵Burke to Fitzwilliam, March 15, 1797, Burke Papers, Sheffield.

The time and energy which Burke put into the fight against the proposed tax in 1773, the forcefulness and pertinency of the arguments which he advanced, and the fact that these convictions remained as strong with him to the end of his life as in 1773 make it difficult to reach any other conclusion than that Edmund Burke sincerely believed in the cause which he espoused. He was motivated principally, not by party feeling or personal friendship, but by his belief that the tax would be such a serious blow to the British Empire that it could ultimately weaken it dangerously.

THE DEFENCES OF CANADA, 1710

GERALD S. GRAHAM

FOLLOWING the capitulation of Port Royal on October 7, 1710, a council of war appointed Major Livingston to visit the Governor of Quebec, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, to announce the capture, demand the surrender of English prisoners, and threaten reprisals should French and Indians continue their savage frontier raids. In making the journey (which resulted subsequently in this detailed report), Livingston endured, according to Colonel Vetch, "not only the greatest fatigue but danger ever mortal perhaps undertook and escaped."¹

A view of Canada taken by Major John Livingston, with accot. of fortifications and number of men.²

There is in Quebec town two hundred and fifty men of ye melitia, and one hundred and fifty soldiers in ye King's pay, two batteries in ye lower town, the westernmost has a street to ye northward of it (250,150 Frenchs 11 guns).³ About sixty yards off north east at ye river side (1 gun). About 100 yards farther north at ye river side is ye other battery, six twenty-four pounders, which are ye biggest in ye town. (6 guns) Upon ye hill to ye northward of ye Bishop's house lies a mortar alone. About 200 yards north north west turning ye point to ye Little River in ye priest's garden a brass mortar and 5 guns. (5 guns) As you goe round to ye hospitall along the river (3 guns). On the right hand of ye way going down to ye Intendant's, 5 guns next ye Little River. (5 guns) A little farther along said river, just by ye Intendant's (2 guns). And as you turn up, at ye Intendant's, there is a gate, and a little above yt gate is three guns west, and a small blockhouse upon ye works. (3 guns) And fifty yards farther south east, as you goe up the hill, is a levell peice of ground, and another gate, and a little further up the hill is a small watch house on ye works, and in it is (3 guns). And from thence till you come to ye stone wall, there is 2 or 3 halfe moons, one within another, and 2 guns course south-east. (2 guns) And on ye top of ye hill, in ye stone wall is six guns, and a gate in said wall. (6 guns) About 50 yards within in said wall north is a square place made of bricks, and a house in ye middle of it, which I call a magazine, and in it 5 guns. (5 guns) And north west from this square there is a windmill and a small battery of 5 guns, and a little further north north west, two guns. (7 guns) And along ye river at ye stone wall upon the hill there is a blockhouse, I saw no guns in it, and further north east upon ye hill at ye top of it there is work hove up, and stockadoes, till you come to ye fort, where is 17 guns planted, against ye river, and 11 patereroes, in this

¹Vetch to Lord Dartmouth, March 20, 1711; C.O. 5, vol. 9, no. 94.

²Dec. 27, 1710; C.O. 42, vol. 13, no. 7.

³Figures in parentheses are in margins with appropriate headings.

place ye governor lives. (17 guns, 11 patereroes) As you goe into ye fort there is 11 guns planted, and over ye Little River at Beauport is 2 guns. (13 guns) By information:—Upon ye island of Orleans there is 300 families and can raise about four hundred men. (400 French) At Shateresha five guns near Cape Diamond. (5 guns) At Shateresha, Sharleboo at Bompre, about four hundred men all militia. (400 French) This island of Orleans lyes about a league below Quebec, and Shateresha seven leagues on ye north west shoar, Sharleboo at Bompre on said shoar near to Quebec, all inhabited. Down ye river of Quebec fifteen leagues at River delu and Dormont, which is on ye said side of said river, about 50 families. (50 French) At Lorette which makes ye Little River of Quebec about four leagues from said town, is an Indian town, about fifty men. (50 Indians) Of ye nation of Orquanshaws, which inhabitt all along ye great river of Quebec, about 70 men. (70 Indians) On ye south east side of ye river over against Quebec, of ye stragling inhabitants, from the River Delesolier to ye River Deleiu, which is 18 leagues, there is about 70 men. (70 French) From Quebeck to a village which is called Ponta Tromble is 7 leagues, ye inhabitants settled along ye river, including ye village about 160 men by observation. (160 French) From Ponta Tromble to Port Nuff [*Neuve*] is seven leagues, along ye river is a small fort, ye inhabitants about forty men as you goe along. (40 French) About 3 leagues farther a village called Gronden, about 70 men. (70 French) Two leagues farther a seigniorie called St. Ann, where is about forty men. (40 French) And 2 leagues farther a village called Shamplin, about 90 men. (90 French) Two leagues farther a village called Belscank, about one hundred men. (100 French) And from thence to Trois Rivieres, which is four leagues along said river, about 70 men. (70 French) At Trois Rivieres, which is thirty leagues above Quebec, a place stockadoed in, about 200 yards long, and near ye same breadth, in which is severall housen, and is ye governor's residence, is seven guns, 80 soldiers, and about ye same number of inhabitants. (7 guns, 160 French) From Trois Rivieres to a place called St. Francoise which place lyes on ye south east part of L. St. Pierre about forty inhabitants up said river. (40 French) And about two leagues farther up, an Indian fort called St. Franswa [*François*], 260 men. (260 Indians) From St. Franswa to Sorrell is about four leagues to ye fort in ye mouth of Shamblee River, where is forty soldiers, and about thirty inhabitants. (70 French) Up ye River Shamblee, about 18 leagues to ye fort, is no inhabitants. From Sorell by way of St. Toer, Countercure, Verseer, and severall other seigniories, which have small forts, two leagues ye one from ye other, along the east side of Quebec River up to Longolia is 18 leagues, for ye most part inhabited along ye river side, about 300 inhabitants. (300 French) From thence cross ye woods 5 leagues course south east and by east upon ye River Shamblee is a stone fort about 16 foot high, and as I guess about 80 yards one way and fifty ye other, each corner a bastion about twenty foot out, six great guns, 100 soldiers, and about 20 inhabitants, stands at ye foot of the riplings on ye north west side of ye river. (6 guns, 120 French) From Longolia to Laparee de Muda Ane, which lies up Quebec River, is 4 leagues. There is a fort at said villiage with four guns but out of repair, and by information 100 inhabitants and 20 soldiers. (4 guns, 120 French) From thence along said river 2 leagues an Indian fort called Nonoh-nowagoo, 250 men. (250 Indians) There is

some small force more up said river, which I could not gain particular information of. From Trois Rivières along ye north west side of ther great river to River De Lu, and so to ye end of ye island of Montreal, which is 23 leagues, stragling inhabitants about 200. (200 French) From ye north east part of Montreal Island to ye town of Montreal (including the villiage of Ponta Tromble, where there is a small fort of stockadoes) being 7 leagues, all ye inhabitants, including some of ye islands of ye great river are about 400 men. (400 French) At the town of Montreal, which is all stockadoed round with cedar stockadoes about 16 foot high, and bastions ye length of 1400 yards and 34 yards wide, 26 guns, 11 patereroes, 280 officers and soldiers, 300 inhabitants. (26 guns, 11 patereroes, 580 French) From thence to ye south west part of ye island, which is ten leagues inhabited scattering about 150 men. (150 French) About 3 leagues north west from Montreal an Indian fort called Canowsadago or L'Mountin, where is 200 Indians. (200 Indians) A stone forte at Codroque, which is 80 leagues from Montreal up ye river called Frontenack, at ye mouth of ye Lake called Codroque, where is 40 soldiers, as I guess about 8 guns, no inhabitants. (8 guns, 40 French). Totals: (4070 French, 830 Indians, 145 guns, 22 patereroes)

REVIEW ARTICLE

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON GERMAN HISTORY*

R. A. SPENCER

WITH the abating of political passions stirred up by the Nazi experience and the war, the study of German history in Britain and the United States could return from the realm of the polemic to scholarship. Of the dozen volumes sent to the REVIEW within the past two years, however, many reflect the continued interest in and apprehension about the future of the new Germany whose achievements in the post-war decade are summarized in the official handbook, *Germany Reports*. Most deal to a greater or less degree with German history since 1919; two, however, are important studies of the nineteenth century; and three cover longer periods.

One of the strange features of modern German historiography—in German as well as in English—has been the lack of scholarly and attractively written one-volume histories. Ralph Flenley's *Modern German History* (1953), a judicious survey from the Reformation to the Third Reich, with particular attention to cultural and intellectual developments, was an important attempt to remedy this deficiency. Somewhat different in its scale and treatment is Koppel S. Pinson's *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization*, which appeared a year later. Apart from brief introductory chapters its 600 pages are devoted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Bismarckian Reich is treated topically in five chapters, with an additional one on the war; and Weimar is dealt with on a similar scale. The Nazi and post-1945 periods are covered more briefly. Professor Pinson has attempted to pass lightly over wars and diplomacy, and to concentrate on internal affairs, integrating developments in culture and thought into the general stream of German history. In this latter aim he has achieved notable success, although the chapter on cultural life in Weimar descends almost to the level of a catalogue. The general theme of the book is the tragic effort of liberal and democratic forces to withstand the pressure of militarism and nationalism. It includes tables of elections and of cabinets, and the extensive references, assembled at the end, are a valuable guide to the literature on which the study is based. This, with the inclusion of many apposite quotations from primary German sources, makes this an excellent teaching text. There are some factual errors: it was the Government of National Defence, not the Paris Commune, which held out against the Prussians in 1870 (p. 147); and the British general who suggested the phrase "stab in the back" was Malcolm, not Maurice (p. 344). But these do not seriously detract from the value of this mature and readable text.

A similar time span is dealt with by Gordon Craig in his *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*. The problem of militarism has recently received a good deal of attention, chiefly because of the part played by the army in Hitler's campaign of destruction. Far from being merely another account of generals *versus* Nazis, Professor Craig's book is a fascinating study of the political role of the Prussian army from the time of the Great Elector to the nightmarish days in the Chancellery bunker in 1945. The emphasis, however, is on the

*For a list of books reviewed in this article see page 174.

years 1807-1933. The most original chapters are those based on the documents which became available after 1945, but there are many topics—the struggle of Bismarck versus Moltke and the Schlieffen plan among them—where Professor Craig's account is the best available in English. He has made a distinguished addition to our understanding of militarism in Germany—a problem which, as Karl Buckheim has remarked, assumed a special importance because in German history the army and democracy became antithetic factors.

The social and economic, as well as the political and military, factors that led to this development are dealt with in F. L. Carsten's *The Origins of Prussia*, a careful account of the growth and development of the institutions of the Prussian state, beginning with the colonization and ending with the death of the Great Elector in 1688. Mr. Carsten argues convincingly that "nothing was further from the Teutonic Knights than a policy of racial or national victimization," and he makes it clear that their Prussia was a country of peasants and small landowners, and more advanced socially than neighbouring principalities. If this was the legacy of the middle ages, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the development of Hohenzollern despotism which "cut off even the possibility of the gradual emergency of a modern representative institution." For the reader who is neither a mediaevalist nor an economic historian, the most interesting chapters will be those which describe the rise of the Junkers, with their peculiar social-political position; and the evolution of Hohenzollern despotism, with the decline of the towns, the defeat of the Estates, and the making of the nobility into a "service nobility."

As Mr. Carsten suggests, the association of the nobility with the state frustrated reform until the early nineteenth century, when it became possible only because the Old Prussia was destroyed on the battlefield, and the resistance of the ruling aristocracy was temporarily neutralized. That the strength of the old régime persisted was clearly demonstrated in the crisis which has been analysed by Eugene Anderson in his *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1864*. As his title suggests he regards the conflict not merely as constitutional, but as the clash of cultural values whose outcome ultimately decided the distribution of political power which was to survive in Prussia until 1918. Professor Anderson's topical treatment of this conflict—essentially one between the Junkers and the new middle class—tends to rob it of any real drama, and his painstakingly detailed account is sometimes clogged by the obtrusion of too much source material. Yet it is characteristic of his thoroughness that he should accompany his analysis with the hitherto unpublished (and enormously complex) statistics of the elections of 1862 and 1863.

Professor Anderson is understandably on the side of the liberals as opposed to the conservatives who were determined to preserve their privileged positions by interpreting the unwanted constitution of 1850 according to their own lights, but he also criticizes the liberals as being too devoted to legalisms, unaware of political power, and never prepared to admit the full consequences of their principles. They never understood ministerial responsibility, and they shrank from developing mass support because they were unwilling to demand limitation of the royal prerogative. As the King swung to the conservative side, the liberals were defeated. "They saw their moral and political assumptions being wrecked, and they came to believe in the superior efficiency of *Realpolitik*." Herein lies the tragedy of German liberalism.

Though the crisis involved more fundamental issues, the liberals concentrated all their energies on the apparently technical question of a two

(instead of three) year service. To solve this question von Roon was made Minister for War. His scheme was the essence of militarism: to make the nation submit to a soldier king and his officer advisers. It was von Roon who installed Bismarck as Minister-President. But Bismarck aimed at something more than preserving the old régime of absolute monarchy and nobility. He possessed a quality of realism which his conservative colleagues lacked. Maintaining himself against both King and Landtag, he was prepared to evolve a programme which, taking elements from the liberal side, would balance dynastic and particularistic interests with popular participation in solving Prussia's (and Germany's) problems by unification.

The career begun under these circumstances is sketched in A. J. P. Taylor's *Bismarck the Man and the Statesman*. In view of the sometimes uncritical notices which this book has received it is important to state that it is by no means a rival to Erich Eyck's three-volume *Leben und Werk* (of which only a fragment has been translated). What Mr. Taylor has done is to write in less than 300 pages a brilliant and provocative interpretative sketch, in which Bismarck the man is skilfully integrated with Bismarck the statesman. He shows Bismarck as bitter, cynical and neurotic by the time he was thirty, already demonstrating petty malignity and infuriated by opposition. Suspicion grew with power; his colleagues became subordinates to carry out the orders of the man who was always right. Yet he possessed great personal charm, and Mr. Taylor feels that "of all the great public figures of the past he is the one whom it would be most rewarding to recall from the dead for an hour's conversation." As a statesman Bismarck was ruthless and unscrupulous, but distinguished by his moderation. As a diplomatist he was possessed of uncanny sensitivity and inexhaustible expedients. His social policy is lavishly praised as "his most individual claim to fame." But even here he was great only in a crisis: his peculiar talent lay in stacking the cards, not in playing the hand.

The most original part of the work is the theme that Bismarck was the unconscious maker of Prussia-Germany, aiming in the first instance to divide Germany with Austria at the Main, not to unite it, and only stumbling on a plan, without knowing it, which was to lead to the victories of 1864-6. Even the solution, Mr. Taylor argues, was accidental: the division at the Inn acquired reality only through existence.

Mr. Taylor's book is written in his accustomed witty and incisive style, but sometimes phrases run away with the facts. This reviewer closed the book entertained, enlightened, but not convinced by the originality of Mr. Taylor's treatment.

Winston Churchill once called Konrad Adenauer "the greatest chancellor since Bismarck," but in the interval Germany produced a statesman whom many ranked with either. Gustav Stresemann, the only political personality of first rank in the Weimar period, has long been a controversial figure. Known in his lifetime as the apostle of reconciliation, his attitude to the secret evasion of the disarmament provisions has puzzled even his most ardent admirers. In his brief, penetrating study Hans Gatzke attempts to throw light on the enigma of Stresemann's metamorphosis from annexationist-monarchist to internationalist and Nobel Prize winner. The picture which emerges is of a man who expressed neither indignation, concern, nor surprise at Reichswehr activities contrary to his professed foreign policy. His attitude ranged from passive acceptance of secret rearmament to active assistance. "He was a nationalist," Professor Gatzke argues, supporting any move on the army's

part that tended to remedy Germany's military impotence. It is curious to note that despite the new evidence available, the famous letter of September 7, 1925, to the Crown Prince, in which the term *finassieren* was used, still remains one of the clearest expositions of Stresemann's aims. Gatzke concludes that Stresemann was a great German statesman, pursuing a two-faced policy out of devotion to his country; he was neither the "good European" nor the "honest dreamer of peace and apostle of reconciliation" seen by his contemporaries or biographers.

While there is insufficient evidence to prove Stresemann's participation in the secret arrangements with Bolshevik Russia, it is unlikely that these could exist without his knowledge, and after Scheidemann's embarrassing disclosures in December, 1926, they were continued and perhaps even intensified with Stresemann's approval. This policy was conceived in realistic self-interest and nurtured despite ideological differences. That Hitler's relations with the Soviet Union from the spring of 1939 to the launching of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, followed the same pattern is one of the conclusions which emerges from Gerald L. Weinberg's *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-41*. His analysis of the captured German documents shows *inter alia* that Stalin's decision to conclude an agreement with Germany dates from the second week in July, 1939, not from March as some accounts have suggested; and that both economic and naval co-operation were considerably greater than has been thought. It is now unmistakably clear that it was the British refusal to accept the fact of military defeat which drove Hitler eastwards. "*With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope will be shattered.*" So the Führer told a secret conference on July 31, 1940, and from that date his inflexible decision was elaborated into a "blue-print for ruthless aggrandizement" in which ideological factors had no place.

In the assault on Yugoslavia—the result, Mr. Weinberg shows, not the cause, of the decision taken on July 31, 1940—as in that on Poland two years earlier, the German armed forces were assisted to a considerable degree by *Volksdeutsch* elements. That these were exceptions to the pattern of Nazi conquest is one of the conclusions reached by Louis de Jong, the Executive Director of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, in his *The German Fifth Column in World War II*. Though he includes himself among the victims of fifth column panic in 1940, the evidence he adduces now makes it clear that the German fifth column was considerably less extensive and less important than was believed at the time. It was superfluous in Denmark, so swift was the German assault; the successes in Holland and Norway were purely military; and while a Frenchman might linger over the memory of a particular German spy—"une tendre jeune fille, si douce, si rêveuse, si innocente, si 'gemütlich'"—there was less tendency to blame defeat on treachery in view of unmistakable German military superiority.

Within Germany, on the other hand, the evidence accumulated since the war has shown that the resistance to the Nazi régime was broader and deeper than many in the West had supposed on the basis of its ineffectiveness in practical terms. Wheeler-Bennett's *Nemesis of Power*, the best account of the resistance in English, has been criticized in Germany as depicting the movement too largely as one deriving from defeat and aiming only at preventing Germany's destruction. This criticism is echoed in Mother Gallin's *Ethical and Religious Factors in the German Resistance to Hitler*. It is undeniable that many of the participants were men of high character; all faced dilemmas such

as whether to resign and become impotent, as did Beck, or to stay in office and try to mitigate the horrors, if not to sabotage the rule, of the régime, as did von Weizsäcker, to whose defence Mother Gallin devotes many pages. However, despite the abundance of moral and religious convictions, the culminating plot of July 20 was singularly inept. Its leaders were liquidated—though not without having struck a spark which may yet prove of deep significance to German history. The opposition which Pastor Bonhoeffer felt was a moral necessity came to an end, and the defeat for which he had prayed followed within a year.

This decline and fall has been vividly told in Georges Blond's *The Death of Hitler's Germany*. His narrative shifts from east to west and back again, but always looking at the collapse from inside Germany. Before Jodl finally acknowledged defeat in the Reims school-house, the Nazi régime had written unprecedented pages into the annals of crime. This, in all its deepening horrors, has been detailed in Lord Russell of Liverpool's *The Scourge of the Swastika*, properly set against the background of tyranny imposed upon the Germans themselves before 1939. Memories are short. Leaving aside the political purpose which prompted the publication of this book, it is important that there should be available a brief record of the level to which human beings could descend in the twentieth century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDERSON, EUGENE N. *The Prussian Election Statistics, 1862 and 1863*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska. 1954. Pp. xxxii, 147.
- *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia 1858–1864*. University of Nebraska Studies, new series, no. 12. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1954. Pp. x, 446. \$5.00.
- BLOND, GEORGES. *The Death of Hitler's Germany*. Translated by FRANCES FRENAYE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. x, 302. \$4.50.
- CARSTEN, F. L. *The Origins of Prussia*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1954. Pp. viii, 310. \$4.50.
- CRAIG, GORDON A. *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1955. Pp. xx, 536. \$7.50.
- DE JONG, LOUIS. *The German Fifth Column in the Second World War*. Translated from the Dutch by C. M. GEYL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1956. Pp. xii, 308. \$5.00.
- GALLIN, MARY ALICE. *Ethical and Religious Factors in the German Resistance to Hitler*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press. 1955. Pp. x, 231. \$2.50 (paper).
- GATZKE, HANS W. *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press [Toronto: Burns and MacEachern]. 1954. Pp. x, 132. \$4.00.
- Germany Reports. With a Preface by Federal Chancellor Dr. KONRAD ADENAUER; 81 charts, 84 tables, and 47 full page photographic reproductions. Bonn: The Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government. 1954. Pp. 368.
- PINSON, KOPPEL S. *Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. xviii, 637. \$10.00.
- RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, LORD. *The Scourge of the Swastika: A Short History of Nazi War Crimes*. With 16 pages of halftone illustrations. New York: Philosophical Library. 1954. Pp. xii, 260. \$4.50.
- TAYLOR, A. J. P. *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman*. London, Toronto: Hamish Hamilton. 1955. Pp. 286, illus. \$4.00.
- WEINBERG, GERHARD L. *Germany and the Soviet Union 1939–1941*. Leiden, E. J. Brill. 1954. Pp. viii, 218.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. I. Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain, and the Pacific. By C. P. STACEY. Maps drawn by C. C. J. BOND. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955. Pp. xiv, 629, illus. \$3.50.

In this handsomely printed volume with its carefully chosen appendices, illustrations, sketches, and maps, Colonel Stacey has fully lived up to his promise in the earlier summary of the Canadian military effort in the last war that as soon as possible a fuller account would be forthcoming "to tell the Canadian citizen what his army has accomplished in the last war, and to provide him, perhaps, with the means of forming an intelligent judgement on military issues that may confront him in the future." His account is deliberately aimed at the general reader and, if this reviewer can venture to be their spokesman, he can state unqualifiedly that the author succeeded admirably. When completed, the official history will run to four volumes, a second being promised for this year on the campaign in Italy, the third on the Northwest Europe campaign, and the final one, which will be of particular interest to historians, on "Canadian military policies in the broad sense including such matters as cooperation within the Commonwealth and with Allied powers."

In the seven years since the summary appeared the author has been able to strengthen his sources materially. Besides help received from the war historians of six Commonwealth countries and the United States he has had unrestricted access to all Canadian government papers, the full use of the private papers of the Minister of National Defence for 1935-9 and of General McNaughton, access to General Crerar's private files, and co-operation from Senator Power and the literary executors of Mackenzie King. The effect can be measured by carefully studying the voluminous footnotes which publishing exigencies have regrettably relegated to the back of the book.

This volume falls naturally into three divisions: organization, training, and home defence in Canada; the army in Britain; and the war against Japan. In each section the author has assembled with patience and pertinacity a mass of material which he has never allowed to smother him by its sheer weight. What emerges is a skilfully planned account of how "an unmilitary community" met successfully, if at times haltingly, the greatest challenge in its history. To a taxpayer who has become accustomed in the past five years to a defence budget of over \$1.5 billion it will seem incredible that it took so much effort by soldier, civil servant, and cabinet minister to secure approval as late as the fiscal year 1939-40 for a defence budget of \$60 million. The late Ian Mackenzie, when Minister of National Defence, described the defence problem in September, 1936, as "a most astonishing and atrocious situation." The opening chapter amply proves this verdict and demonstrates how much we owe to the little group of militia officers who struggled, along with a permanent force of less than 4,300 (July, 1939), to keep some semblance of an army in being. The calibre of these officers is well illustrated by the senior appointments which they had achieved by the end of the war. The closest that the author comes to a criticism of some of their personnel appears in his dis-

cussion of the years of training overseas, which paid "tremendous dividends," although he thinks the army "still got rather less than it might have had." Apart from initial shortages of equipment, the reason for this deficiency, in his judgment, arose from the tendency found among some regimental officers to display an attitude towards training which was "casual and haphazard rather than urgent and scientific": like the traditional amateur actor they were cheerfully confident that it would "be all right on the night without their having to exert themselves too much." Sometimes the defects in training went right to the top, as was demonstrated by "Exercise Spartan" in March, 1943, which was the largest exercise for Canadian troops of the war. The armoured divisions involved made "disappointingly slow progress," there was "a complete breakdown in communications between Corps and Army Headquarters" and a faulty regrouping of his forces by one of the Corps commanders. As the author, somewhat elliptically, puts it, "The unfortunate aspect of the matter was that a poor performance by any Army or Corps in such manoeuvres was likely to count heavily against its commander in the opinion of GHQ Home Forces and the War Office."

There are several interesting illustrations of the high opinion which senior British officers had of General McNaughton's military judgment and their regret at the series of abortive efforts to get into action which his troops experienced in 1940 and 1941.

Problems of adequate consultation with Ottawa are also carefully described, the most illuminating being the account of the episode when General McNaughton agreed to send a Canadian force to Norway and allowed over thirty hours to pass before sending any information about the proposition to NDHQ. As Colonel Stacey says crisply, "Such a delay never happened again." One completely new piece of information is given about Canada's cautious attitude towards the American eagerness to invade Western Europe in 1942 as expressed by General Pope and the Prime Minister in appropriate circles in Washington. At the Pacific War Council in April, 1942, King secured complete agreement with his views after he explained why he felt that Roosevelt "was crowding the position pretty strongly." It is the author's verdict that, despite the Prime Minister's lack of military experience, "his instinct and his common sense led to a very sound conclusion."

The nature of this volume precludes much opportunity for describing the Canadians in action. But when the opportunity is presented, as is true of the raid on Dieppe and the defence of Hong Kong, the author does ample justice to his subject. More is known about Dieppe than when he last described it, so that Colonel Stacey is able to be more precise in his assessment. This "brave and bitter" day when more Canadians were taken prisoner than in the whole of the campaign after D Day, when the RAF lost more fighter planes than on any other single day since the war began, when six of the seven commanding officers of the Canadian units did not return, was "almost a complete failure" tactically. The "optimistic tactical conceptions" of the planners were shattered irretrievably by "Operation Jubilee." The Canadian people must content themselves with the assurance that "The casualties sustained in the Dieppe raid were part of the price paid for the knowledge that enabled the great enterprise of 1944 to be carried out at a cost in blood smaller than its planners had ventured to hope for."

If the subsequent volumes maintain the high standard set by Colonel Stacey's initial one, Canada will possess an official history that will be surpassed by none. It is earnestly to be hoped that the RCAF will feel obliged to set to and produce a worthy counterpart.

F. H. SOWARD

The University of British Columbia

The Age of Mackenzie King: The Rise of the Leader. By H. S. FERNS and B. OSTRY. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Toronto: British Book Service (Canada) Limited. 1955. Pp. xiv, 356, illus. \$4.25.

PREVIOUS biographers of Mackenzie King have skipped lightly over the years down to his election as leader of the Liberal party in August, 1919, when he was in his forty-fifth year. That is the point at which the story by Ferns and Ostry ends. They say in their preface: "This book is presented to the reader not as a definitive study, but as an essay contributed to a public discussion of the thoughts and policies of a man who reflected and in some measure shaped the character of Canadian society. . . . We have found that a factual examination of his early political life throws a vivid and revealing light upon his years of power."

Enemies of the late Prime Minister will gloat over this book, and his admirers will be strongly tempted to throw it into the fire; for the authors seem to have been intent on digging up all the dirt they could in order to prove that Mackenzie King was fundamentally an unprincipled self-seeker. What they do reveal, unwittingly, is that they themselves, as scholars, are no more honest than they would have him be. Also, apparently without realizing it, they smear their native country while smearing him. They do it by harping on the thesis that he owed his extraordinary success as prime minister to the fact that he represented and understood Canada far better than any of his rivals.

In the first chapter the authors give an impressionistic account of the great student strike of 1895 in Toronto University, when Mackenzie King was a senior; and they report, but fail to support with factual evidence, an old rumour that he "ratted" on his fellows. Much less attention is paid to what is more important—his active interest in welfare work when he was still an undergraduate. The chapter on his four years as a graduate student, first at Chicago and then at Harvard, shows how he became immersed in the problem of industrial relations and, while preparing for an academic career, put his foot in the door of government service. In the well-known story of his interview with Mulock on the production of Canadian postmen's uniforms by sweated labour, Ferns and Ostry see only a young man using veiled blackmail to sell his services and possessing "a very acute idea of how a political reputation might be made."

The two chapters on Mackenzie King as the first Deputy Minister of Labour and editor of the *Labour Gazette* have him making that government periodical his "personal organ" and the department "a friendly society of his own" to further his political ambition. Apparently in ignorance of the fact that Parliament in 1900 passed the Conciliation Act and provided for the establishment of a Department of Labour to administer this act, Ferns and Ostry pour scorn on Mackenzie King for pushing the policy of conciliation. They insist that he

was the betrayer, not the friend of labour. The book abounds in such remarks as "Whether Mackenzie King succeeded at this time in keeping himself clean, we cannot say." The chapter on his career as a member of Laurier's Cabinet is almost entirely devoted to the Grand Trunk Railway strike of 1910. His handling of that crisis, according to Ferns and Ostry, dealt the death-blow to the Laurier Government. Those of us who at that time had a vote in Canadian elections have always thought that it was something else that turned Laurier out.

According to the authors, Mackenzie King raised his dubious stock as an expert in labour relations by cultivating President Eliot of Harvard, but they do not refer to the fact that while he was still Deputy Minister he was Eliot's first choice for the deanship of the new Graduate School of Business Administration. The chapter on Mackenzie King's Rockefeller connection is sketchy and confused, going into details only where the authors think they can prove him a liar or a Judas to labour. In the chapter on the 1917 election campaign, they maliciously misconstrue his proposal for consultation with British, American, and other allied authorities on what "resources and men" Canada should supply to the war effort; and they sneer at his excuse—the illness of his mother—for not meeting Laurier in Toronto. They call it "his mother's chest condition" and make no reference to her death, which occurred on election night. Their chapter summarizing *Industry and Humanity*, the book that gives the key to Mackenzie King's work as a labour conciliator, is much less intelligible than the shorter sketch in Bruce Hutchison's *The Incredible Canadian*. Ferns and Ostry have certainly not produced "a definitive study," and they make this reviewer suspect a hidden motive behind their denigration.

A. L. BURT

The University of Minnesota

The Struggle for the Border. By BRUCE HUTCHISON. Maps by JAMES MACDONALD. Toronto: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1955. Pp. xii, 500. \$6.00.

THE past few years have seen a growing interest in the history of Canadian-American and Anglo-American relations. The groundwork was laid for this in the admirable Carnegie series on Canadian-American relations which began to appear in the decade before the war. Since that time historians have increasingly turned their attention to a study of the intricate triangular relations existing between Britain, Canada, and the United States. The latest to join the lists is Bruce Hutchison in his *Struggle for the Border*. However, Mr. Hutchison has not written a narrow diplomatic history of Canadian-American relations. Rather, he has chosen to write the larger story of how Canada was founded and then survived the pressures from the south to develop into a separate nation with its own unique institutions.

Because of this he opens his volume with the French settlement of Canada. He then moves rapidly over the struggle for the continent that culminated in Britain's victory over France in 1763, and into the American Revolution which produced the United States on the one hand, and Canada on the other. The struggle for the border was now in full swing, and in succeeding chapters Mr. Hutchison covers the race for the West and the War of 1812—the latter creating, he observes, "a new creature, the Canadian" (p. 257). But if the

Canadian, he continues, had now appeared, his survival was less than certain, and so he next deals with the various crises that Canada had to meet. These involved border disputes from Maine to Oregon; the struggle over the fisheries; the threat, real and imagined, of the Fenians; and the fight to retain the West in the face of Riel's rebellion. With Confederation assured and the West safe, Canada's separateness was recognized by the United States, and Mr. Hutchison concludes with a narrative of the peaceful Canadian-American relations which culminated in the close wartime co-operation between Roosevelt and King.

Those who know Mr. Hutchison's previous works will expect a vividly written book. And they will not be disappointed. His style is vigorous and he tells an exciting story well. His character sketches are swift, if not always sure; and his judgments stimulating, if not always convincing. His great merit is, however, that he shows with force how Canada's growth has been, in part, a reaction to American pressure.

The weakness of the book lies in the considerable number of errors which have crept into it. He is unfair to General Amherst, and his explanation of the American Revolution as largely a clash of economic interests is inadequate. His analysis of the Revolutionary War is weakened by the repetition of the old story that Howe and Burgoyne missed each other through lack of instructions. Surely this myth has been killed so often that by now it should be stone cold dead. His explanation of the War of 1812 is superficial. The Orders in Council, for example, were not absolutely, but only conditionally, repealed in 1812. Mr. Hutchison insists that no answer has been found to why Britain accepted the *status quo ante bellum* in 1814. A reading of any of the recent standard works in the field would have given him the answer and would have shown him, too, why Wellington behaved as he did. He overestimates the danger of American annexation during the Riel crises, and is probably too harsh on Macdonald's actions in this affair. But when all this is said, Mr. Hutchison has still written a stirring account of a fascinating subject.

PATRICK C. T. WHITE

The University of Toronto

Acadian Odyssey. By OSCAR WILLIAM WINZERLING. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1955. Pp. xiv, 224. \$4.85.

This book is modestly described by its author as "only one chapter in the vast history of the Acadians," since it concerns only those who went to France after 1755 and returned to America twenty-eight years later as immigrants to Louisiana at Spanish expense. But it is one chapter, unlike most in Acadian history, which will not have to be rewritten, for it is a work of painstaking and exhaustive scholarship. Father Winzerling, who began working on the Acadians under Professor Lawrence Kinnard at the University of California in Berkeley, has studied his subject in original sources in the European archives from Seville to London, though naturally he found most of his material in France.

Because of Longfellow's *Evangeline*, attention has been focused on those Acadians who were deported from Nova Scotia and scattered among the American seaboard colonies, some of whom eventually made their way back to their old homes and others of whom found refuge in Louisiana. This book is concerned with the 3,000 Acadians who eventually assembled in the ports of France in the 1760's. Some of them were sent there directly by Governor

Lawrence when the American colonies refused his earlier deportees; others were first banished to Virginia and then sent to England as prisoners of war and then released to the French government; while others came directly from the American colonies to which they had been deported. Promised arable lands by Louis XV for their loyalty to France, but given only a miserable dole when they rejected projects to settle them on sterile lands in Brittany, Poitou, and Corsica, they welcomed in 1783 the plan of Peyroux de la Coudrenière, a Frenchman who had prospered in Louisiana, to transport them there at the expense of the King of Spain. Peyroux convinced the Count de Aranada, the Spanish ambassador to France, of the merits of his scheme. There was no difficulty from the French authorities, who were only too glad to be rid of the troublesome and expensive Acadians, while the Spanish court saw in them a useful human bulwark against English or American expansion into Louisiana. Peyroux began his work of enlisting Acadian immigrants in July, 1783, and by December, 1785 he had landed 1,596 of them in Louisiana, in the largest single transatlantic colonization project.

Father Winzerling has not allowed his thorough study of his subject to interfere with a colourful account of this remarkable odyssey. The book is an admirable piece of historical writing, which should spur others to rescue the history of the Acadians from the hands of emotional partisans who have expressed their sentiments rather than investigated the facts in original sources.

MASON WADE

The University of Rochester

The Loyalists of New Brunswick. By ESTHER CLARK WRIGHT. Ottawa: The author, 407 Island Park Drive. 1955. Pp. vi, 365. \$4.00.

CANADIAN historical scholarship has been oddly neglectful of the American Loyalists. They suffered first from the romantic distortions of uncritical admirers and later from the embarrassed silence of liberals and democrats. The Loyalists in the Maritimes have also been victims of the provincialism of Ontario historians. It is surely remarkable that although there are good studies by American scholars of the Loyalists in a dozen American states, there has been until now no competent description of the Loyalist settlement of New Brunswick, their main stronghold and resting-place.

Mrs. Wright's book answers satisfactorily a number of questions about the New Brunswick Loyalists; who they were, how many there were, how they came, where and how they settled. The question of why some 14,000 American refugees accepted New Brunswick as a place to live is less successfully answered, and, despite a brief, brave first chapter, the author fails to show plausibly why these people became Loyalists in the first place.

By a close analysis of who the New Brunswick Loyalists were, Mrs. Wright destroys finally the once dearly held notion that they were Tory gentlefolk, mainly Harvard men, fleeing the wrath of a vulgar mob; 80 or 90 per cent of them appear to have been long-settled Americans of yeoman stock. Three-fourths of them came from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Only 6 per cent of the total settlers were from Massachusetts, and perhaps only 5 per cent from all the southern colonies combined. Nothing in Mrs. Wright's study supports the riches to rags mythology about the Loyalists. Only one-twelfth of these people were sufficiently literate and sufficiently aware of their

lost prosperity to file any claim at all with the Loyalist Claims Commission, and most of those who did claim compensation for their losses asked for less than £500 sterling. When the city of Saint John was incorporated in 1785, the yeomen, carpenters, cordwainers, tailors, labourers, masons, blacksmiths, and their fellows outnumbered the gentlemen, esquires, merchants, physicians, and other such folk by almost five to one. In laying these old ghosts of Loyalist gentility, Mrs. Wright has done a service to American as well as to Canadian historical interpretation.

Using mainly the Carleton Papers and the Colonial and War Office records, the author has untangled with some skill the complex of regular plans, improvised schemes, and desperate resorts which attended the evacuation of the Loyalists from New York and their settlement on the north shore of the Bay of Fundy. Mrs. Wright notes correctly the dismay of the Loyalists in New York at the news of Cornwallis's surrender, but this news reached them about two weeks after the surrender, not "many months" later as stated in the book. The discussion of the partition of Nova Scotia should have been related to the larger plans afoot in 1783 and 1784 for a reorganization of the remaining British North American colonies. Here, and occasionally elsewhere, Mrs. Wright has neglected useful secondary sources.

The best of this well-written book is the moving account of the actual pains of settlement in New Brunswick: the bungling and bickering, the wild hopes and real achievements, the scramble for office among displaced oligarchs, and, above all, the stubborn efforts of the "hospitable yeomen" of the Loyalist regiments to clear the land and live in peace. A valuable appendix contains the names of some 6,000 New Brunswick Loyalists, together with relevant facts about them.

W. H. NELSON

The Rice Institute

Early Travellers in Upper Canada. Edited by GERALD M. CRAIG. Pioneer Books. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited. 1955. Pp. xxxvi, 300, illus. \$5.00.

DURING the first half of the nineteenth century the United States and the Canadian provinces were visited by scores of British visitors who, in one form or another, set down their observations. Some came primarily to visit the United States but extended their trip into Canada; others did the reverse; some came to Canada alone. Professor Craig has, from an almost embarrassing richness of such material, made selection from thirty writers and in doing so introduces to Canadian readers many names of which they have never before heard. The publication of these selections suggests that some of these books might well be republished in full.

For the most part visitors showed chief interest in Upper Canada. Few made any serious effort to understand the French province; Quebec and Montreal were all that most of them saw in Lower Canada. This we may attribute to anti-Catholic feeling, the handicap of language, and sheer parochialism. Visitors came for various reasons. A few, such as military men, had a sort of official relation to the country; some came to assess its immigration possibilities; others chiefly to see Niagara Falls. Few stayed long enough to gain any real understanding of the political situation and it is quite true, as

the editor observes, that most of them found Canadian politics incomprehensible. Rather generally they looked for ultimate separation from the motherland, though frequently cautioning against this possibility or the likelihood of absorption by the United States.

Coming as so many of them did from a land cultivated for centuries, they were critical of backwoods agriculture, but if they entered Upper Canada after visiting the United States they often expressed pleasure at the English nature of things—it was home again. Patrick Shirreff, a hard-headed Scot, was more realistic than most and for that reason his "Critical View of Upper Canada" has special value. He thought Illinois offered better opportunity than Upper Canada. He laid his finger on the abuses of the thirties, the land-granting system in particular, and hoped that the home government would find means to cripple the colonial aristocracy, the dominant church, and the Canada Company. Of a quite opposite type were the conclusions of Rev. Isaac Fidler, who eventually settled on Yonge Street. He painted an optimistic picture of the province and warned against emigration to the United States.

The editor has provided an excellent introduction, an extensive bibliography of the type of books from which the selections have been made, and an index. There has long been need of a compilation of this kind and it should have many readers.

FRED LANDON

The University of Western Ontario

Garden Gateway to Canada: One Hundred Years of Windsor and Essex County, 1854-1954. By NEIL F. MORRISON. Foreword by FRED LANDON. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1954. Pp. ix, 344, illus., maps. \$5.00.

THIS work is another regional history written by a professionally trained scholar and is a fitting companion to Fox, *The Bruce Beckons*, and Hamil, *The Valley of the Lower Thames*, which have appeared in recent years. The treatment in this book is somewhat different from the others. Professor Landon in his foreword says that the author's "knowledge of his subject is encyclopaedic" and that is an eminently fair statement. The style is somewhat staccato and each page contains a great deal of information. For example, page 144, part of the chapter on the end of the Victorian era, describes the coming of Coca-Cola, improvement in drainage, displacement of rail fences by wire, the flooding of the country with catalogues from big Toronto department stores, the new office building of Hiram Walker and Sons, and the formation of a horticultural society. But no other style would have allowed Dr. Morrison to pack as much detail as he has into 325 pages.

Much of the interpretation in the book is left to a series of excellent maps reflecting the author's training in geography, though chapter viii "Sixty Odd Years of Progress," draws some threads together. In addition to the maps, the illustrations are numerous and interesting. A great deal of effort must have gone into the collection. The book is rather arbitrarily divided into decades, which tend to break up the flow of the narrative, but the facts are there and a reader wanting to gather the information on a certain subject can readily do so through the good index.

The best chapters are those which cover the middle years of the study. The chapters covering recent years inevitably had to be thin, but

perhaps not as thin as they are. Compression was carried to an extreme when the depression of the 1930's was dismissed with one paragraph and the statement "Difficult as was this challenge of depression, Windsor met it with high courage and emerged more self-reliant to rise to new heights of accomplishment." Likewise, the amalgamation of the "Border Cities" of Windsor, Walkerville, Sandwich, and East Windsor cannot have been as simply done as seems to be suggested.

The point which struck this reviewer is the youth of the county. Until the 1890's Essex was essentially a wooded region, marked by an extensive lumber trade. Agricultural and industrial development was largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. This aspect of the history of the county is extremely well done and is pointed up by the well selected illustrations. The geographical determinants which brought the automobile industry to Windsor are well defined, but the tariff policies which played a large part are mentioned only, not described.

The foregoing comments are made not with a view to minimizing the solid contribution of the work, but rather to indicate what a reader may expect to find. Dr. Morrison has supplied a book which will not need to be written again.

JAMES J. TALMAN

The University of Western Ontario

A Journal of a Voyage from the Rocky Mountain Portage in Peace River to the Sources of Finlays Branch and North West Ward in Summer 1824. [By SAMUEL BLACK.] Edited by E. E. RICH, assisted by A. M. JOHNSON; with an introduction by R. M. PATTERSON. London: The Hudson's Bay Record Society. 1955. Pp. c, 260, illus., map. Issued only to subscribers.

THE appearance of this, the eighteenth volume published by the Hudson's Bay Record Society suggests that the time is long overdue when tribute should be paid to the great service that Mr. Rich, with the assistance first of Mr. R. G. Leveson Gower, and later of Miss A. M. Johnson, has done in making available the rich resources of the Hudson's Bay Company's archives to Canadian historians. When Mr. Rich undertook the editing of the first volume of the Hudson's Bay series, under the auspices of the Champlain Society, in 1938, he was a newcomer to the history of the Canadian fur trade; but from that day to this he has shown an ever increasing mastery of the subject which has placed the student of Canadian history under a great debt to him. The first twelve volumes of the series, which were published jointly with the Champlain Society, owed a little perhaps to the Champlain Society, which sponsored these volumes; but the volumes published later have been solely the work of Mr. Rich and the Hudson's Bay Record Society.

The present volume is one of the most admirable and successful of the series. It was a happy inspiration that led Mr. Rich to invite Mr. R. M. Patterson, the author of that entrancing book *The Dangerous River* (London, 1954), to write the introduction and to provide some of the footnotes. Mr. Patterson had not only followed Samuel Black's trail in the exploration of the Finlay River, but he has apparently a very full and enviable knowledge of the literature relating to his subject, as well as a first-class flair for writing. No such combination of practical knowledge, scholarship, and literary ability has been seen in the field

of Canadian exploration since Dr. J. B. Tyrrell, who had followed David Thompson's explorations over a goodly part of northwestern Canada, undertook to edit for the Champlain Society David Thompson's *Narrative*.

It adds to the interest of the volume that the authorship of the journal here published was for many years attributed erroneously to John Finlay, whose name the Finlay River bears. It was only in 1927 that the late Mr. J. N. Wallace proved conclusively that the author of the journal was Samuel Black, a Nor'Wester who was at first excluded from the Hudson's Bay Company at the time of the Union of 1821, but was admitted as a chief trader in 1823, and was given in 1824 the difficult task of exploring the Finlay River. Mr. Patterson's introduction now tells the full story of Samuel Black and of his associates, not only in the exploration of the river, but in their lives as well; and his telling of the story leaves nothing to be desired.

A reviewer usually likes to find some mistakes in a book, to which he can call attention, if only to show that he has read the book critically. I must confess I have been able to find nothing here at which I can cavil.

W. S. WALLACE

Toronto

Whoop-Up Country: The Canadian-American West, 1865-1885. By PAUL F. SHARP. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press [Toronto: Thomas Allen Limited]. 1955. Pp. xiv, 347, illus. \$5.50.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN contacts in the plains region first developed at widely separated points on the 49th parallel—at the eastern end where the Red River ignores the carefully surveyed line, and at the western end where red hunters and white traders moved back and forth across the short-grass country near the foothills of the Rockies in pursuit of buffalo and business. Professor Pritchett has delineated the early development of the international community in the eastern sub-region, and Professor Sharp has now provided a scholarly and attractively written study of the western sub-region. In the latter area, the north-south axis dates from 1869 and was man-made—an overland trail from Fort Benton on the Missouri to the free traders' posts in the heart of the Blackfoot and Assiniboine country in what is now southern Alberta and southwestern Saskatchewan. The most famous, or infamous, of these posts was Fort Whoop-Up, which gave its name to the main artery of communication.

In a series of topical chapters, Professor Sharp describes the history of this area in the period 1869 to 1885, after which the force of Canadian nationalism, operating through the agency of the C.P.R., severed the tentacles of Fort Benton's commercial empire, and the 49th parallel became an effective boundary in economic as well as political terms. The pioneers of the Whoop-Up trail were the Montana traders who made quick profits and permanent enemies among the Indians. The Cypress Hills massacre of 1873, followed by the advent of the North-West Mounted Police, marked the end of their disorderly and demoralizing activities. *Whoop-Up Country* provides material for a comparison of Canadian and American institutions in the chapters on law enforcement in Chouteau County on the Montana side of the line, on the system of Indian administration as applied to the Blackfoot tribes ("One People, Divided"), and on the customs and practices of the cattle kingdom. In treating

these and other topics Professor Sharp avoids the pitfalls of a rigid environmentalist interpretation which has marred many frontier studies, and stresses the "extraregional relationships and many heritages from older societies" which affected developments on both sides of the boundary.

Whoop-Up Country contains the first thorough analysis of the Cypress Hills massacre, a subject dear to the purveyors of folk history in western Canada. The author produces important new evidence, though admitting that "what really happened . . . is shrouded in a haze of confused testimony." Local historians in Montana will welcome the succinct and vivid account of the halcyon days of Fort Benton, and the economic historian will be grateful for the description of the beginnings of the famous I. G. Baker and T. C. Power merchandising firms, though restricted by the scanty surviving company records. The two chapters of the five-year incursion of the Sioux under Sitting Bull are a major contribution to the late nineteenth century diplomatic history of the United States and Canada. This reviewer feels, however, that the treatment of Sitting Bull's surrender ignores the abundant evidence of Jean Louis Légaré's key role in this accomplishment.

LEWIS H. THOMAS

Archives of Saskatchewan

Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta. By W. E. MANN. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1955. Pp. xiv, 166. \$4.00.

Sect, Cult and Church is the sixth of the series Social Credit in Alberta edited by Professor S. D. Clark. Despite the occasional outbreak of sociological jargon I found it among the most readable of the six. This was not because of the detailed information which the book gives on Alberta sects and cults, but because its analysis brings out something in the inner structure of history; if ever "history repeats itself," it is surely in the phenomena accompanying the emergence of religious groups. In Alberta, as elsewhere, new groups—"sects" as they are called today—form in the bottom and marginal areas of the society wherever there is a sense of underprivilege and isolation. Appealing to humble people at the "grass-roots" level, they often achieve a wide, and possibly deep, success, displacing over large areas the older religious bodies or "denominations"—the Biblical emphasis on poverty and humility, that powerful thread throughout Christianity, springs from exactly this soil. Poverty, narrowness, banality, various forms of extremism (such as "speaking with tongues") are guarantees of success: "He has put down the mighty from their seats and has exalted them of low degree." The older bodies, with their educated ministries, make little appeal to the mass and slowly shrink into aspects of a class—the middle-class, with its urban outlook, stingy of life.

In Alberta, the landscape seems dotted with Bible schools, chapels where the "old time," hot-and-strong religion is dispensed, and radio stations whence the powerful exhortations of numerous Mr. Aberharts sweep salvation over the countryside and money into the till. Its roads are thronged with eager peddlers of tracts and religious pamphlets. Its farm youth rush forth to bring to the native of Central Africa the blessings of Seventh Day Adventism. Quackery and sentimentality, but also sincerity and a genuine devotion to Christian standards, characterize, as they have ever characterized, "the religion of the people."

Dr. Mann describes the sociological process well and with interesting documentation. His subject calls for him to confine himself to Alberta and, no doubt, "the sects" are rather more prominent there than in the east. But surely no more prominent than on the west coast. And in the east, too, they flourish on every back street. They are a Canadian, a North American, phenomenon, not merely an Albertan.

Indeed, they are aspects of a universal phenomenon. As I read, my attention did not stay on Alberta. I thought of the Methodists in Upper Canada, whose story provided an exact step-by-step anticipation of the present-day sects. In those days Anglicans said about Methodists much the same sort of thing (but with far more class *hauteur*) that both Anglicans and the United Church are now saying about the sects. Unfortunately for both Methodists and "the sects," the gulf of "respectability" ever yawns, and shortly they slide into it as their own tenets carry them "up" the social scale.

I also thought of Wesleyans in England, whose story was much the same, of Anabaptists in Germany, of the Quakers, and of the Friars, so many years ago, with all their fond doctrines of poverty and simplicity eventually confounded by the corruptions of wealth. And would not early Christians have been at home in any Pentecostal Assembly! Here, surely, in this everlasting upsurge of the humble and the resulting processes of accommodation with "the world" lies material for some explanation of history more satisfactory than the "high-falutin'" stuff which flows so readily from Toynbeeian pens.

I am sorry that certain omissions had to be made, notably Mennonites, Mormons, and Roman Catholics. The sociology of the first two of these is obvious, but that of Roman Catholicism in a democratic frontier environment is not. And I am a little worried, though I hope also mistaken, in imagining a certain note of condescension. The author does not reveal his own secret shrine but I am sure he would agree that the current sects constitute simply another fresh upsurge of Protestantism and that in their stubborn convictions, however bizarre some of them may be, we have a major factor in our free society. I, personally, wish the sects well, especially those that make themselves public nuisances. Again, I wonder if "the denominations" are in such a predicament of prosperity and middle-class respectability as Mr. Mann suggests. I quite agree with him as to the evils entailed on them by their own bureaucracies—as a member of the United Church, I would cheerfully see "The United Church Vatican" blown sky-high (though I admit the presence of righteous men therein). But Dr. Mann taught in a certain western college where I also served: I ask him, "Did he see signs of dangerous affluence in it?" My own impressions are that "the denominations" in the Canadian West can compete with any of the sects in the matter of poverty, fat city congregations and their clergy excepted. I agree, of course, that "the denominations" are middle class in their orientation (some of them would readily be upper class if there were any upper class), in contrast to the lower-class sects.

My observations do not affect the general argument of the book, which is sound and stimulating and constitutes a most useful tool of historical interpretation.

A. R. M. LOWER

Queen's University

The Great Experiment. By FRANK THISTLETHWAITE. Cambridge: At the University Press [Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited]. 1955. Pp. xiv, 335, maps. \$4.25.

THIS volume is itself a very successful experiment. Its purpose is to provide an introduction to American history for the undergraduates of British universities based upon assumptions "which an Englishman instinctively understands." The chief assumption appears to be that the British undergraduate is more mature and has read more widely than his North American counterpart. This, although embarrassing, can scarcely be argued. Other evidences of a British approach are found largely in the use of terms like "yeoman" to describe the small planters of the South, and of "corn" instead of wheat. But apart from these, the most startling aspect of the book is the apparently complete assimilation by the author of American terminology and points of view—and his easy familiarity with American physical and social geography.

Perhaps the shortest way to describe the success of this work is to say that Mr. Thistlethwaite has done competently what Charles Beard attempted ineffectually in his *Basic History of the United States*. One chapter of eighteen pages discusses provincial society and takes the reader to the brink of Revolution; the rest of the book is an extremely skilful weaving of economic, cultural, and political themes within broad topical divisions. Eschewing the American tendency to minute organization of the discussion, the author manages still to incorporate an astonishing amount of factual material and to give references to a wide range of excellent secondary sources.

Definite or controversial lines of interpretation are not a prominent feature of the book, save for the basic assumption that America started as, and is yet "a dedicated association in which men participate not by virtue of being born into it as heirs of immemorial custom, but by virtue of free choice . . . a gathered community of Protestants, 'separatists', nonconformists, for whom the individual conscience alone is sovereign . . . squatters sojourning in a mansion where all the cluttering furniture of the past has been banished to the attic. . . ." This theme fascinates the author and he devotes considerable attention to discovering who are the Americans—by frequent reference to population and immigration statistics. Although he observes that the sluice gates were closed in the early 1920's and that this necessarily modifies much of the present significance of his central theme, he seems to underestimate the degree to which the United States has become a tightly closed corporation—and the implications of this for freedom, dissent, protestantism.

To a Canadian the book's perspective will appear very narrow indeed. The wars of expansion are mentioned almost in passing. The interplay of ideas and people within the "Atlantic community" is touched upon at several points; but the underlying assumption seems to be that the great theme now is the impact of the United States upon Europe. No doubt there is some truth in this. However, the implication that what America does as a result of its changing nature and vast power is the only serious factor in the course of Atlantic affairs is disturbing.

KENNETH MCNAUGHT

United College

Hernán Cortes, Conqueror of Mexico. By SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. London: Hollis & Carter [Montreal: Palm Publishers Press Services Ltd.]. 1955. Pp. xii, 554. \$5.00.

THIS is not a new book and, possibly unconsciously, the author has not done much to indicate that fact to the reader. It is substantially the same work as the English translation which appeared in 1941: there is the same bibliography listing no book published after 1940, the notes and references show no changes or additions, and there are no real alterations in the text. Notwithstanding all this it is a book that still deserves attention.

It is, for example, placed about midway between a biography based upon real research and disclosing new facts, and the popular biography which does not usually worry very much about original material, so long as it can combine entertainment for the reader with reasonable historical accuracy. Fortunately Señor Madariaga found a good deal of excellent original material in print, documentary as well as narrative, and he uses this on the whole in a critical and scholarly manner. But he never forgets that a book is meant to be read; his English style is admirable, and as translator of his own work he is not afraid to give a free and lively English version of the Spanish original; the result is a popular biography of a very superior type.

All the same Madariaga's work has been vigorously criticized on two main grounds:¹ his reliance on narrative sources, especially on the *Historia verdadera* of Bernal Díaz del Castillo and the *Crónica* of Francisco Cervantes de Salazar, and his too high opinion of the statesmanship and character of Cortes. The first charge is true only with some qualification, for Madariaga also made use of the published letters and reports of Cortes; moreover he had quite a number of other narrative sources at his disposal for purposes of comparison with Díaz and Salazar. An equally serious charge, however, might be made with more justice, in that he quotes, often at considerable length, speeches reported to have been made by Cortes and others, without warning the reader that, though probably expressing the ideas of the speaker they were often the words of the narrative historian who, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had no hesitation in himself supplying the words that he felt were proper to be spoken on such an occasion; but it is true that such quotations make the story much more vivid.

That the biography is a mere eulogy of Cortes is a much more serious accusation, but it could not be made today, for the views of other historians have altered during the last twenty years. While it is recognized that Cortes had all the cruelty and ruthlessness that were common to the age in which he lived, he also showed a statesmanship and, when he dared, a moderation not to be found among the other leaders of the *conquistadores*. It is true that he was forced to accept a form of slavery for the natives; as he writes to Charles V, "I thought it a grave matter to compel them to serve the Spaniards in the manner it is done in the Islands; yet, short of it, the conquerors and settlers would not be able to support themselves." And he really wanted and planned a peaceful and ordered settlement of Mexico by the Spaniards in contrast to their treatment of the West Indian islands, where the Spaniards' policy had been "to exhaust them, to destroy them, then to leave them. And

¹For example, by H. R. Wagner in the *American Historical Review*, XLVII (July, 1942), 911-14.

as I believe that it would be a grave guilt for those of us who have experience of the past not to remedy the present and the future," he started to build up a sort of economic feudalism and showed every intention of making the Spanish landowners recognize their responsibility towards their native labourers. Though Madariaga's treatment of Cortes is much more than mere eulogy, it is not possible to accept all aspects of his character that are here described so eloquently. For example Madariaga is of course quite right in pointing out that religion in the sixteenth century was far more important to the individual than it is today, but he ought not to go so far as to assert that the main reason for the Mexican defeat "was that their faith gave way before a firmer faith" (p. 238); and the sincerity of Cortes' displays of religion should also be treated with more critical doubt than Madariaga gives them.

This otherwise excellent biography can be criticized on the ground that it is too long, and not very well proportioned. The detail in chapter iv dealing with previous expeditions to the Mexican coast is hardly necessary, though it makes good reading. On the other hand, the biography becomes very thin after 1530, and almost non-existent after 1540; that the printed sources have comparatively little material for those years is probably the main reason for this, but the reader gets the impression that the later stages of the biography were being rushed along in order to end the book as rapidly as possible. This view is confirmed by the fact that the author makes no real attempt to give a complete picture of Cortes' character and achievements such as might be expected in the final chapter. The *residencia* is dismissed with hardly a word, and there is no attempt made to discuss the charges brought against Cortes. There is no proper stress laid upon the fact that the Aztecs were recent conquerors, hated by their subjects, and therefore fairly easy to overthrow; moreover the Aztecs were largely a warrior and priestly class and had little to do with that craftsmanship which the Spanish admired so much.

Señor Madariaga apparently belongs to the school of thought that believes that the sight of a reference at the foot of the page would frighten the reader away; so the references are massed at the end of the book and any consultation of them becomes an abominable nuisance. The author has also used what he regards as a better way of spelling Mexican names; in most cases this does not matter, for few readers would ever attempt to pronounce them, but when Montezuma becomes Moteçucuma, he is trying to change something that has been incorporated in the English language; would he write Roma or Mejico in the middle of an English sentence?

E. R. ADAIR

Austin, Texas

New Letters of David Hume. Edited by RAYMOND KLIBANSKY and ERNEST C. MOSSNER. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1954. Pp. xxxiv, 253. \$4.50.

MR. J. Y. T. GREIG's two volumes of Hume's letters, published in 1932, was with some justice regarded as a definitive edition; but fresh letters soon began to appear and the present volume contains 127 letters, of which 98 are not to be found in Greig's edition, while 27 had been printed by Greig but with omissions or inaccuracies. The editors, quite rightly, have followed the editorial policy laid down by Greig, but they deserve their full share of praise for

the patience and skill with which they have identified persons and events mentioned in the text, and especially for the self-control with which they have prevented the footnotes from becoming too long. They have also provided an excellent introduction and two indexes. Very few errors have been noted: page xix note 3 should refer to letter 126 not 125; on page 39 note 1, the skirmish at Powick Bridge took place in 1642, not 1672; and surely on page 70 Hume should have written "without consent of parliament" not "with consent"; on page 204 line 22, "other" should read "brother."

A good many of these new letters merely add a small touch to the story told in Greig's volumes, but there are some that also serve to show what sort of a man Hume really was—a philosopher who did not push philosophy into the letters he wrote to his friends, "a man," as he said of himself, "of mild Dispositions, of Command of Temper, of an open, social and cheerful Humour . . . and of great Moderation in all my Passions." There are, however, two matters on which these new letters shed an important light: Hume as a diplomat, and the celebrated quarrel between Hume and Rousseau. On July 3, 1765, Hume was appointed secretary to the English embassy in Paris; on July 21 the ambassador, Lord Hertford, left Paris for London, and Hume became the *chargé d'affaires*. There were at that time three questions of importance at issue between England and France. The destruction of Dunkirk as a port had been promised under the Treaty of Paris of 1763, but the French were very slow in getting the job done. Secondly, the French appeared to have been slower in adjusting the amounts to be paid as compensation to the holders of the various forms of French-Canadian currency—the so-called Canada Bills. Finally, and most complicated of all, there were the disputes arising from the conflicts of interest in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries. The editors have printed for the first time fifteen despatches from Hume to the Secretary of State in London, and three letters to the Duc de Praslin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. These despatches show Hume to be thoroughly competent in presenting the English case and in meeting on terms of equality such skilful diplomats as Choiseul and Praslin.

Hume's side of the quarrel with Rousseau is presented at considerable length in several hitherto unpublished letters, and after allowing for some natural bias, they fully support the view that Rousseau was a neurotic exhibitionist who had developed a magnificent persecution complex—a view that is confirmed by fifteen letters from Richard Davenport to Hume, which the editors have printed in an appendix.

E. R. ADAIR

Austin, Texas

SHORTER NOTICES

Canadian Yesterdays. By EDGAR ANDREW COLLARD. Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company. 1955. Pp. viii, 327, illus. \$4.50.

THIS book, by the editor-in-chief of the *Montreal Gazette*, contains forty-six short chapters. The author explains that he likes to wander in the byways of history and that these sketches are designed to bring to Canadian history "the kindly warmth of human association." A lesser journalist probably would have used the expression "human interest." "Dawson of Dawson City" (pp. 33-40) provides an illustration. Practically everything in this chapter could be found in

standard reference works but the author has built up Dawson's severe physical handicap, providing information which certainly improves the portrait.

In space the book covers from Cape Breton to British Columbia and in time from 1761 to 1914. The arrangement is random. The region of Montreal receives the greatest concentration. The St. Lawrence figures directly in four sketches, hermits (not in Montreal) figure in three, lecturers visiting Montreal, riots, and buildings all figure in two or more. The information in "The Debtors Prison" (pp. 278-83) that the old Montreal jail on Notre Dame Street East now houses the offices and storehouse of the Quebec Liquor Commission adds a nice touch of "kindly warmth." The general picture left with the reader is one of the social life of Montreal in the nineteenth century and of the pleasures, difficulties, and dangers of travel.

The most poignant sketch, to this reviewer's mind, is the account of Grosse Ile (pp. 250-4) which was set up as a quarantine station in 1832; and the most interesting is the story of Sarah Bernhardt's Christmas visit to Montreal in 1880 (pp. 163-7).

In spite of the wide range of subjects sketched, errors of fact are not noticeable and errors of interpretation few. This reviewer, however, cannot accept the statement made in connection with the arrival in Montreal, on October 27, 1856, of the first train from Toronto (p. 79) that "not until the Grand Trunk was incorporated in 1852 was there an organization with sufficient enterprise and capital to cover some of the greater distances of the country." The Great Western was operating trains from Suspension Bridge to Windsor, a distance of 229 miles, by January, 1854.

The book will not be of much value as a work of reference as it has neither table of contents nor index and the statements are not documented.

JAMES J. TALMAN

The University of Western Ontario

Rideau Waterway. By ROBERT LEGGET. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1955. Pp. xiv, 249, illus., maps \$5.00.

MR. LEGGET is an engineer who has long been interested in what he aptly describes as the "Rideau Waterway" (pointing out that only 18 out of 123½ miles are covered by an artificial waterway), examining it thoroughly throughout its length, and digging deeply into historical records—a happy combination in the pattern set by Parkman. The book is divided into two halves, the first dealing with the project and construction of the canal, and the second being an account of the whole waterway from Kingston to Ottawa. It is attractively illustrated by photographs taken by the author, and maps help the reader to find his way.

The author is clearly an admirer of Lieutenant Colonel By, and defends his record against contemporary criticisms. There is a chapter examining the "financial worries," and showing how the rising estimates were largely justified by the problems encountered and the absence of adequate surveys. It was, indeed, no mean achievement for this engineer officer to cut a waterway through what was then hardly more than a wilderness. Those who have examined the locks cannot fail to have been impressed by the lasting masonry, and will be interested to read Mr. Legget's account of the means by which the locks were erected and the canal dug.

This reviewer, no doubt like many others familiar with the waterway, has often wondered what traffic it carried at various periods. His curiosity has been satisfied by the author's analysis of the records (pp. 85 ff.) which gives numbers and types of vessels and their cargoes. The original military purpose was at least not wholly forgotten, for some transports and naval vessels did make their way along the waterway, but freight was the main element.

In modern years the waterway has been used only by pleasure boats, and these in surprising numbers. The second half of the book will revive pleasant memories for those who have already taken all or part of the journey, and tempt those who have not to set out on whatever craft they command—keeping at close hand Mr. Legget's readable guide.

G. DE T. GLAZEBROOK

Washington, D.C.

A Bibliography of Father Richard's Press in Detroit. By A. H. GREENLY. Ann Arbor, Mich.: William L. Clements Library. 1955. Pp. x, 48. \$5.00.

WHEN Father Richard brought his printing press to Detroit in the summer of 1809 it was primarily for educational, civic, and religious purposes. This is evident from the early publications that have been preserved and which Mr. Greenly has classified in chronological order. On August 1, 1809, the press published the first booklet (12 pages) entitled *The Child's Speller or Michigan Instructor*. On August 31, 1809, there appeared the first number of a 4-page newspaper—*The Michigan Essay or The Impartial Observer*. In this issue there was an announcement of the proposed publications of the press. The first was to be a reprint of a devotional work entitled *L'Ame Pénitente or Le Nouveau Pensez-y Bien*.

Since this was the only press in Detroit at the time (there had been an earlier one operated by John McCall, 1796–1800), it was used also for legal documents, proclamations, etc. When Hull surrendered Detroit to Brock in August, 1812, Father Richard's Press printed the articles of capitulation. Ironically enough, in February, 1813, it printed the proclamation of martial law under which Father Richard was later arrested and kept in custody for nearly a month in the presbytery of Assumption parish, Sandwich (now part of the city of Windsor, Ont.).

This bibliography is the most complete of all the works that have appeared on the subject. The whole collection (52 pieces) has been done in a scholarly and painstaking manner. It has recorded and preserved for future historians an up-to-date catalogue and description of the extant publications of Father Richard's Press during the years 1809–16. The introduction gives a brief history of early printing at Detroit, as well as a short account of Father Richard as an educator, pastor, and congressman. Unfortunately there appears the ambiguous statement that Father Richard is entombed in his own beloved church, the present St. Anne's, Detroit. The fact is true, but the present church was built more than fifty years after Father Richard died during the cholera epidemic of 1832.

E. J. LAJEUNESSE C.S.B.

Assumption University of Windsor

RECENT PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO CANADA

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

By MARGARET JEAN HOUSTON

Notice in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review.

The following abbreviations are used: *B.R.H.*—*Bulletin des recherches historiques*; *C.H.R.*—*Canadian Historical Review*; *C.J.E.P.S.*—*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*; *R.H.A.F.*—*Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*.

See also *Canadians*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the Canadian Bibliographic Centre, Ottawa, and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the April issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

I. CANADA'S RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH

BLACKTON, CHARLES S. Australian Nationality and Nationalism: The Imperial Federationist Interlude, 1885-1901 (*Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand*, VII (25), Nov., 1955, 1-16).

MANSERGH, NICHOLAS. The Commonwealth: Problems of Multi-Racial Membership (*Political Studies*, III (3), Oct., 1955, 235-46).

MILLER, J. D. B. *Richard Jebb and the Problem of Empire*. Commonwealth Papers, Sir KEITH HANCOCK, General Editor, III. London: University of London, Athlone Press, for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. 1956. Pp. 48. 4s.6d.

United Kingdom, Central Office of Information. *Constitutional Development in the Commonwealth*. I. Member Countries. II. United Kingdom Dependencies. Central Office of Information Reference Pamphlets, 5, 6. London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1955. Pp. 44; 84, map. 2s.; 3s. (paper).

II. CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BELSHAW, CYRIL S. Canadian Policy and Asian Society (*International Journal*, XI (1), winter, 1955, 36-45). Canada's role in Far Eastern affairs.

BONARDELLI, PETER M. Canada's Foreign Service: Some Notes on Its Origins to Modern Times (*Culture*, XVII (1), mars 1956, 31-8).

BOSSIN, HYE. Mr. Lincoln's Forgotten Friend (*Canadian Film Weekly*, XXI (6), Feb. 8, 1956, 4, 9). The diplomacy of Lord Lyons, British Ambassador to Washington during the Civil War.

BROWN, ROGER HAMILTON. *The Struggle for the Indian Stream Territory*. Cleveland, Ohio: Western Reserve University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 104, maps. \$3.00. To be reviewed later.

Canada, Army Headquarters, Historical Section. Canada's Army in Korea (*Canadian Army Journal*, IX (1), Jan., 1955, 5-29; IX (2), April, 1955, 20-42; IX (3), July, 1955, 20-42; IX (4), Oct., 1955, 16-34; X (1), Jan., 1956, 21-34).

Canada and Asia: Participation in the Colombo Plan (*Round Table*, no. 182, March, 1956, 145-8).

GILBERT, BENJAMIN F. Rumours of Confederate Privateers Operating in Victoria, Vancouver Island (*British Columbia Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (3, 4), July-Oct., 1954, 239-55). A problem in Anglo-American relations during the Civil War.

KEIRSTEAD, B. S. *Canada in World Affairs, September 1951 to October 1953*. With the assistance of MURIEL ARMSTRONG. Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 268. \$3.50. To be reviewed later.

LANCÔT, GUSTAVE. Les Relations franco-canadiennes après la conquête et avant "La Capricieuse" (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, X (7), mars 1956, 591-9).

MEYER, F. V. The Commonwealth and Europe: Britain's Dilemma (*Political Quarterly*, XXVII (2), April-June, 1956, 194-208).

III. HISTORY OF CANADA

(1) General History

- Les Cahiers des Dix*, no 20. Montréal: Les Dix. 1955. Pp. 245, illus. Articles are listed separately in this bibliography. To be reviewed later.
- The Epic Story of the Victoria Rifles (*Canadian Military Journal*, XXII (6), Feb., 1956, 8-15).
- LERMER, ARTHUR. The Evolution of Canadian Policy towards Cultural Pluralism (*Canadian Jewish Review*, XXXVIII (25), March 23, 1956, 7, 77-83).
- McKELVEY, BLAKE. The Port of Rochester: A History of Its Lake Trade (*Inland Seas*, XI (3), fall, 1955, 155-63; XI (4), winter, 1955, 271-84). Includes information on Rochester's trade with Canada.
- MALCHELOSSE, GÉRARD. Une Rivière, une vallée (*Cahiers des Dix*, no 20, 217-31). The military importance of the Richelieu Valley in Canadian history.
- WOLFENDEN, MADGE, ed. John Tod: "Career of a Scotch Boy" (*British Columbia Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (3, 4), July-Oct., 1954, 133-238). Life of a Hudson's Bay Company trader in the nineteenth century.

(2) Discovery and Exploration

- CROUSE, NELLIS M. *La Vérendrye, Fur Trader and Explorer*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press [Toronto: The Ryerson Press]. 1956. Pp. xii, 247, illus., maps. \$4.75. To be reviewed later.
- FIDLER, VERA. The Story of an Astrolabe (*Echoes*, no. 222, spring, 1956, 14-15). Brief account of Champlain's trip up the Ottawa in 1613.
- MURPHY, ROWLEY. Discovery of the Wreckage of the *Griffon* (*Inland Seas*, XI (4), winter, 1955, 232-42; XII (1), spring, 1956, 43-53). An article dealing with the Tobermory wreck believed to be La Salle's ship.
- PATTERSON, R. M. "The Strangest Man I Ever Knew" (*Beaver*, outfit 286, spring, 1956, 26-9). Notes on the career and character of Samuel Black, fur trader and explorer.
- SNIDER, C. H. J. Further Search for the *Griffon* (*Ontario History*, XLVIII (1), winter, 1956, 1-6). An account of the Tobermory wreck.
- SWANNELL, F. C. Ninety Years Later (*Beaver*, outfit 286, spring, 1956, 32-7). Account of an exploring expedition up the Finlay River 90 years after Samuel Black's expedition.
- WHEAT, CARL I. Mapping the American West (*Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, L (1), 1956, 1-16). Includes the work of French and English explorers, such as St. Denis, Lahontan, Pond, and Mackenzie.

(3) New France

- DELAFOSSÉ, M. Séjour de Champlain à Brouage en 1630 (*R.H.A.F.*, IX (4), mars 1956, 571-8). Two documents relating to a sale of property by Champlain.
- DESROSIERS, LÉO-PAUL. Iroquoisie, terre française (*Cahiers des Dix*, no 20, 33-59). French-Iroquois relations, 1665-8.
- FRÉGAULT, GUY. *La Guerre de la conquête*. Collection Fleur de Lys. Montréal: Fides. 1955. Pp. 518, illus., map. \$5.00. To be reviewed later.
- HITSMAN, J. MACKAY, and BOND, C. C. J. Louisbourg: A Fated Fortress (*Canadian Army Journal*, X (2), April, 1956, 78-87). An account of the building of Louisbourg, and of its two captures, 1745 and 1758.
- MAURALT, OLIVIER. Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville (*Mémoires de la Société Royale du Canada*, XLIX, Série III, juin 1955, Section I, 47-50).
- ROQUEBRUNE, ROBERT DE. Deux Episodes de l'histoire du Canada (*Amérique française*, XIII (4), 1955, 28-45). "Deux Gouverneurs français incapables et deux chefs sauvages retors: La Barre et Denonville, La Grande Gueule et Le Rat" (pp. 28-34); "Tragédie à La Prairie en 1690" (pp. 35-45).
- SCHUTZ, JOHN A. Cold War Diplomacy and the Seven Years' War (*World Affairs Quarterly*, XXVI (4), Jan., 1956, 323-37). An account of the preliminaries of the Seven Years' War.

(4) *British North America before 1867*

- FLEMING, ROY F. An Irish Poet on the Lakes (*Inland Seas*, XII (1), spring, 1956, 28-34). Thomas More's tour of 1804, with a description of the circumstances of the composing of "A Canadian Boat Song."
- HODGETTS, J. E. *Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867*. Canadian Government Series, R. MACG. DAWSON, Editor, no. 7. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 292. \$5.50. To be reviewed later.
- JACKSON, W. A. DOUGLAS. The Regressive Effects of the Late 18th Century British Colonial Policy on Land Developments along the St. Lawrence River (*Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, XLV (3), Sept., 1955, 258-68).
- STACEY, C. P., ed. Upper Canada at War, 1814: Captain Armstrong Reports (*Ontario History*, XLVIII (1), winter, 1956, 37-42). A contemporary account of the happenings of the summer of 1814 in Upper Canada.

(5) *Canada since 1867*

- BLAIS, ARISTIDE. Souvenirs de l'armistice de 1918 (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, X (7), mars 1956, 645-8). The personal recollections of a surgeon attached to a Canadian hospital at Saint Cloud.
- BURNS, E. L. M. *Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945*. With a Foreword by the Hon. C. G. Power. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited. 1956. Pp. xiv, 184. \$3.50. To be reviewed later.
- FLATT, S. A. *History of the 6th Field Company Royal Canadian Engineers, 1939-1945*. New Westminster, B.C.: The author, 1411-11th Ave. [1956.] Pp. xiv, 141, illus. To be reviewed later.
- PERCE, CLAIRE. Canadian Politics in the Twenties (*Canadian Messenger of the Sacred Heart*, LXVI, 1956, 60-2, 130-2).
- WILLIAMS, JOHN R. *The Conservative Party of Canada: 1920-1949*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press [Toronto: Burns & MacEachern]. 1956. Pp. xiv, 242, illus. \$7.50. To be reviewed later.

IV. PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL HISTORY

(1) *Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces*

- BECK, J. MURRAY. Privileges and Powers of the Nova Scotian House of Assembly (*Dalhousie Review*, XXXV (4), winter, 1956, 351-61).
- CHAPIN, MIRIAM. *Atlantic Canada*. Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 179. \$3.50. To be reviewed later.
- ERSKINE, S. J. Seal Island (*Journal of Education*, V (1), 1955, 26-36). A geographical, botanical, and historical study of one of the larger islands of the Tusket group off the coast of Nova Scotia.
- HARPER, J. RUSSELL. *Portland Point, Crossroads of New Brunswick History: Preliminary Report of the 1955 Excavation*. Publications of the New Brunswick Museum, Historical Studies, no. 9. Saint John, N.B. 1956. Pp. vi, 51, illus., map. To be reviewed later.
- MACKENZIE, T. G. The Honourable Benjamin Franklin Pearson, K.C. [1856-1912]: An Appreciation (*Dalhousie Review*, XXXV (4), winter, 1956, 362-9). Biography of a Nova Scotia lawyer and industrialist.
- MANN, NELSON. Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (*Dalhousie Review*, XXXV (4), winter, 1956, 309-22).

(2) *The Province of Quebec*

- BRUCHÉSI, JEAN. De la maison Souldard à l'hôtel Chevalier (*Cahiers des Dix*, no 20, 91-105). The history of a landmark of the Lower Town of Quebec.
- DOUVILLE, RAYMOND. La Dictature de la famille Le Neuf (*Cahiers des Dix*, no 20, 61-89). An account of a family which controlled the destinies of Three Rivers in the period 1636-67.

- DUFEBVRE, BERNARD. Une Journée de M. de Bonne (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, X (4), déc. 1955, 304-18; X (5), janv. 1956, 405-25; X (6), fév. 1956, 524-50). Reconstruction of a day in the life of Pierre-Amable de Bonne (1758-1816), member of the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada and judge, with a brief biography and numerous notes.
- GLASS, MARY HOPE. Quebec, Past and Present (*Echoes*, no. 222, spring, 1956, 4-5, 22-3). Notes on historic events and personalities connected with Quebec landmarks.
- ROY, ANTOINE. *Rapport de l'Archiviste de la province de Québec pour 1953-1954 et 1954-1955*. Nos. 34-35. Québec: Imprimeur de Sa Majesté la Reine. [1956.] Pp. vi, 569. To be reviewed later.
- SHUFELT, HARRY B. *Along the Old Roads: Reflections, Recollections, Romance of Eastern Townships History*. Knowlton, P.Q. 1956. Pp. 48, illus. \$1.25. Available from the author, 3556 Shuter Street, Montreal.
- TRÉPANIÉ, LÉON. Figures de maires (*Cahiers des Dix*, no 20, 149-77). An article on mayors of Montreal since its incorporation.
- TRUDEL, MARCEL. *Le Régime seigneurial*. Les Brochures de la Société historique du Canada, no 6. Ottawa. 1956. Pp. 20. 25¢. Distributed free to members.

(3) The Province of Ontario

- BLANCHARD, HARRY D. The Abel Stevens Migration to Canada (*Vermont History*, XXIV (1), Jan., 1956, 63-4). A brief note regarding the migration of 120 families from Vermont to Leeds-Grenville County in 1798.
- REDDAWAY, NORMAN. *Earncliffe, Ottawa*. London: Commonwealth Relations Office. [1955.] Pp. 35, illus. Sir John A. Macdonald's home from 1883 until his death, now the residence of the United Kingdom High Commissioner.
- RIDLEY, FRANK. An Archaeological Reconnaissance of Lake Abitibi, Ontario (*Ontario History*, XLVIII (1), winter, 1956, 18-23). An account of expeditions made in 1954.

(4) The Prairie Provinces

- DOUGLAS, WILLIAM. New Light on the Old Forts of Winnipeg (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 11, 1956, 40-88).
- GLUEK, ALVIN C., JR. The Minnesota Route (*Beaver*, Outfit 286, spring, 1956, 44-50). "In the late 1850s the Hudson's Bay Company began to abandon the historic York Factory route to Lake Winnipeg in favour of that via St. Paul and the Red River."
- Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba. *Papers*. Series III, no. 11. Edited by PAUL YUZYK. Winnipeg. 1956. Pp. 95. Papers are listed separately in this bibliography.
- Lethbridge: *Alberta's Golden Jubilee*. [Lethbridge. 1955.] Unpaged, illus. \$1.00. Available from City Treasurer's Office, City Hall, Lethbridge, Alberta.
- MORTON, W. L. The Bias of Prairie Politics (*Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada*, XLIX, series III, June, 1955, Section II, 57-66).
- NUTE, GRACE LEE, ed. Simpson as Banker (*Beaver*, outfit 286, spring, 1956, 51-2). "At the time the Minnesota Route was opened between St. Paul and Fort Garry, Sir George Simpson and Rt. Hon. Edward "Bear" Ellice . . . decided it would be advantageous to establish a bank at St. Paul. These letters from Simpson to Governor Ramsay of Minnesota . . . tell the first part of the story, but . . . we know of none which show what happened to the project."
- THOMAS, LEWIS HERBERT. *The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-97*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 276, maps. \$5.00. To be reviewed later.

(6) Northwest Territories, Yukon, and the Arctic

- BANFIELD, A. W. F. The Cariboo Crisis (*Beaver*, outfit 286, spring, 1956, 3-7). An article dealing with the continuing importance of the caribou to the inhabitants

- of the Canadian North, and discussing in particular the methods and results of surveys carried on by the Canadian Wildlife Service in 1948-9 and 1955.
- DONALDSON, B. Rae's Wintering House (*Calgary Associate Clinic Historical Bulletin*, XX (4), Feb., 1956, 95-9). Brief notes on the life of Dr. John Rae and on his northern exploration.
- ROUSSEAU, JACQUES. L'Origine et l'évolution du mot esquimau (*Cahiers des Dix*, no 20, 179-98).
- ILLINGWORTH, FRANK. *Highway to the North*. London: Ernest Benn Limited [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited]. 1955. Pp. 293, illus., map. \$5.00. The author's experiences during two journeys in the north along the Alaska Highway.
- ROWLEY, DIANA, ed. *Arctic Research: The Current Status of Research and Some Immediate Problems in the North American Arctic and Subarctic*. Arctic Institute of North America, Special Publication no. 2. Montreal: The Institute, 3485 University Street. 1955. Pp. 261, with maps and illustrations. \$3.00 to members of the Institute.

V. EDUCATIONAL HISTORY

- AUDET, LOUIS-PHILIPPE. Un Pensionnat à l'Hôpital-Général de Québec, 1725-1868 (*Mémoires de la Société Royale du Canada*, XLIX, Série III, juin 1955, Section I, 79-87).
- *Le Système scolaire de la province de Québec*. VI. *La Situation scolaire à la veille de l'Union, 1836-1840*. Québec: Editions de l'Erable. 1956. Pp. xviii, 353. To be reviewed later.
- BARNETT, JOHN. An Early Red School House and Its Century-Old Record Book (*Ontario History*, XLVIII (1), winter, 1956, 7-17). An article based on the record book of what is now Hillcrest School, Clarkson.
- Food for Thought*, XVI (7), April, 1956. Pp. 289-351. 25¢. A retrospective issue of the journal of the Canadian Association for Adult Education.
- LORTIE, LÉON. Les Mathématiques de nos ancêtres (*Mémoires de la Société Royale du Canada*, XLIX, Série III, juin 1955, Section I, 31-45). Mathematics and mathematics teachers in the early days of the province of Quebec.
- SHAW, BERTHA M. C. *Broken Threads: Memories of a Northern Ontario School-teacher*. New York: Exposition Press. 1955. Pp. 153. \$3.00. Life in a Canadian frontier mining town.

VI. RELIGIOUS HISTORY

- CHIEL, ARTHUR A. *Jewish Experiences in Early Manitoba*. Winnipeg: Manitoba Jewish Publications. 1955. Pp. 125.
- FRANCIS, E. K. *In Search of Utopia: The Mennonites in Manitoba*. Altona, Man.: D. W. Friesen and Sons Ltd. 1955. Pp. xvi, 294, illus., maps.
- MARIE-MICHEL-ARCHANGE, SŒUR. *Par ce signe tu vivras: histoire de la Congrégation des Petites Franciscaines de Marie (1889-1955)*. Baie Saint-Paul, Qué. 1955. Pp. 539.
- PARADIS, WILFRID H. L'Erection du diocèse de Québec et l'opposition de l'Archevêque de Rouen, 1662-1674 (*R.H.A.F.*, IX (4), mars 1956, 465-501).
- POULIOT, ADRIEN. *Aux origines de notre dévotion à l'Immaculée-Conception*. *Cahiers d'Histoire*, no 8. Québec: La Société historique de Québec, Université Laval. 1956. Pp. 31. 50¢.
- PROVOST, HONORIUS, ed. "Etablissement du séminaire royal pour les missions d'Amérique" (*R.H.A.F.*, IX (4) mars 1956, 502-11). Documents relating to a project of 1646; with biographical notes on Henry de Lévis, duc de Ventadour.
- PRUD'HOMME, MAURICE. The Life and Times of Archbishop Taché (Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, *Papers*, series III, no. 11, 1956, 4-17).
- REYLING, AUGUST. *Marquette Controversies*. Quincy, Ill.: The author, Quincy College. 1956. Pp. 4 (mimeo.). Issued with STECK, FRANCIS BORGIA, *Marquette's Alleged Priesthood*.

- STECK, FRANCIS BORGIA. *Marquette's Alleged Priesthood: A Reply to Ernest J. Burrus*, S.J. Quincy, Ill.: The author, Quincy College. 1956. Pp. 16 (mimeo.).
- STEVENSON, R. C. Trinity Memorial Church in Montreal (*Canadian Churchman*, LXXXIII (8), April 19, 1956, 177-80).
- TIDY, ARTHUR. Notable Churches: Port Perry; St. John's Church, Parish of Cartwright; The Church of St. Timothy; St. Clement's, North Toronto (*Canadian Churchman*, LXXXII (14), July 21, 1955, 332-3; LXXXII (17), Sept., 1955, 404-5; LXXXII (21), Nov. 3, 1955, 508-10; LXXXII (24), Dec. 15, 1955, 588-90).
- TRUDEL, MARCEL. Inventaire de l'Eglise canadienne à la fin de 1764 (*R.H.A.F.*, IX (3), déc. 1955, 313-46).
- Le Protestantisme s'établit au Canada (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, X (1), sept. 1955, 3-22).
- WALSH, H. H. The Return of Protestantism (*Bulletin: Records and Proceedings of the Committee on Archives of the United Church of Canada*, no. 8, 1955, 7-21). An article dealing with the religious history of Nova Scotia from the founding of Halifax to the American Revolution.

VII. GENEALOGY

- ASSELSTINE, KATHRYN RACHEL. *A Pioneer Family: The Name Van Ysselsteyn, Esselstein, Asselstine, 1649-1949: Three Hundred Years on the Continent of North America*. . . Windsor, Ont.: The author, 74 Ellis Ave. West. \$3.00, \$2.25 to libraries.
- BERGERON, ADRIEN. Deux Grandes Familles acadiennes du Québec: les Bergeron et les Hébert (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, VI (8), oct. 1955, 389-97).
- BERNARD, J. ELZÉAR. *Les Brouillet dit Bernard de Beloeil*, P.Q. St. Sauveur des Monts. 1954. Pp. 249, xxii (mimeo.). \$3.50.
- COMEAU, ROGER. Placide Gaudet, généalogiste acadien (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, VI (8), oct. 1955, 337-44).
- DOUCET, MME LOUIS-JOSEPH. Généalogie des familles Doucet (*Mémoires de la Société généalogique canadienne-française*, VI (8), oct. 1955, 371-88).
- GODBOUT, ARCHANGE. *Nos Ancêtres au XVIIe siècle: dictionnaire généalogique et bio-bibliographique des familles canadiennes*. I. Abancourt-Avisse. Privately printed. N.d. Pp. 96. \$1.50.
- JOB, ROBERT BROWN. *John Job's Family: A Story of His Ancestors and Successors and Their Business Connections with Newfoundland and Liverpool, 1730 to 1953*. Second enlarged edition. St. John's, Nfld.: The author, c/o Job Brothers & Co. Ltd. 1954. Pp. 144, illus. Not for sale. Distribution limited.
- MACK, HARRY WILSON. *The Mack and Sine Families, with Allied Families: Althouse, Sarles, Chard, Rosebush, Hills, Kromenaker, Grant and Others*. Detroit, Mich.: The author, 18916 Woodward Ave. 1955. Pp. 74, illus. Private distribution only. Contains numerous references to Canadian residents and to persons born in Canada.
- MACKENZIE, KENNETH FERNS. *Sabots and Slippers*. Toronto: Privately printed. 1954. Pp. 131, illus. Private distribution. Contains a history of the author's family.
- MAHEUX, ARTHUR. *Pierre Maheust Sieur des Hazards, et ses descendants: Souvenir du tricentenaire (1655-1955)*. Québec. 1955. Pp. 33. See C.H.R., March, 1956, p. 93.
- PELLETIER, BURROUGHS. Voyer, ou Voyer d'Argenson? (*B.R.H.*, LXI (4), oct. 1955, 169-72). Lineage of a French-Canadian family.
- PICHETTE, J. A. ROBERT. *Bref Aperçu historique sur la famille Damours*. Edmundston, N.B. 1953. Pp. 14.

VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANSLOW, FLORENCE. *The Haliburton Memorial Museum*. [Windsor, N.S. 1954.] Pp. 21, illus. 75¢. A description of "Clifton," the home of Thomas Chandler Haliburton, Windsor, N.S.
- BAUDRY, RENÉ. Aux sources de l'histoire de l'Acadie et des Provinces Maritimes (Canadian Historical Association, Report, 1955, 62-8).
- BESOUSHEKO, W., and RUDNYC'KYJ, J. B. *Publications of Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1945-1955*. Winnipeg: The Academy. 1955. Pp. 22. Text in Ukrainian.
- Canada, Archives publiques, Division des Manuscrits. *Inventaire provisoire, Fonds des Manuscrits no 5: Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris*. Ottawa. 1955. Pp. 44. 50¢.
- DAVIES, RAYMOND ARTHUR. *Printed Jewish Canadiana, 1685-1900: Tentative Check List of Books, Pamphlets, Pictures, Magazines and Newspaper Articles and Currency, Written by or Relating to the Jews of Canada*. Montreal: L. Davies, 4559 Harvard Ave. 1955. Pp. 56. \$3.00.
- DAVIS, WILLIAM L. Some Neglected Archives of Europe (*Mid-America*, XXXVIII, new series XXVII (1), Jan., 1956, 15-37). A discussion of private archives of use to historians, including those of religious foundations and of the Hudson's Bay Company.
- DROLET, ANTONIO. *Bibliographie du roman canadien-français, 1900-1950*. Ouvrage publié avec le concours du Conseil canadien de recherches sur les Humanités. Québec: Les Presses Universitaires de Laval. 1955. Pp. 125.
- DUGRÉ, ALEXANDRE. Ce qu'on a dit de l'Acadie (*Relations*, no 176, août 1955, 207-9).
- GOGGIO, EMILIO; CORRIGAN, BEATRICE; and PARKER, JACK H., comps. *A Bibliography of Canadian Cultural Periodicals (English and French from Colonial Times to 1950) in Canadian Libraries*. Toronto: Department of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese, University of Toronto. 1955. Pp. iv, 45. See C.H.R., Dec. 1955, p. 385.
- GUILLET, EDWIN C. Twenty-five Years of Historical Research and Authorship (*Ontario Library Review*, XXIX (2), May, 1955, 87-90). Includes a list of the author's published works.
- HIDY, RALPH W., and HIDY, MURIEL E. List of Books and Articles on the Economic History of the United States and Canada (*Economic History Review*, 2nd series, VIII (2), Dec., 1955, 265-77).
- JARVI, EDITH, comp. *Windsor and Essex County, Ontario: Bibliography*. Windsor, Ont.: Reference Department, Windsor Public Libraries. 1954. Pp. 24 (mimeo.). Free. Available from Carnegie Library, 416 Victoria Ave., Windsor.
- KANE, LUCILE M., and JOHNSON, KATHRYN A., comps. *Manuscripts Collections of the Minnesota Historical Society: Guide Number 2*. Saint Paul: Minnesota Historical Society. 1955. Pp. xvi, 212. \$3.60. See C.H.R., Dec., 1955, p. 385.
- LOMER, GERHARD R., comp. *Stephen Leacock: A Check-list and Index of His Writings*. Ottawa: National Library of Canada. 1954. Pp. 153. \$2.00. Available from the Supervisor of Government Publications, Queen's Printer, Ottawa.
- MACDONALD, CHRISTINE. Golden Jubilee News (*Saskatchewan History*, VIII (3), autumn, 1955, 113-16; IX (1), winter, 1956, 32-3). Two lists of local histories published in connection with the Saskatchewan Jubilee celebrations.
- Manitoba, Public Archives. *Preliminary Inventory, 1955*. Winnipeg: Provincial Library. 1955. Pp. 59.
- MARSHALL, JOHN MAITLAND. *Saskatchewan and the West: A List of Books Available from the Central Library, Yorkton School Unit no. 36*. Yorkton, Sask.: The author, Box 308. 1955. Pp. 10. Free. Distribution limited.
- MARTIN, GÉRAUD, comp. *Bibliographie sommaire du Canada français, 1854-1954*. Québec: Secrétariat de la Province. 1954. Pp. 104.
- New Brunswick Museum. *Annual Report, 1954*. Saint John, N.B.: The Museum. 1955. Pp. 48.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

CHARLES WILLIAM COLBY

The death of Dr. Charles William Colby in Montreal on December 10, 1955, at the age of eighty-eight, calls for notice in these pages, chiefly because he was one of the pioneers in the study and teaching of Canadian history in Canadian universities. He was appointed Kingsford Professor of History in McGill University in 1895, just about the time when Professor George M. Wrong was appointed Professor of History in the University of Toronto; and the two, who became close friends, introduced the study of Canadian history into McGill and Toronto. In 1905 he was, with Sir Edmund Walker, Dr. James Bain, and Professor Wrong, one of the founders of the Champlain Society; he was for many years one of its vice-presidents; and from 1948 to his death he was its honorary president. In 1908 he published his charming *Canadian Types of the Old Régime*; and he contributed to the *Chronicles of Canada* the volumes on Champlain and Frontenac. In 1921, however, he retired from academic life, to take over the extensive business responsibilities left him by his father, the Hon. Charles C. Colby, sometime president of the Privy Council of Canada; and his connection with university life in Canada ceased, except for the period from 1938 to 1947, when he served as one of the Board of Governors of McGill University. He was a delightful lecturer and writer; and his resignation from McGill, followed by his absorption in business, was a great loss to Canadian history. [W. S. WALLACE]

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

J. K. CHAPMAN is Assistant Professor of History at the University of New Brunswick.

ALVIN C. GLUEK, JR., is Assistant Professor of History at Michigan State University.

GERALD S. GRAHAM is Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at the University of London. He is author of *Sea Power and British North America, 1783-1820* (1940) and *Empire of the North Atlantic* (1950).

THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY is Associate Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is author (with M. E. Cameron and G. E. McReynolds) of *China, Japan and the Powers* (1952); editor (with J. B. Rae) of *The United States in World History* (2nd ed., 1955); and editor of *Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1955).

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS is Professor of History at the University of Toronto. He is editor of *Education for Tomorrow* (1946); and author of *Flashing Wings* (1947) and of *Carolina Quest* (1951).

R. A. SPENCER is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Toronto.

